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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Mobile Campaign is one of the few campaigns of any size in 
the Civil War about which little is known and less has been written. 
The size of the Federal Army directly engaged in this Campaign was: 
slightly more them the total aggregate at the beginning, and more than 
half of the Union army at the conclusion of the Vicksburg Campaign in 
1863; about three fourths the size of the Federal force which took part 
in the Chattanooga Campaign during the month of November, 1863; almost 
twice the number of troops engaged in the Red River Campaign in 1864; 
a little less than one half the size of General Grant's army taking 
part in the Wilderness Campaign, in Virginia, the same year; and slightly 
larger than General Sheridan's force while operating in the Shenandoah 
Valley in 1864. The Mobile Campaign took place during the same weeks 
which proved to be the last for General Lee's army in Virginia. The 
final assaults of the Confederate fortifications guarding the eastern 
side of Mobile Bay came the night previous and the same day that Lee 
surrendered to General Grant at Appomattox, Virginia. The glory in the 
east has for many years overshadowed this important campaign which took 
place primarily in southern Alabama. Few studies of the Civil War devote 
more than a paragraph to the Mobile Campaign and in many books, only a 
few sentences are used to describe this Campaign in which over forty-
five thousand Union troops were directly engaged. 
The limiting factor of space does not enable the author to give a 
complete and detailed account of the Union army's activities in southern 
Alabama and western Florida during the spring months of 1865. It is, 
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however, the author's purpose to present a broad view of the events 
which led up to the Mobile Campaign, a general account of the Federal 
army's activities, under the direct command of General E. R. S. Canby, 
against the Confederate fortifications around the Old Spanish Fort; and 
a more detailed description of General Frederick Steele's Column from 
Pensacola, Florida. 
Since the days of colonization until 1813, especially from 1763 to 
1813, the area designated as West Florida, which encompassed the terri-
tory around Mobile, was an "international football" between Spain, 
England, France, and the United States. As the area changed hands, 
boundary disputes arose. The United States included the Mobile area as 
part of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803; Spain insisted that West Florida 
was not included in the purchase. In 1804, Congress passed the Mobile 
Act, which placed the disputed territory of West Florida (west of the 
Perdido River) in a customs district. This action of Congress was vio-
lently protested by the Spanish government which still claimed the area. 
During the years between 1804 and 1810, it was realized that West 
Florida could only be obtained by either military force or by purchase. 
In 1806, Congress appropriated the necessary amount for its purchase, 
but the political situation in Europe changed and frustrated this 
attempt to win the land which President Jefferson claimed already 
belonged by right to the United States. 
West Florida was annexed to the United States by the medium of 
force rather than by sinuous diplomacy. In September of 1810, a small 
group of American settlers seized the Spanish garrison at Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana, and proclaimed the area of West Florida free and independent 
of Spain. A month later, President Madison issued a proclamation 
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absorbing the territory of the Gulf Coast from the Mississippi to the 
Perdido River. Mobile, however, continued to be held by the Spaniards. 
It was not until after the War of 1812 had begun that the United States 
obtained possession of this Creole town. An expedition led by General 
James Wilkinson took possession of Mobile in April, 1913, the only 
piece of territory gained by the War. 
The expansion of the South's staple crop, cotton, following the 
War of 1812, brought Mobile and its fine harbor into distinction. By 
the middle of the nineteenth century, Mobile, backed by Its extensive 
river system, was the second only to New Orleans in its cotton exports. 
The trade facilities of Mobile were thus important to the Confederacy, 
especially after the fall of New Orleans, even though hampered by the 
Federal Naval blockade. 
My interest in the Mobile Campaign and first real knowledge of it 
came when I was reading original letters written during the Civil War 
by my great-grandfather, Carlos W. Colby, late of the Ninety-Seventh 
Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment. The interesting descriptions 
given by Colby in hie letters to various members of his family in 
Illinois, offered me an opportunity to use this original material in a 
thesis. Upon seeking further information about the Campaign, I dis-
covered that very little could be found. Though a portion of Colby's 
letters gave an enlightening account of the Vicksburg Campaign which 
might have been used, I decided to write on a subject of which little 
is recorded, and thereby, endeavor to make a small contribution to 
history. 
Of the some one hundred and twenty letters written by Carlos W. 
Colby during his three years in the Union army, in my possession, only 
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eight are concerned with the Mobile Campaign. Portions of these 
letters are quoted, in an edited form, throughout the parts of the 
thesis in which the Ninety-Seventh Illinois Regiment took part, in 
order to give the reader a view of this Campaign through the eyes of 
the common soldier. It is interesting to note and compare similari-
ties and differences, the accuracy and inaccuracy of Colby's account 
with the account given in the text of this thesis. In general, this 
common soldier's description is mostly correct. 
In the course of two years' research, part of which was concerned 
with the entire set of Colby letters, I searched for material in eight 
states, traveling over fifteen thousand miles. Part of the summer of 
1957 was spent in Illinois and surrounding states. This trip proved of 
little value, as I was not even able to find a Regimental history of 
the Ninety-Seventh Illinois Infantry Regiment, and which to my know-
ledge has not been written. A trip to Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Florida in the late summer of 1958 was, however, more 
successful. Though I found that little material was available con-
cerning the Mobile Campaign, the greatest benefit of the trip was 
spending time at the Old Spanish Fort and a day walking over the battle-
field at Blakely, Alabama. As of the last week of August, 1958, the 
area around the Old Spanish Fort was being excavated for a new housing 
development. Except for a small area, the positions of the Confederate 
and Union armies are not visible. The area around what was the old 
town of Blakely, Alabama, presents a very different story. Except for 
a very small area which was under cultivation at what was the rear of 
the battlefield, the intrenchments of the opposing armies are, for the 
most part, clearly visible. 
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Upon hiring one of the local colored farmers as a guide, I spent a 
pleasant day walking over the battlefield. Not only were the Confederate 
fortifications distinguishable, but also the three lines of intrenchments 
and approaches constructed by the Union array in their investment and 
siege of Blakely. In some places, the Confederate parapets are still 
eight to ten feet high when approached from the front. Also in some 
places it was easy to see where the Confederate artillery had been 
placed. Distinguishable too, were some of the advanced sharpshooter or 
rifle pits used by both armies, these varied from about a foot to two 
and a half feet deep. There were places along the Federal trenches 
which were still waist-deep. For the most part, the approaches were 
fairly shallow, from six inches to a foot and a half deep. 
The terrain of the battlefield was such that a number of times I 
was thankful to have someone with me who knew his way. There were 
places, characteristic of that part of the country, where the under-
growth was almost impassable, small streams with marshy banks in the 
bottoms of the ravines, and in other places there were open pine forests. 
The only evidences of there having been a town of Blakely were a ceme-
tery and a road which had served as the main street. This road, even 
though the sides were overgrown with underbrush, was picturesque, as it 
was lined with ancient giant oak trees, each having a little Spanish 
moss hanging from its branches. 
As nearly as I could ascertain, the terrain along the eastern side 
of Mobile Bay has changed but little in the last ninety-five years. 
The first-hand view was of immense value In being able to comprehend 
the difficulties incurred in this area by the soldiers of the Civil War. 
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The source material used for the land Campaign of Mobile can be 
classified into four categories: first, the official correspondence 
and reports found in the War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies; second, the descriptive material found in 
the unpublished Letters of Carlos W. Colby; third, the narration of 
the Mobile Campaign in General C. C. Andrews' book, the Campaign of 
Mobile; and fourth, the small particles of information one could gather 
from the various Regimental histories, histories of the different 
states' participation in the Civil War, and the little mention of the 
Campaign in the various histories of the Civil War. In compiling the 
different facts from the various sources, it was found that these facts 
did not always correspond. The author found differences in the various 
commanders' reports in the Official Records, between the Official 
Records and Andrews' narration, and the description as given by Colby. 
As to be expected, the various Regimental histories were usually slanted 
towards building up the importance and gallantry of the particular 
regiment. This factor has been taken into consideration when using 
such biased sources. 
It will be noted that In the narration of General Steele's opera-
tions, emphasis has been placed on the movements of General Andrews' 
second division. This is due to the availability of more material con-
cerning this division than any of the others. There are more Official 
Records dealing with Andrews' division than all the other divisions 
under Steele's command put together. Also, Andrews' narration gives 
more information about his division than the other divisions. The third 
reason for the emphasis toward the second division is that the Ninety-
Seventh Illinois Regiment, of whom Colby was a member, was part of this 
division. 
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The maps and figures included were taken from the following 
sources. Maps one, two, three, five, six, seven, eight, and ten were 
taken from the Official Atlas of the War of the Rebellion, Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Map four was taken from 
A. T. Mahan's The Gulf and Inland Waters. Map nine and figures one 
through three were taken from C. C. Andrews' the Campaign of Mobile. 
As few are familiar with the circumstances surrounding the Mobile 
Campaign and General Frederick Steele's expedition in particular, a 
great deal of space had been devoted to the background which led up 
to the latter subject. More familiar to the reader, at least in part, 
is the following chapter which is concerned with the general strategy 
of the Bay of Mobile and the area encompassed in the "south central part 
of the Confederacy" and the naval "Battle of Mobile Bay." Chapter three 
tells of the gathering of troops with an emphasis on social history 
and with a description of the camp life of the Union soldiers. The 
next chapter, the fourth, describes the strategy of the Federal forces 
in the Mobile Campaign and the Confederate Army they had to face. A 
narration of General E. R. S. Canby's movements against the Confederate 
fortifications around the Old Spanish Fort is reiterated in chapter 
five. The following chapter is concerned with General Steele's march 
of over one hundred miles. His force accomplished this feat in less 
than two weeks which included traveling through the swamps of the 
Florida flats. Chapter seven narrates Steele's forces in the action 
of the investment, siege, and assault of the Confederate fortifications 
around the port town of Blakely, Alabama. The last chapter gives some 
conclusions and observations concerning the troops at Blakely specifi-
cally, and the Mobile Campaign in general. 
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For the benefit of the readers, two appendices have been included. 
Appendix I is so that the reader may examine the letters written by 
Carlos W. Colby in their original form. The spelling and punctuation 
have been left as they were written. A few additions and corrections 
have been made, by the author, for the sake of clarity, which have 
been bracketed. Appendix II gives the organization of the Union forces 
This has been included so that the reader may have quick reference to 
see where a particular unit spoken of belongs. 
I would like to call particular attention to the many persons 
mentioned in the Acknowledgments, without whose fine help, this study 
could not have been possible. 
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CHAPTER II 
STRATEGY AND MOBILE BAY 
The general situation in the "West" which prompted General U.S. 
Grant in the early part of July, 1863 to encourage a movement against 
Mobile was as follows: General William S. Rosecrans had been at 
Murfreesboro, Tennessee, with a large and well equipped army from the 
early months of 1 8 6 3 , with General Braxton Bragg's (C. S. A.) army con-
fronting him with a force quite equal, at first, considering that it 
was on the defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg, Bragg's 
army was largely depleted to strengthen General Joseph E. Johnston 
(C. S. A.), in Mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the 
siege. Rosecrans delayed and failed to take advantage of the depletion 
of the Confederate forces until June 24, 1 8 6 3 . The hesitant General had 
waited too long, for ten days later Vicksburg surrendered to Grant, 
thereby setting free those troops of Bragg's army to return. Four days 
later, July 8th, Port Hudson, Louisiana, the last hold on the Mississippi 
River of the Confederacy fell to Union forces, thereby removing 
opposition to the free use of this vital transportation route. 
It was at this time, General Grant suggested to the General-in-
Chief that a campaign against Mobile, Alabama, would be of immense 
value. 
1Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (editors), 1956 edition, 
New Introduction by Roy F. Nichols, Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War, III, p. 679. 
Hereafter cited as Battles and Leaders. 
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Map I. 
Eastern section of a Map of the 
United States used by General U. S. Grant 
in making the proposed lines of operations 
of the Union Armies in 1864. The heavy 
lines indicate these proposed lines of 
operations. 
Note that some of the proposed 
operations were not completed until l865. 
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Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all 
regular Confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all 
directions, I felt that the troops that had done so much should 
be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow 
he had received, and while important points might be captured 
without bloodshed. I suggested to the General-in-Chief the idea 
of a campaign against Mobile, . . 2 I knew the peril the Army of 
the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually not only by 
ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold 
its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while 
the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. Mobile 
was important to the enemy, and, in the absence of a threatening 
force, was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened 
by land and from the water at the same time, the prize would fall 
easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defense. Those 
troops would necessarily come from Bragg.3 
Thus, such a campaign against Mobile would produce two almost 
equally beneficial results; either the capture of Mobile, thereby 
giving the Union forces a supply base for operations against the 
Confederate Army from the south and thus depriving the Confederacy 
of this supply line, or relieve the pressure on the troops of the Army 
of the Cumberland. 
In agreement with Grant on such a campaign against Mobile were 
General N. P. Banks, commander of the Department of the Gulf, and 
Admiral David G. Farragut, commander of the United States Navy in the 
"west." The latter had considered the feasibility of this expedition 
shortly following the capture of New Orleans in 1862, and had since 
that time urged such operations. Even though these three were in 
agreement that Mobile would be the next ideal target, in order to lend 
an effective support to the main operations about Chattanooga, 
Tennessee at a critical period, they were coerced into attempting to 
2U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, I, p. 578. 
3Ibid., II, pp. 20-21. 
13 
carry out the orders of the United States Government to restore the 
flag in Texas. General Banks was informed by General Henry W. Halleck, 
the General-in-Chief, that the Government fully appreciated the impor-
tance of the proposed operations against Mobile, but there were impor-
tant reasons, other than military, why the Texas movement should be 
made first and with the least possible delay, by sea or land. A com-
bined naval and military operation by the Red River was indicated as 
the best mode of carrying out the object; the selection of the route 
was, however, left to General Banks, but as to the movement itself he 
was distinctly told there was no choice and that the view of the 
Government must be carried out. Thus General Banks began the Red River 
Campaign which resulted in probably the biggest Union fiasco of the 
war, not because of the generalship demonstrated during the campaign 4 
but because of the impracticability of the task assigned. 
The Red River Campaign committed the services of forty thousand 
troops and prevented their effective use elsewhere for almost a year, 
from September, 1 8 6 3 to May, 1864. 
General Grant sheds some light on why the Government decided on 
this course of action. 
I suggested to the General-in-Chief the idea of a campaign 
against Mobile, starting from Lake Pontchartrain. Halleck pre-
ferred another course. The possession of the trans-Mississippi 
by the Union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind 
than almost any campaign east of the Mississippi. I am well aware 
that the President was very anxious to have a foothold in Texas, 
to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which 
seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least 
so far as to recognize belligerents' rights to the Confederate 
states. This, however, could have been easily done without 
wasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by send-
ing a garrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande.5 
4. 
Op. cit., Battles and Leaders, IV, p. 345. 5 U. S. Grant, 0£. cit.. I, p. 5 7 8 . 
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In the interum, Admiral Farragut, in January, 1864, made a recon-
naissance of Forts Gaines and Morgan defending the entrance to Mobile 
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Bay. Early in April, 1864, General Grant, who had by this time been 
confirmed as General-in-Chief, in anticipation of a victory by Banks 
in the Red River expedition, ordered preparations to be made for the 
concentration of troops at New Orleans for a forthcoming Mobile Campaign. 
This movement was delayed as there was no immediate victory by Banks. 
It was not until the Red River Campaign proved a disappointment, in 
the middle of May, that attention could be focused on Mobile. 
Before considering the operations of the Army and Navy at Mobile 
Bay, it deems necessary to first consider the defenses of Mobile. The 
city of Mobile, at the commencement of the war, contained a population 
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of thirty thousand. The fortifications of the city, which General 
Joseph E. Johnston pronounced to be the best-fortified place in the 
Confederacy, began with the first continuous line of earthworks around 
the city being made in 1862 under the guidance of Captain C. T. Lieuner. 
This line of defense was about three miles out from the main business 
street, on terrain about one hundred feet higher than the city, and 
comprised of fifteen redoubts. After the fall of Vicksburg, the appre-
hension of an attack stimulated the defensive operations, and the year 
I 8 6 3 witness the completion of a second line of works, by General 0. 
Leadbetter. This second line was built nearer the city and rendered the 
defenses so formidable that it was estimated that a garrison of ten 
thousand effective troops could hold the city ninety days against a 
6 
For the defenses of Mobile, see the following paragraph. 
7 'See Map No. II, p. 16. 
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Map II. 
Map of the Defenses of the City of 
Mobile, Alabama, showing also the rela-
tive location of the Confederate Defenses 
of the Entrance of Mobile Bay. 
16 
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besieging army of forty thousand. Another and still stronger line of 
earthworks was constructed in 1864, about halfway between the two built 
the two preceding years. This line, built by Lieutenant Colonel V. 
Sheliha, included nineteen heavy bastioned forts and eight redoubts. 
The parapets of these forts were from twenty to thirty feet thick, the 8 
ditches about twenty feet deep, and about thirty feet in width. 
The principal entrance into Mobile Bay direct from the Gulf, was 
between Mobile Point, a long low projection from the mainland, on the 
east, and Dauphin Island on the west, the latter being one of the chain 
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which bounded the Mississippi Sound. Though the distance between 
these points was three miles, because of a hard sand bank shoal which 
extended under water both east and south from Dauphin Island, the ship 
channel is defined so that it skirts closely to Mobile Point, narrowing 
it to a little less than two thousand yards. Near the southeast point 
of this sand bank were two small islands, called Sand Islands, a dis-
tance of three miles from Mobile Point (see Map IV). The east side of 
the channel was similarly defined by a bank extending seaward from 
Mobile Point. Though vessels of very light draught could also enter 
the Bay from the Mississippi Sound by passing over the shallows to the 
north of Dauphin Island, the amount of traffic via this route was 
insignificant, 
Guarding this main entrance from the Gulf were two works. Fort 
Morgan on Mobile Point and Fort Gaines on Dauphin Island. The 
Mississippi Sound approach was covered by Fort Powell, a small earthwork 
"' * 8 
C . C . Andrews, Campaign of Mobile, pp. 10-11. 
9See Maps No. III and VI, pp. 19 and 42. 
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Map III. 
Map Showing the Defense of Fort 
Morgan and the Confederate Defenses of 
the Entrance of Mobile Bay. 
19 
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on Tower Island, commanding the channel which gave the most water, 
known as Grant's Pass. Fort Gaines was too far distant from the main 
ship channel to greatly enter into the picture of defenses. 
It was a pentagonal work mounting in barbette three X-inch 
columbiads, five 32-, two 24-, and two l8-pounder smooth-bore 
guns, and four rifled 32-poundersj besides these it had eleven 
24-pounder howitzers, siege and for flank defense. In Fort 
Powell there were one X-inch, two VII-inch and one 32-pounder 
smooth-bore and two VII-inch Brooke rifles; these bore on the 
sound and channels, but the rear of the fort towards the bay was 
yet unfinished and nearly unarmed. The third and principal work, 
Fort Morgan, was much more formidable. It was five sided, and 
built to carry guns both in barbette and casemates} but when seized 
by the Confederates the embrasures of the curtains facing the 
channel were masked and a heavy exterior water battery was thrown 
up before the northwest curtain. The armament at this time cannot 
be given with certainty. . . .the following estimate has been made: 
Main fort seven X-inch, three VII-inch and twenty-two 32-pounder 
smooth-bore guns, and two VII-inch, two 6.5-inch and four 5.82-
inch rifles. In the water battery there were four X-inch and one 
VII-inch columbiads and two 6.5-inch rifles. Of the above, ten 
X-inch, three VII-inch, sixteen 32-poinders and all the rifles, 
except one of 5.82 calibre, bore upon the channel. There were 
also twenty flanking 24-pound howitzers and two or three light 
rifles. . . 1 0 
These last, however, were useless against an assaulting navy 
because of their particular position. 
As an anticipated attack did not materialize shortly following 
the Union Army's victory at Vicksburg, Mississippi, the Confederates 
strengthened their defenses. From the point of Dauphin Island a line 
of pile obstructions extended across the sand bank, in the direction 
of Fort Morgan, thus blocking the passage of any light vessels that 
might try to pass that way and thereby partially closed the main entrance 
to the Bay. During the spring of 1864, additional defense mechanisms 
were subjoined. From where the piles ended, near the edge of the sand 
10A. T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters, pp. 219-220. 
21 
bank, a triple line of torpedoes in echelon began, extending across 
the main ship channel to a red buoy, a distance of two hundred and 
twenty-six years from the water battery under Fort Morgan. Thus, the 
passage into Mobile Bay was narrowed to less them one hundred yards, 
from the end of the torpedoes to the beach on Mobile Point. 
The third element of the Confederate defense of the Bay was a 
small squadron under the command of Admiral Franklin Buchanan. It 
consisted of three small side-wheeler gunboats and the pride of the 
Confederate Navy, their "greatest" ironclad ram, the C. S. S. Tennessee. 
The construction of the Tennessee was begun in the spring of 1863, 
completed, and was ready for service in March 1865. Though this force 
afloat was comparatively small, their greatest strength lay in their 
position and the many dangers which had to be Incurred by a hostile 
fleet.11 
The Confederates were thus able to increase their defenses of the 
Mobile area from the existing line of fortifications around the city of 
Mobile and the small garrisons in Forts Morgan and Gaines in the summer 
of 1863, to the construction of two additional lines of earthworks for 
the defense of the city, the construction of pile obstructions and 
torpedoes placed at the main opening of the Bay, and the construction 
of the ironclad, the Tennessee, by late summer of 1864. It was thus 
evident that the delay in attacking Mobile had enabled the Confederates 
11For the defenses of Mobile, the following sources were consulted: 
op. cit.. Battles and Leaders, IV, pp. 381-383; Mahan, op. cit., pp. 
218-225 
Allan F. Wescott(editor), American Sea Power Since 1775 
pp. 180-181; Charles L. Lewis, David Glasgow Farragut. pp. 219-251; 
John W. Draper, History of the American Civil War, III, pp. 220-221; 
John Spears, David G. Farragut, pp. 302-309. 
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to increase their defenses and thereby increasing the risk and danger 
to the lives of both the assaulting Array and Navy, to say nothing of 
the possible material loss of ships. 
The decision in Washington for a campaign against Mobile finally 
came: first, because General Grant took over from General Halleck the 
general direction of the Federal armies; secondly, because the failure 
of the Red River Campaign released these units of the Army for duty 
elsewhere; thirdly, it was realized that additional delay would only 
accomplish the building of further defenses by the Confederates! and 
finally, General William T. Sherman wanted a demonstration against 
Mobile in conjunction with his own descent upon Atlanta, Georgia. 
In May, 1864, though General Banks was, for a time, left in com-
mand of the Department of the Gulf, General Edward R. S. Canby was 
placed over him and took control of his troops as the commander of the 
newly made Trans-Mississippi division. After the Red River disaster. 
General Grant decided that the majority of the fighting men could be 
vised to better advantage in Virginia, at that particular time, and the 
force in the Department of the Gulf was greatly reduced. This reduc-
tion in General Canby's force canceled any formal, full-scale military 
campaign against the city of Mobile, thus he was forced to limit the 
military objective to the forts in the lower Bay. It was not until 
the latter part of July, 1864, that General Canby could make his arrange-
ments to cooperate with Admiral Farragut at Mobile Bay. 
On the 3rd of August, 1864, a division (5,500 strong), under the 
command of Major General Gordon Granger, landed on the west end of 
Dauphin Island and began preparations for the siege of Fort Gaines. 
In the evening of the 4th, the last of Admiral Farragut1s monitors, 
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the Tecumseh, arrived. Just before dawn, on the 5th of August, 
Farragut's fleet sailed for the channel. The four monitors, Tecumseh, 
Manhattan, Winnebago, and Chickasaw, led the way, sailing a little to 
starboard (to the east) to draw the fire of Fort Morgan away from the 
wooden ships. The wooden ships, lashed together in pairs, followed. 
Admiral Farragut had intended to lead this line in the Hartford, but 
his captains insisted that the flag must not risk itself in so exposed 
a position, Farragut yielded the honor of heading the line (of wooden 
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crafts) to Captain Alden of the Brooklyn. At 6:45 A.M. Fort Morgan 
opened fire on the monitors and Captain T.A.M. Craven of the Tecumseh 
ordered his gunners to commence firing on the Fort. Two lines of ships 
moved on until they were abreast of Fort Morgan. Inside the Bay, the 
Confederate squadron, led by the formidable Tennessee with three other 
black, tallow-greased gunboats, moved out from behind Mobile Point to 
attack the leading vessels. Farragut climbed the port main rigging of 
the Hartford to see over the Brooklyn. He saw the Tecumseh veer to the 
right, dangerously close to the red buoy that marked the line of 
torpedoes. He heard a muffled explosion and saw his leading monitor 
settle like a stone to the bottom. He saw the Brooklyn, immediately 
ahead of him, back her engines and slow down. Farragut could not stop 
now with ships in the rear piling into confusion tinder the guns of Fort 
Morgan. He shouted to the Captain of the Hartford on the quarter-deck 
beneath him the famous order, "Damn the torpedoes! Four bells! Captain 
Drayton, go ahead." And to the Captain of the Metacomet lashed along-
side the Hartford, "Jouett, full speed!" He sailed around the Brooklyn 
12See Map No. IV, p. 25. 
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Map IV. 
Map of the Naval Battle of Mobile 
Bay. Ledger indicates the relative 
location of the naval vessels. 
25 
26 
and ran directly over the line of torpedoes. Inside the Bay the ships 
cast off the smaller crafts lashed to their aides, the latter captured 
two of the enemy's wooden ships and destroyed a third. The Tennessee 
under the intrepid Admiral Buchanan, might have hugged the security of 
the shallow water under the guns of Fort Morgan and pounded Farragut's 
wooden ships from a safe distance} instead she steered straight for 
Farragut's flagship, intent on ramming. Farragut's ships in turn made 
for the giant Confederate ram. Too long to dodge, too slow to run away, 
the ironclad Tennessee took a terrific pounding as ship after ship 
rammed into her. Finally the Tennessee, battered and listing badly, 
ran into shallow water whither she was followed by the two river moni-
tors. The Chickasaw and Winnebago stove in her casemate before the 
great Confederate ironclad, the Tennessee, showed a white flag. Fort 
Powell surrendered at nightfall, and Fort Gaines raised the white flag 
the next day, August 6, 1864. General Granger's force was transferred 
across the Bay and landed in the rear of Fort Morgan, cutting its com-
munications with the mainland. Granger commenced at once a siege which 
lasted two weeks before Fort Morgan formally surrendered at 2:30 p.m. 
the 23rd of August. Thus, the entrance to, and Mobile Bay were in the 
hands of the Union, save for a few small Confederate craft operating 
at the northern end of the Bay. The blockade of the Gulf was now 
13 effectively sealed. 
13For the "Battle of Mobile Bay," the following sources were con-sulted: op. cit., Battles and Leaders, IV, pp. 379-411} Mahan, op. cit., pp. 220-245; Wescott, op. cit., pp. 183-186; Lewis, op. cit., pp. 263-295; Spears, o p . , pp. 316-340; Richard S. West, Jr., Mr. Lincoln's Navy, pp. 262-270; Richard S. West, Jr., Lincoln's Navy Department. pp. 285—286. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AND CAMP LIFE AT BARRANCAS, FLORIDA 
For almost seven months after the Union victory in the Battle of 
Mobile Bay, the area around Mobile was circumambiented in an atmosphere 
of stillness and non-belligerent activity. The only military action 
in the area was a demonstration made against Mobile in December, by a 
small column of Infantry under the command of General Granger, moving 
from his headquarters at Pascagoula, Mississippi. The column reached 
Grand Bay, twenty-two miles from the city, and then returned. 
General Canby's inability to follow up the victory, late in 1864, 
with an army campaign, was due to the lack of available units to make 
up a sufficient force for such a campaign. Confederate activity in 
Missouri and Arkansas kept many of the Federal units along the 
Mississippi River occupied and were thereby not available for duty 
elsewhere. General J. B. Hood's (C.S.A.) invasion of Tennessee made 
it impossible for General George H. Thomas to send Canby any forces 
from the Army of the Cumberland. However, by January, 1865, the mili-
tary outlook in the "west" was indeed bright. The Rebel activity in 
Missouri and Arkansas had been put down and Thomas has quelled Hood's 
forces in Tennessee. 
General Canby spent the months of December, January, and part of 
February organizing part of his forces in the Military Division of West 
Mississippi for the pending operation against Mobile. This proved no 
small task for two reasons: first, his troops were spread out from 
Memphis, Tennessee, along the Mississippi River to New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and along the Gulf Coast to Pensacola, Florida; and second, 
28 
there was difficulty in securing sufficient transportation for the 
troops. These two reasons plus unusually uncooperative weather slowed 
the process of concentrating his forces. These troops along the 
Mississippi River, which were to be used in the Mobile Campaign, were 
concentrated at Kenner, Louisiana, ten miles above New Orleans. Major 
General Frederick Steele was assigned to their command with instruc-
tions to have them fitted for a campaign. These were troops which had 
been well tried on a number of occasions, and were, in all respects 
such as any commander would be proud. They remained at Kenner for 
about three weeks. The weather was like September north of the Ohio 
River, but there was considerable rain and the ground was wet and muddy 
much of the time so that men could hardly be comfortable. Nevertheless, 
in pursuance of Steele's orders, some time was spent each day, when the 
weather permitted, in drill. 
In the latter part of January, 1865, General Canby received infor-
mation (through a reconnaissance report) leading to a suspicion that an 
attempt would be made by the Confederates to regain possession of 
Barrancas, Florida, or some other point thereabouts on the Gulf. On 
the afternoon of the 23rd of January, the commander of the Third 
Brigade of the Reserve Corps, was summoned to Canby's headquarters. 
Upon arrival, Brigadier General Christopher C. Andrews received instruc-
tions to proceed with the detachment of his brigade, then at Kenner, to 14 
Pascagoula, Mississippi. Though transportation was not altogether 
This detachment of the Third Brigade of the Reserve Corps was 
composed of the units which later made up the Second and Third 
Brigades, Second Division, Thirteenth Army Corps. See the Organization 
of Canby's Forces, Appendix, II, pp. 1 6 9 . 
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ready, all the regiments of this detachment had embarked the follow-
ing day. By daylight of the 26th of January, they reported to General 
Granger, at East Pascagoula, and were by him ordered to Barrancas, in 
accordance with previous instructions from General Canby. The detach-
ment arrived at Barrancas, Florida, at dawn, the 27th, debarked and 
went into camp. 
On the 26th of January, Grant ordered General Halleck, Chief of 
Staff, to have Thomas send General Andrew J. Smith's command of three 
15 
divisions plus cavalry to strengthen Canby's force. Though General 
Thomas' headquarters were located in the northeast corner of 
Mississippi, at Eastport, just the length of the state of Mississippi 
from Pascagoula, the easiest route of travel, because of heavy rains 
in central and southern Mississippi made roads impassable for heavy 
wagons, was up the Tennessee River to the Ohio River and then down the 
Mississippi. While enroute to join Canby's forces, the following 
correspondence between General A. J. Smith and Secretary of War, Edwin 
M. Stanton was communicated concerning Smith's forces. 
15 U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion; A Compilation 
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, 
Vol. XLIX, pt. 1, p. 584. Hereafter cited as Official Records. 
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CAIRO, ILL., February 8, 1865 2 p.m. 
(Received 5 p.m.) 
Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON 
Secretary of War: 
I arrived at 1 p.m. with two divisions of my command. Will 
coal and take on board supplies and leave for my destination. My 
other command follows me. I am now without a heading or identity 
for my command. Unless I receive a number or a name for my com-
mand, I must style myself the Wandering Tribe of Israel. Please 
telegraph me immediately and give me a number. 
A. J. SMITH 
Major General 
WASHINGTON D.C., February 8, 1865 
6:50 p.m. 
Maj. Gen. A. J. SMITH 
Cairo: 
Continue on in your exodus as the Wandering Tribe of Israel. 
On reaching the land of Canby you will have a number and a name. 
H. W. HALLECK 
Major General and Chief of Staff16 
General Smith and his troops were delayed at Vicksburg, Mississippi 
by a missent telegram, but finally arrived at New Orleans on the 22nd 
day of February. 
The Reserve Corps of the Military Division of West Mississippi 
used by Canby in the Mobile Campaign were reorganized into the 
Thirteenth Army Corps, Major General Gordon Granger commanding. Major 
General A. J. Smith's forces, detached from the Department of the 
Cumberland were reorganized into the sixteenth Army Corps. The Cavalry, 
l6Ibid., p. 669 
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Map V. 
Map illustrating the Campaign of 
the Army of West Mississippi in Southern 
Alabama and Western Florida under the com-
mand of Major General Edward R. S. Canby, 
March and April, 1865. 
Indicates the route of Cavalry 
Indicates the route of the 
16th Army Corps 
Indicates the route of the 
13th Army Corps 
Indicates the route of Steele's 
Forces 
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prior to March 29, 1 8 6 5 , was known as the "Separate Cavalry Brigade," 
commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Lucas, the "Special Cavalry 
Expedition," commanded by Lieutenant Andrew B. Spurling, and the First 
Cavalry Division, Brigadier General Joseph F. Knipe, commanding. 
Following the 29th of March, the first two cavalry units became Lucas' 
17 
Division. Finally the last unit of Canby's force was the First 
Division, United States Colored Troops, commanded by Brigadier General 
John P. Hawkins, better know as Hawkins' Division. 
The troops under General Canby's command encamped in three loca-
tions near Mobile; at Dauphin Island, Alabama, at Mobile Point, Alabama, 
and at Barrancas, Florida, near Pensacola. General Granger, early in 
January, had assigned the First Division of the Thirteenth Army Corps, 
with Brigadier General James C. Veatch in command, to Dauphin Island, 
and part of the Third Division under the command of Brigadier General 
William P. Benton, to Mobile Point (for the remaining portions of the 
Third Division, see below). The troops arrived in the Mobile area in 
the following order: January 27, at Barrancas, Florida, the Second and 
Third Brigades, Second Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, Brigadier 
General C. C. Andrews commanding (the Detachment from the Third 
Brigade, Reserve Corps, hereafter referred to as Andrews' Division); 
February 1, at Mobile Point, the First Brigade, Second Division, 
Thirteenth Army Corps, Colonel Henry Bertram in command (the remainder 
of the Third Brigade, Reserve Corps, hereafter referred to as Bertram's 
Brigade); February 18, at Mobile Point, part of the First, Second, and 
all of the Third Brigade, Third Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, 
17 See the Organization of Forces, Appendix, p. 1 6 9 . 
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Brigadier General William P. Benton, commanding (these units came from 
the Reserve Corps in the Department of Arkansas); March 1, at Barrancas, 
the First Division, United States Colored Troops, Brigadier General 
John P. Hawkins, commander; March 7, Dauphin Island, First Division, 
Sixteenth Army Corps, Brigadier General John McArthur in command; 
March lO and 11, Dauphin Island, Second Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, 
under the command of Brigadier General Kenner Garrard; March 12 to 16, 
Mobile Point, Third Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, commanded by 
Brigadier General Eugene A. Carr; and finally, March 17, Barrancas, 
Lucas' Cavalry Division, Brigadier General Thomas J. Lucas in command. 
Thus, before beginning the Mobile Campaign, the various units were con-
centrated in the three locations as follows at Mobile Point, General 
Canby, his headquarters and staff, Benton's Division, Bertram's Brigade, 
and Carr's Division; at Dauphin Island, McArthur's Division, Garrard's 
Division, and Veatch's Division; and at Barrancas, Florida, General 
Steele, his headquarters and staff, Andrews' Division, Hawkins' Division, 
18 
and Lucas' Cavalry Division. 
As Andrews' Division was the first to arrive, they spent more than 
six weeks encamped at Barrancas, Florida. It is interesting to note 
how these troops spent this time immediately preceding the Campaign. 
First, a look at their surroundings and then at their camp and camp 
life. This first description is as it was perceived through the eyes 
of their commander, and then an account as viewed by the common soldier. 
118Official Records, op. cit.. Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 1, pp. 91-322; 
Andrews, op. cit., pp. 23-26. 
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The natural appearance of that part of the country is 
unattractive. Barrancas is a narrow and sandy peninsula, a third 
part covered with pine openings, with here and there clusters of 
live oaks. Along the shore the sand is white, and on a raw day 
creates the illusion of snow. 
The fort which gives the place its name was originally built 
by the Spaniards, about two centuries ago [from 1867], and with 
Fort Pickens, which is opposite, helps guard the entrace into the 
splendid harbor of Pensacola. On the southeastern side of the 
peninsula are the ruins of the Pensacola navy-yard and surround-
ing that are the villages of Woolsey and Warrington. From the 
landing at Barrancas the ground rises slightly for a mile, and 
then declines to a bayou on the north side. On the higher ground 
was located the camp of the brigade. Its front was along the edge 
of the pine wood, and near was a small clear19 
The Regiments of Andrews' Division (Brigade as Andrews called it, refer-
ring to the Brigade of the Reserve Corps) camped in the area, taking 
position as they happened to arrive, rather than according to rank. 
It is a saying among the volunteers, that the more pleasant 
their camp is made, the sooner will they be called upon to leave 
it. However, much or little this thought influenced these regi-
ments, they certainly, in a very few days, made a beautiful and 
attractive camp. It was laid out with five streets to a regiment, 
with tents for two companies on a street, the companies facing. 
Small evergreen trees were cut and hauled to the camp, and set in 
rows on each side of every street, and in front of every tent. 
Handsome arbors were made, and artificial groves before the 
officers' tents; and especially around the hospital tents, which, 
however, were but few in number and had but few inmates. Walks 
were neatly arranged, having their margins adorned with shrubbery, 
handsome shells, and devices molded from the white sand. Guns, 
mortars, shields, cannonballs, and other warlike implements were 
ingeniously carved in this sand, with, here and there, a felicitous 
motto or inscription. Its cleanliness corresponded with the taste 
and industry displayed In ornamenting it. 
These soldiers were some of the best young men of the West, 
and had the characteristics of proud and gallant men, as one could 
plainly see who noticed them off duty in their familiar and joyous 
groups around the camp. The plates on their accoutrements were 
kept brightly polished, and their muskets and accoutrements always 
neat. Two hours In the forenoon they spent in company drill, de-
voting considerable attention to the manual of arms and to target 
practice) and two hours of the afternoon were devoted to brigade 
19 Andrews, op. cit., p. 23. 
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drill. The ground on which these drills took place was a mile 
north of Fort Barrancas. The field officers met evenings in the 
school of the brigade; and the exercises of the brigade in the 
field were eminently successful. As these battalions moved with 
so much precision and beauty, closed in mass, or rapidly deployed, 
or advanced in line of battle in double-quick on the charge, their 
bayonets glittering and their alignment grandly preserved, no 
observer could doubt—remembering they had been through many 
battles——that these were rehearsals for no common event.20 
The following portions of letters written by a common soldier 
21 encamped at Barrancas, gives a more detailed account of camp life. 
Moot of my time during the week is so occupied in doing the 
duties that are required of me in camp, so much so, that I can not 
have time to write a letter without being disturbed. For the past 
week we have had to drill six hours a day beside the many other 
little things that had to be done, so you see I do not have much 
time to myself. As for writing after night, that is out of the 
question, for our house is so small that we can have neither 
chairs nor table in it. All the protection we have from the earth 
is a rubber blanket spread on the ground. It has to serve for 
chairs to sit on, a table to eat from, and a bed to sleep on. In 
my tent there are two besides myself. . . . Bach of us have a 
piece of tent cloth six feet square. Two of these pieces are 
buttoned together at the ends and stretched over a pole so as to 
look like the roof of a house. With the third piece, we fill up 
one end of the tent and then for the other end, we use a rubber 
blanket. In this way, we have a house big enough to Crawl into, 
but not big enough to stand up in. When we go on a march, each 
man takes his piece of tent, his rubber and woolen blanket and 
rolls them up in his knapsack with all his clothes so that when 
we stop at night, we can have our house built and ready to go to 
bed in a half hour after stopping. Besides this, a soldier has 
to carry a canteen full of water, a haversack with rations to eat 
for two or three days, a gun and cartridge box, making, as some of 
the boys say, a full mule load. 
20 
Ibid.. pp. 24-25. 
21These letters were written by Sergeant Carlos W. Colby, Company 
G., Ninty Seventh Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, Second Brigade, 
Second Division (Andrews' Division), Thirteenth Array Corps. The first 
and third excerpts are taken from letters written to his niece who was 
about ten years old. The second excerpt is taken from a letter written 
to his adult sister. The portions of the letters quoted are in an 
edited form. For the letters in their original form, see Union Letters 
of Carlos W. Colby, Appendix I, pp. 138-168. 
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We are having delightful warm and pleasant weather. The 
grass is looking as green and the birds sing as gaily as they do 
in April with y o u . 2 2 
The National Salute in honor of Washington's birthday has 
just ceased firing. . . . I believe that our Regiment is the 
only one here that is celebrating the day by not drilling. This 
is a wonder, too, for Colonel Vifquain [Commander of the 97th 
Illinois Volunteer Regiment] is the hardest drill master here by 
all odds. As a general thing, there has to be a good excuse, or 
he will have us drilling. 
Vifquain is a man that I respect, though I still fear him. 
Since he has come in command, the Regiment has been under the 
strictest military discipline. Some of his rules are rather 
grinding to a volunteer, and I sometimes think useless. Although 
I had rather it would be so, than to be ruled by as lenient a hand 
as formerly, for then, a good soldier had all the duty to perform 
and a shirk was always playing off. By being so strict, he has 
made a good many enemies, some of whom have been writing him 
anonymous letters, making some dreadful threats against him, 
shaving his horse's mane and tail, etc. He suspects it to be the 
doings of some of the members of Company G. I should not be at 
all surprised if his supposition were correct, for since I have 
been back to the regiment, our company has had eight or ten men 
tried by Court Martial for various misdemeanors. At the present 
time, we have six under arrest, three absent and three present. 
As many more might be subtracted from the company and then we 
would still have a full complement of roughs. One thing is certain, 
the Colonel keeps a sharp eye on us so that we are well looked 
after. He has the keenest eye for any man I ever saw. He can 
see every movement that is made on dress parade, and the penalty for 
moving a hand or foot or of the least unnecessary noise is six days 
extra duty for a private or the reduction of a non-commissioned 
officer. As for myself, I believe I am rather a favorite for I 
have crossed him two or three times, and as yet, have never been 
reproved. 
Troops are concentrating at this place. All preparations are 
being made for a military movement in some direction, perhaps 
through the interior of the state to Montgomery. This I should 
much prefer to staying here all summer (although this is a healthy 
place) for I have always had the best health when on the march, 
and can stand the marching as well as the best of them. 23 
22 Carlos W. Colby to his niece, Carrie, Barrancas, Florida, 
February 19, 1865, manuscript, possession of author. See Appendix I, 
Letter No. 1, pp. 138-140. 
23 
Carlos W. Colby to his sister Sallie, Barrancas, Florida, 
February 22, 1865, manuscript, possession of author. See Appendix, 
Letter No. 2, pp. 141-143. 
I hardly know what to write about, to interest you, but for 
the want of anything better to write, will give a little descrip-
tion of how some of the officers have fixed up around their tents. 
A Lieutenant Colonel's shoulder straps consists of two silver 
leaves on a strap. Some of the men made an imitation of the same 
in front of Lieutenant Colonel Vifquain's tent one night just 
before dark. The outlines of the leaf was made by placing little 
snails (that are picked up along the coast) all around and filling 
the center with white sand. When it was finished it looked quite 
perfect, but the next morning, low and behold, it was spoiled. At 
first, everybody supposed that someone had done it on purpose, but 
on a close examination it proved that the snails were alive and 
that they had done all the mischief by moving from their proper 
position. Dr. Smith has in front of his tent a miniature Fort 
built In the shape of a star. It mounts eight guns, which are 
nothing more than Ale bottles. The parapet is covered with green 
moss. It is built so stylish as to attract the attention of every 
passerby, for everything about it is perfect, even to a small flag 
flying over it. Some of the boys in the regiment got some red 
berries and placed them on the sand in the shape of letters, and 
wrote out the words, "Fort Smith." In the 76th Illinois, they have 
a representation of the eagle made in the sand. The name of the 
Colonel with the number of the regiment was written with red ber-
ries. In the 24th Indians, nearly every officer had some fancy 
ornamental work in front of his quarters, such as hearts, diamonds, 
cannon, mortars, etc. It is really worth one's while to spend an 
hour in roaming around the different Corps to see the ornamental 
gardens. But enough, am near the bottom of the page, so goodby.24 
24Carlos W. Colby to his niece, Carrie, Barrancas, Florida, March 
4, 1 8 6 5 , manuscript, possession of author. See Appendix, Letter No. 3, pp. 144-146. 
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Map VI. 
Map of the State of Alabama indi-
cating the important points of the Mobile 
Campaign. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE UNION CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND THE CONFEDERATE FORCES 
By the middle of 1863, the "western" portion of the Confederacy 
was split from the rest of the seceded states by the Union control of 
the Mississippi River. Late in December, 1864, General William T. 
Sherman's successful "March to the Sea" through Georgia from Atlanta 
to Savannah again split the Confederacy. These military operations 
split the Confederacy into three sections. These three sections con-
sisted of the following areas the northeastern section encompassed 
Virginia, North and South Carolina, and the northeastern part of 
Georgia) the western section consisted of the western half of Louisiana 
and the state of Texas) the middle section, or the south central section, 
consisted of the eastern central part of Mississippi, most of Alabama, 
the southwestern two thirds of Georgia, and Florida. The general 
strategy in the last section was an aggregate of three important com-
ponents. The first was to break entirely the enemy forces so suffi-
ciently that, at a minimum, it would not be able to function effectively 
as a unit. The second part planned the partial ruining of the economic 
structure of this section. This embraced: the prevention, as far as 
possible, of the 1865 crop from being planted for the purpose of sup-
plying the Confederate armies) the destruction of the enemy's communi-
cation and railroads; and finally, the stopping, and if necessary, the 
destruction of the areas where war materials were being produced. The 
third component of the strategy, as stated by General Grant, was ". . . 
to get all the Negro men we can before the enemy puts them into their 
ranks.25 
25Official Records, op. cit., Ser. 1, XLIX, pt. I, pp. 780-781. 
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General Canby's force operating In southern Alabama was only one 
part of this broad strategic picture. In cooperation with Canby's 
Mobile Campaign, General Thomas, if the opportunity presented itself, 
was to descend from Tennessee into central Alabama. Cavalry units were 
to execute movements in the area from Memphis, Tennessee, Vicksburg, 
Mississippi, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and the west side of Mobile Bay. 
Their mission was not only to carry out the over-all strategic assign-
ment, but also to create diversionary action for the Mobile Campaign. 
More specifically, the strategy for the Mobile Campaign called 
for the opening of a base of supplies at either Mobile, Alabama, or 
Pensacola, Florida, for further operations in central Alabama and 
Georgia. Whichever it would be, depending upon the one that could be 
established with the least delay, it was necessary to eliminate all 
opposition east of Mobile Bay in order to open the Tensas and Alabama 
Rivers. Thus, with a base of supply, the enemy's manufacturing and 
transportation elements In central Alabama and western Georgia could 
easily be taken with Federal armies converging from both the north and 
south. 
The general plan of operation for Canby's Army incorporated the 
reduction of the enemy's works on the east side of Mobile Bay, the 
clearing of the Alabama and Tensas Rivers for transit, the turning of 
the strong works erected for the defense of Mobile, Alabama, and forcing 
the surrender or evacuation of the city. If the latter involved too 
great a delay, a direct movement upon Montgomery or Selma, Alabama, 
would be made with a shifting, for the subsequent operations, of the 
army's base of supplies from Mobile to Pensacola Bay, and using the 
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railroad from Pensacola to Montgomery for the transit of supplies. In 
carrying out the first part of this plan, the main army, under the 
command of General Canby, moving by land and water, was to establish 
itself on firm ground on the east side of Mobile Bay near the Old 
Spanish Fort. General Steele, with a smaller, but sufficient force to 
meet any opposition which might be sent against him, was to move from 
Pensacola, Florida, threatening Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, and 
covering the operations of the cavalry by disabling the railroads from 
Mobile to Montgomery. This accomplished, Steele's force was to turn 
southeastward and join the main force on Mobile Bay for operations 
against the Confederate fortifications at Blakely and the Old Spanish 
26 
Fort. 
For the Confederate forces, Lieutenant General Richard Taylor com-
manded the Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, with 
his headquarters at Meridian, Mississippi. Within this department, 
Major General Dabney H. Maury was in command of the District of the 
Gulf. General Maury's senior officer, who commanded the Confederate 
forces on the eastern side of Mobile Bay, designated as the Eastern 
Division, District of the Gulf, was Brigadier General St. John R. 
Liddell. General Liddell's headquarters was at Blakely, Alabama, where 
he was in direct command of the garrison on duty there at the fortifi-
cations. The garrison in the fortifications at the Old Spanish Fort 
was under the command of Brigadier General R. L. Gibson. 
Though the troops in total aggregate present in the District of 
the Gulf, numbered slightly more than twelve thousand as of the 10th 
26Ibid.. pp. 91-93, 708-709, 727, 757, 780-781, 769; Vol. XLV, 
pt. II, pp. 609-6l0| Vol. XLVIII, pt. I, p. 7 8 6 . 
of March, 1865, it is difficult to determine the exact size of the 
27 force which opposed General Canby's army. ' Probably defending the 
immediate area east of the Bay, were about ten thousand Confederate 
28 troops. The garrison at Old Spanish Fort, March 28th, consisted of 
29 
about four thousand effective infantry plus artillery batteries. . 
General Liddell's garrison inside the fortifications at Blakely 
totaled about three thousand, five hundred effective infantry, with the 30 
addition of a few artillery batteries. Though the larger number of 
troops were defending the fortifications at the Old Spanish Fort, a 
portion of these were transferred to Blakely when the Confederates 
evacuated the Old Spanish Fort. 
27Official Records. op. cit.. XLIX, pt. I, p. 1045. 
28 — Battles and Leaders, IV, p. 4ll. 29 
C. C. Andrews, op. cit., p. 60. 
30Ibid., p. 125. 
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Map VII. 
Enlargement of the Mobile area 
taken from Map No. V. 
Indicates the route of the 
l6th Army Corps 
Indicates the route of the 
l3th Army Corps 
Indicates the route of Steele's 
Forces 
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL CANBY AND THE OLD SPANISH FORT 
The general plan for the Mobile Campaign called for a large por-
tion of the assembled army, directly under the command of General 
Canby, to move northward along the eastern shore of Mobile Bay and 
reduce the enemy's fortifications near the mouth of the Apalachee and 
Tensas Rivers.31 By the middle of March, 1 8 6 5 , the necessary troops 
and supplies had arrived in the Mobile area so that the campaign could 
32 
commence. 
The initial movement was undertaken by the Thirteenth Army Corps, 
March 17th. Bertram's brigade, detached from the Second Division, left 
Fort Morgan early in the morning, followed by Benton's division. They 
marched nine miles along the peninsula before stopping for the night. 
The following day, good roads enabled them to travel thirteen miles, 
making camp near Muddy Creek, or as it was sometimes called, Bayou 
Portage, near Oyster Bayou. On the 19th, the dubious swampy character 
of the terrain was revealed. The ground fallaciously appeared to have 
a heavy crust, but it soon became evident that it was a mere thin 
crust with a wet quicksand-like substance beneath. The wheels of the 
first few wagons soon cut through the thin crust and the following 
vehicles sunk into mire up to their hubs. It became necessary to 
corduroy most of the road. The column moved only a few miles because 
of the slow work of constructing the road. Though the rear guard got 
51The Apalachee River was also called Blakely River. Both names 
have been used on the various maps included. 
32For the movement of the various units, see Maps V and VII, 
pp. 33 and 48. 
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only about a mile and a half, the head of the column just passed around 
the head of Bon Secour's Bay. On the 20th of March, this column of 
Bertram's brigade and Benton's division made only four miles due to a 
very heavy rain and the necessity of corduroying the road, which in 
places seemed to almost float away. Veatch's division, which was 
transported from Fort Gaines to Navy Cove on the l7th, had, by the 20th 
caught up with Benton's division north of Muddy Creek in spite of the 
fact that Dennis' and Slack's brigades got lost and took the wrong 
road once. 
The morning of March 21, found the Thirteenth Army Corps still 
drenched in torrents of rain. Though Benton's division moved on, the 
wagons were unable to get out of park. 
Every team seeking an untried path soon got mired, and wagons 
were seen in all directions sunk down to the hubs. The poor ani-
mals, in their struggles to haul the teams, half buried themselves. 
In this dilemma, long ropes were made fast to the teams, and the 
soldiers, with cheerfulness and alacrity, hauled both animals and 
wagons out of the mire with a rush) and it was only their speed 
that saved each team from again sinking at every rod. The same 
laborious efforts were applied to the field artillery. The corps 
and division commanders were present, wading about in the mud up 
to their knees, and the latter himself lending a hand at the ropes. 
In hauling the Twenty-sixth New York battery through a bad place, 
where the newly-made corduroy had been washed away, the men moved 
some distance in mud and water waist deep. 33 
Bertram's brigade, after contributing greatly to the bridge build-
ing and corduroying, reached the banks of the north fork of Fish River 
on the afternoon of the same day (21st). This same afternoon, Captain 
J. J. Smith's company of Pontoniers, in three hours, laid a bridge some 
three hundred and twenty feet long across the river. 
33 Andrews, op. cit., p. 34. 
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The 22nd and 23rd of March opened with the Thirteenth Army Corps 
crossing the north fork of Fish River and march-into toward Danley's 
Mill on the east branch of Fish River. In the morning of the 24th, a 
bold party of Confederate Cavalry attacked the widely spread column. 
Though this small party captured a few Federal soldiers, they caused a 
much larger commotion in the Union ranks than damage. The column con-
tinued after the short delay caused by the mischievous action of the 
enemy's cavalry. The terrain was somewhat better, and they were able 
to cross the eastern branch of Fish River by nightfall. 
While the Thirteenth Army Corps was moving up the eastern side of 
Mobile Bay, a demonstration was also being made on the western shore to 
create the impression that a principal movement was also being made 
there. Colonel J. B. Moore, with his brigade, the First of the Third 
Division, Sixteenth Army Corps, about seventeen hundred effective infan-
try plus a small artillery battery, debarked from Dauphin Island for 
Cedar Point. Upon arrival, they found the pier destroyed and the point 
defended by a small Confederate force which was promptly driven back 
two miles without any trouble. The following morning, the 19th of 
March, Moore's force moved up the shore to Alabama Point, or Port, 
where they met Confederate outposts consisting of two mounted companies, 
which fell back with slight resistance. The following morning, Colonel 
Moore ordered the morning calls repeated three or four times to impress 
the enemy with the magnitude of his forces. Moore's force advanced to 
Fowl River where they met some resistance, the Confederates having set 
the bridge on fire and taken position on the opposite side. Moore 
brought up what artillery he had and dispersed the enemy with little 
difficulty. Not having orders to continue any farther, he halted and 
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returned to Fort Gaines, mission accomplished; his force had been 
reported to the Confederates in Mobile as having consisted of four to 
six thousand effective troops. On March 22nd, Moore's brigade was 
34 
ordered to rejoin the Sixteenth Army Corps at Fish River.. 
The Sixteenth Army Corps was moved by naval transports from Fort 
Gaines to Danley's ferry landing on the north bank of the east branch 
of Fish River. The operation took three days, from the 20th through 
the 22nd of March. The Corps remained in camp at Fish River for the 
Thirteenth Army Corps to come up by land, and for supplies, transporta-
tion, and some of the heavy guns to come up by water. Carr's division, 
the first to arrive, continued with its brigade drills begun at Fort 
Gaines, thereby constantly improving on its discipline and efficiency. 
On the 23rd, the Confederates, trying to determine the strength of the 
Union force, felt the pickets in front of McArthur's division with the 
net result of four soldiers wounded, two on each side, and one 
Confederate soldier killed. The gun fire which occurred was more 
general and protracted along the line than the event justified. 
It had taken a full week for General Canby to collect and con-
centrate his whole force. The commander moved his entire force forward 
on the eighth day, March 25th, with McArthur's division of the Sixteenth 
Army Corps at the head of the column and the Thirteenth following the 
first Corps. The leading division had gone but a short distance when 
it met a small force of Confederates. Though skirmishing continued off 
and on throughout the day, the column was not retarded. The Sixteenth 
34Ibid.. pp. 36-37. 
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Army Corps camped at Deer Park, having marched twelve miles, the 
Thirteenth encamped nearby. Because of the harassing by the enemy all 
day, the commanders ordered the camp entrenched. 
The next morning, March 26, Bertram's brigade marched down the 
left fork of the road to Montrose, and the next day moved over a hilly 
road to D'Olieve's creek. As they were near the vicinity of the Old 
Spanish Fort, they had Confederate cavalry hanging along their front 
all the way. General Granger, with the remainder of his Corps, took a 
more direct route to the area. After getting two miles from Deer Park, 
Veatch's division, ahead of Benton's division, turned to the left on a 
road running northwesterly, and struck D'Olieve's creek about a mile 
to the right of Bertram. Having accomplished the crossing of the 
creek, which had unusually steep banks, a line of battle was formed. 
As the Corps moved forward, skirmishing was incurred all along the front. 
During the same day (26th), leaving the Old Spanish Fort three 
miles to its left, General A. J. Smith's Corps marched on a direct 
route to C. Sibley's mill. Garrard's division in the advance, met some 
sharp fire from enemy forces, however, no serious resistance was met 
until the bridge at Sibley's mill was reached. This obstacle was soon 
overcome, the Sixteenth Army Corps crossed and went into camp on high 
ground a mile north of Bayou Minette, on which the mill was situated. 
Smith's Corps had marched a respectable ten miles during the day. 
The Confederates, at first, planned to make a stand outside their 
fortifications and on the 25th had occupied their proposed line of 
defense. The Confederate commanders learned, however, that the 
Garrard's Corps was not the only one in the immediate field. Fear of 
being outflanked by Smith's Corps, the proposed offer of battle outside 
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Map VIII. 
Map of the Siege Operations at 
Spanish Fort on the Eastern side of 
Mobile Bay, showing the various lines 
of investment of the Union Army under 
the command of General Canby. 

54 
the works was abandoned. A general order to f a l l back into their 
fort if icat ions was given, leaving, however, a small portion of the 
force to develop the attacking army before doing so. 
The l ine of Confederate fort if icat ions was located on the bay 
seven miles due east of Mobile.35 Set on a high, red bluff , less than 
two hundred yards from the bay, was an old fort bui l t by the Spanish i n 
the eighteenth century. This bastioned work was inside the actual 
Confederate l ine of works, but, however, i t housed some of the enemy's 
important a r t i l l e r y . About four hundred yards to the southwest, guard-
ing the Confederate right flank, was their prominent fort i f icat ion, Fort 
McDermett. 36 Fort McDermett, armed with ten heavy guns, was situated 
atop the highest and most prominent bluff some hundred yards above the 
water. From this Fort, extending i n a semicircle, was a continuous 
l ine of breastworks and redoubts. This outer l ine of works was upward 
of two miles in length, and batteries were a l l on high and commanding 
ground. The terrain had been covered with open pine timber, but i n 
front of the outer l ine of works, the trees were fel led for a few 
hundred yards. Every ravine had borne a heavy growth of hard wood, 
which, having been slashed, made, with the underbrush and vines, an 
almost impassable obstacle. The ditch i n front of the breastworks was 
five feet deep and eight feet wide, but i n front of Fort McDermett, i t 
was deeper and wider. In front of the batteries were detached r i f l e -
pits for sharpshooters, and a l l along the entire front was a l ine of 
abatis f ifteen feet wide. The extreme l e f t of the works was unfinished. 
35 
See Maps I I and VIII, pp. 16 and 55. 
36Sometimes spelled Fort McDermott. 
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In the center of the line of works, was a heavily fortified area, called 
Red Fort. Toward the Interior of this semicircle of fortifications, 
the surface was undulating and wooded, but no spot was so commanding as 
the bare crest of Fort McDermett. 
At daylight, on the morning of the 27th of March, a small detach-
ment of Confederate Infantry, numbering about four hundred, attacked 
the front of Veatch's division. This small detachment effectively per-
formed its delaying mission and made it possible for the entire defend-
ing army to display within their prepared positions. 
Dawn on the 27th found Smith's Corps heading almost due east from 
C. Sibley's mill toward the Confederate fortifications, with Carr's 
division at the head of the column. When about a mile from these 
defenses, a line of battle was formed with Carr's division on the right, 
nearest Minette Bay, and McArthur's division forming the left flank of 
the Corps. Garrard's division was held in reserve. In this manner the 
Corps advanced, driging the Confederate skirmishers into their main 
works. The establishment of a battle line, about six hundred yards 
from the enemy's defenses, was the Corps. fine accomplishment for their 
hard days' work. 
While the Sixteenth Army Corps was establishing its line, Granger's 
Corps was also engaged in the investment of the Confederate fortifica-
tions. The Thirteenth Army Corps advanced toward the enemy's defenses 
with Benton's division on the right, Veatch's division in the center, 
and Bertram's brigade on the extreme left directly facing Fort 
McDermett. By the evening of March 27» the investment of the fortifi-
cations was complete with Granger's Corps' line varying from eight 
hundred to one thousand yards distance to the enemy's works. There 
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was no time that evening for celebrating the admirable day's work, for 
as soon as darkness arrived, large details were set to work intrenching. 
All along the whole line, the spade, the pick, and the axe were busily 
employed. The Union's general investment line, extending for about 
three miles, was linked together by the joining of McArthur's division 
of the Sixteenth Army Corps with Benton's division of Granger's Corps. 
The opposing armies settled down to what was to be thirteen days 
of siege. The garrison inside their defensive works saw that they were 
to be regularly besieged by a large force, but were determined to hold 
out as long as they could without unreasonable sacrifice, and were in-
spired with the pride and satisfaction of holding at bay, a powerful 
and finely equipped army. For the besiegers, the next thirteen days 
meant fighting for each foot which would bring them within assaulting 
distance of the strong fortifications. 
As the Union line moved closer to the Confederate works, new 
placements for the artillery were made. The artillery fire from the 
assaulting army was kept up fairly constantly while that of the defend-
ing army fired only when an ideal target presented itself. The siege 
was also marked with constant sharpshooter fire from both sides. In 
the afternoon of March 30, a small force from the defending garrison 
successfully executed a sortie resulting in the capture of Captain 
R. B. Stearns, of Company K, Seventh Vermont, and twenty of his men. 
Though hindered by shallow water, elaborate obstructions, and 
torpedoes, the Union navy played an important part in the shelling of 
the fortifications around the Old Spanish Fort. With their help, the 
assaulting army was able to construct parallels and saps to within 
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about one hundred yards of the enemy's defenses by April 8, though at 
the cost of three ships being sunk by torpedoes. 
At five thirty, the afternoon of April 8, a general bombardment 
of the defenses of the Old Spanish Fort was commenced. General Canby's 
plan was to order an assault of the works the following morning. But 
the corps commanders had received instructions, when the investment 
commenced, to push forward the works as fast as consistent with due 
care of the men, and to take advantage of every opportunity that prom-
ised successful and decisive results, but not to attempt an assault 
without that assurance. General Carr, having pushed his works on the 
right as of the cannonading, and carry, by assault on their flank, some 
two hundred yards of the Confederate left, and gain a crest covered 
with a grove of pines. This crest, if obtained, would give a command-
ing position for a battery and would enable it to fire almost directly 
down the Confederate line of works. 
About a half hour after the bombardment had commenced, Colonel 
James L. Geddes, commanding the third brigade of Carr's division, 
ordered Lieutenant Colonel William B. Bell, commander of the Eighth 
Iowa Infantry volunteers, to advance two companies to the crest of the 
hill as a picket guard, and for them to intrench themselves during the 
night. Companies A and G were given the assignment. Even though the 
terrain was difficult, they advanced bravely and skillfully, but were 
met with sharp musketry-fire from the Texas defenders inside the works. 
It became evident to Colonel Bell that the two companies needed help, 
so he sent forward Company H to their support. A few moments after 
Company H left, fearing that the assaulting party , if unsupported, 
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would f i n a l l y be driven back, i n which case they would be almost 
annihilated, he ordered the remainder of the regiment forward, with 
himself leading the attack. Arriving on the ground held by the advance 
companies, i t was found to be too hot a place to stop with safety, so 
he ordered and led his gallant command i n a direct assault of the 
Confederate main works. 
Upon entering the works, the Eighth Iowa met a furious resistance 
put up by the Texas and North Carolina troops of the defending Ector's 
brigade, but f i n a l l y the defenders yielded, many being k i l l e d or 
captured. Lieutenant Colonel B e l l , with his command, captured about 
three hundred yards of the Confederate works, three stand of colors, 
and three hundred and f i f t y prisoners. The losses of this gallant 
regiment were eight k i l l e d and seventeen wounded, some mortally. 
I t was some time after dark before any regiment came to the Eighth 
Iowa's support, however, the penetration was s k i l l f u l l y maintained with 
r i f l e - p i t s quickly dug perpendicular to the enemy's works. Though the 
Confederate defenders tr ied to restore their l e f t flank, they were 
unable to drive the attacking force back. The Confederate officers 
quickly realized that i t would be better to evacuate their position 
than have the garrison trapped and captured. By the most gallant effort 
of a small detachment l e f t to hold the assaulting army at bay, most of 
the garrison was able to be evacuated safely to Mobile and Blakely. 
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At nine o'clock, the attacking forces were still held in check, but by 
twelve midnight, the Confederate fortifications were in the hands of 
37 
the Union Army,"" 
While Canby's force was marching to, besieging, and assaulting 
the fortifications around the Old Spanish Fort, General Steele's force 
was engaged in an expedition into southeastern Alabama, the investment, 
and siege of the fortifications around Blakely, Alabama, It is to this 
expedition that the next chapters are devoted. 
37 
The preceding account of the Union operations against the f o r t i -
f ications around the Old Spanish Fort was compiled from the following 
sources: O f f i c i a l Records, op, c i t , , Ser, I , XLIX, pt, I, Reports: 
No, 1 , pp, 91-105i No, 4, pp, 116-138, Nos, 1 1 -30, pp, 155-211 , Nos. 
36-79, PP. 220-277, Ho. 97, PP. 313-319t I b i d . . Ser. I , XLIX, pt. I I ; 
Correspondence; pp. 5 -9, 14-16, 23, 26, 33-34, 41-42, 48, 51 , 55, 58-60, 
66-70, 74-80, 85-90, 95-96, 103-105, 1 1 3 - 1 1 7 , 127-128, 130, 132-133, 
140, 145-148, 150-152, 158-161, 164-165, 167, 175.176, 180-184, 190-
195, 207-210, 212, 222-233, 227-229, 232, 240-241, 246, 255, 265-266, 
279-280, 288, 293, and 294; Andrews, op. c i t . , pp. 33-94 and 130-162; 
Battles and Leaders, op. c i t . , IV, p. 411 . 
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CHAPTER VI 
GENERAL STEELE'S COLUMN FROM PENSACOLA 
Major General Frederick Steele arrived at Barrancas, Florida, on 
the 28th of February, and assumed command of the troops operating from 
Pensacola Bay. Steele at once, i n person, began a thorough inspection 
of his troops, taking one regiment at a time, and going through i t , 
examining the arms, accoutrements, and clothing of each soldier. He 
found his troops i n excellent condition and of fine quality. Directly 
responsible for these well disciplined and trained troops were their 
commanders, which were of the highest cal ibre. The following General 
Order, more properly described as a "pep talk" for soldiership, by 
Brigadier General C. C. Andrews, commanding the Second and Third 
Brigades, Second Division, Thirteenth Army Corps, exemplifies this 
superior quality of leadership. 
GENERAL ORDERS, SECOND DIV., 13th ARMY CORPS, 
No. 3 Barrancas, F l a . , March 9» 1865 
The general commanding cannot omit to express to the troops 
that their exemplary soldiership has already won his admiration. 
Such troops cannot be contented with common success. They w i l l 
seek rather to i l l u s t r a t e a l l that i t i s possible for gallant men 
to achieve. In this stage of the war the blows we str ike should 
be decisive blows. We should not be too confident—-certainly not 
boastful| but we ought to nourish i n our inmost hearts a determi-
nation to make every exertion and sacr i f ice rather than f a i l . 
Heroes from Shiloh and Vicksburg, noble-hearted representatives 
of the youth and manhood of States pre-eminent for s p i r i t and 
culture 1 why should you not surpass any of the exploits of history? 
Great success can be obtained only by great exertions. Success 
i s i n proportion to preparations and exertions. I f the path to 
victory were easy, a l l would be wi l l ing to travel i t , and success 
would be cheap. But i t i s a d i f f i c u l t and perilous path. The 
heroic and constant only can keep i t . To then belongs the glory. 
To be ever ready for the worst; never to be surprised, but rather 
to surprise and astound the surpriser| to be quick when rapidity 
i s required! to be confirmed i n those golden mil itary p r i n c i p l e s -
punctuality, and unhesitating obedience} i n a word, to have been 
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f a i t h f u l i n attending to those simple requirements which consti -
tute preparation—it i s th is which makes valor avai l ing; th is 
that insures substantial triumph. Be i t the supreme object of 
th is d iv is ion, wheresoever i t moves, whatsoever i t confronts, to 
accomplish whatever i s required of i t . Let i t be i t s next object 
to leave behind i n i t s path the fewest possible of i t s numbers. 
Whether we are good soldiers, whether we have good d isc ip l ine , 
w i l l be seen i n the number of men present for duty at the end of a campaign. For i n war the greatest losses are not i n batt le. 
By order of Br ig. Gen. C. C. Andrews: 
GEORGE MONROE 
Assistant Adjutant-General38 
On the 10th of March, Andrews. Second Divis ion received orders to 
move to Pensacola, and repair the wharf. This was not only i n order 
that the place could be available as a depot and base, i f subsequent 
operations should require i t , but also the wharf was needed immediately 
for the cavalry being transported from New Orleans to land. 
I n compliance with a c ircular issued the previous day, 5:30 A.M., 
March 11, found Andrews. d iv is ion on the march with the Second Brigade, 
Colonel William T. Spicely, commanding, i n the advance, with the 
a r t i l l e r y d irect ly following. Colonel Frederick W. Moore's Brigade 
brought up the rear. The distance around the head of the bayou to 
Pensacola from Barrancas i s thirteen miles, the road sandy and very 
heavy. I t was the same road over which General Andrew Jackson marched 
i n h is invasion of F lor ida, early i n l 8 l 8 with h is army of three thou-
sand men and two pieces of a r t i l l e r y . The condition of part of the 
road had changed, for some of the road was under water making i t nec-
essary to construct a few small bridges. Andrews' d iv is ion reached 
i t s destination i n mid-afternoon and camp was made shortly thereafter. 38 
O f f i c i a l Records, op. c i t . . Ser. I , XLIX, pt. I , p. 879. 
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The next day being Sunday, the repairs of the wharf were not fu l ly 
commenced. The repairs that were to be made consisted chiefly of 
driving pi les and making a new wharf to f i l l up two gaps, each about 
three hundred feet i n length i n the central or main wharf. I t took 
s ix days, including one day i n which work was halted by a storm, to 
complete the work assigned. The work completed included making the 
wharf serviceable and strong, constructing eight hundred yards of 
rai lroad, making a platform car, and putting the latter i n running 
order. 
Pensacola at that time was indeed remarkable for i t s ruined 
and lonely condition. I t appeared once to have contained five 
thousand inhabitants! but i t did not even have a hundred. I t had 
been raided upon by troops on both sides. Apparently the best 
part of the town had been swept away by f i re . Amid the ruins, 
the shrubbery, and here and there delicate flowers, recalled a 
period of taste, i f not affluence. But now there was not a dozen 
sound buildings i n the town, and not a single shop doing 
business.39 
Not knowing how long they would remain, the troops handsomely 
policed their camp and parade grounds, and bui lt quarters, using what 
they could find i n the ruined buildings for materials. 
Information concerning the movement of Andrews' divis ion reached 
General Maury1s headquarters March 12. The number of troops under 
Andrews was, however, estimated about four times i t s actual strength. 
On the 19th of March, General Steele, with an infantry divis ion 
under the command of Brigadier General John P. Hawkins and a cavalry 
brigade commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Lucas, moved to 
Pensacola. The same day, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew B. Spurling, with 
30 ^Andrews, op. cit., p. 97 
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eight hundred cavalry, embarked on transports to the east shore of 
the Blackwater River, and thence moved to str ike the railroad above 
Pollard, Alabama. 
Before the campaign commenced, Steele issued the following order 
concerning the conduct of the troops under his command. 
GENERAL ORDERS HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES 
No. 1 OPERATING FROM PENSACOLA BAY 
Barrancas, F l a . , March 19, 1865 
The following w i l l be observed during the campaign upon 
which this command i s about to enter 
1 . The order of march and the time for starting w i l l be 
habitually announced from these headquarters the evening previous. 
2. Orderly c a l l w i l l be sounded on the bugle one hour before 
sunset (or immediately after the troops get into camp), at which 
time a staff officer from each infantry divis ion and cavalry 
brigade w i l l repair to headquarters to receive the orders. 
3. Division trains w i l l follow their respective divis ions. 
The train of general headquarters, followed by the cavalry tra in, 
w i l l move at the head of the tra in of the leading divis ion. 
No straggling w i l l be allowed on the march. Marauders, 
plunderers, and incendiaries w i l l be severely punished. 
5. Foraging parties w i l l be organized under orders of d i v i -
sion commanders for infantry, and brigade commanders for cavalry. 
No Independent foraging w i l l be permitted either on the march or 
while the troops are i n camp. A l l captured animals w i l l be turned 
into the quartermaster's department for issue or appraisal. 
6. The discharge of fire-arms, except by order or i n the l ine 
of duty, i s s t r i c t l y prohibited. 
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7. I t shall be the duty of a l l commissioned officers to check 
any violation of paragraphs 4, 5» and 6, of this order that may 
come under his observation, to arrest the offender and turn him 
over to the provost-marshal with a f u l l statement of the case. 
Provost-marshals w i l l report a l l such cases to their respective 
headquarters i n the form of charges against the offender. 
By order of Maj. Gen. F. Steele: 
JOHN F. LACEY ^ 
Captain and Assistant Adjutant General 
On March 20, 1865, Steele's command moved out from Pensacola, 
Florida, on the road to Pollard, Alabama. The troops were issued ten 
days' rations, f ive carried by the men and five i n the wagons. There 
were approximately two hundred and seventy wagons i n the whole column. 
41 Each division was i n charge of i t s own train. 
The cavalry always takes the lead, and i f there i s any enemy 
i n the rear, also the rear i s protected by them. With two or more 
divisions of infantry, the advance division today takes the rear 
tomorrow. The same routine i s followed with the brigades and 
regiments, the advance brigade takes the rear of i t s divis ion, 
and the regiment of i t s brigade. The last brigade i s usually 
guarding the division tra in with one regiment just i n the advance, 
one behind, and the others as flankers, or i f not practicable to 
travel beside the wagons, each regiment i s assigned to so many 
wagons and marches between them.42 
Andrew's division had the advance, and started at daylight. I t 
was followed by Hawkins' division of colored troops. The Cavalry 
Brigade (except the Second I l l i n o i s , which was detached to Spurling's 
command) l e f t Pensacola at three i n the afternoon and bivouacked at 
ten P.M., four miles out, the road having been badly cut up by the 
40 
O f f i c i a l Records, op. c i t . . Ser. I , XLIX, pt. 2, pp. 32-33. 
41The following excerpt from one of Carlos W. Colby's letters t e l l s the manner i n which Steele's column marched. 
42Carlos W. Colby to his s i ster , [in the f i e l d near Blakely], 
Sunday noon [Apri l 9, 1865], manuscript, possession of author. See 
Appendix I , No. 6, pp. 154-162. 
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infantry. The forward division, halting ten minutes every hour, moved 
along pleasantly. They went into camp by noon, at Twelve-mile house, 
in a pine forest where the ground sloped a few hundred yards down to a 
clear stream. A few wagons of the train had sunk in the sand to their 
hubs, in a few places, and these were not up with the rest of the troops 
until after dark. 43 
Our regiment was on train guard, which consists of one 
hundred and fifty wagons. The country is low, flat and sandy, 
and the wagons would mire down so that we had to put our shoulders 
to the wheels frequently to help them out. After making eleven 
miles, we were tired enough to go into camp.44 On our first day's 
march, our division train broke thirteen wagon tongues and two 
wheels.45 
The division of colored troops went into camp not far from the 
Second Division just before dark. After midnight, a heavy rain com-
menced to fall, and continued to come down in a steady stream until 
ten the next morning. This was the same storm which impeded Canby's 
column marching up the eastern shore of the Bay to Fish River. The 
ground was so flooded, in some places, that many of the troops were 
driven from their slumber in search of higher ground before morning. 
Dawn on the morning of the 21st found Spicely's Brigade, of the 
Second Division, moved out of camp, and pursued the march. Moore's 
Brigade remained to take charge of the division train. As soon as it 
was light enough, the artillery and the wagons attempted to get out of 
— 
43The portions of Carlos W. Colby's letters cited concerning 
activities from March 20 to April 9 are taken from two letters par-
tially written in a diary form. 
44 
Carlos W. Colby, op. cit., April 9« See Appendix,Letter No. 6, 
pp. 154-162. 
45 
^Carlos W. Colby to his sister, Sixteen miles from Sea, Sixteen 
from Land on the Pensacola and Montgomery R. R., March 22, 1865, manu-
script, possession of author. See Appendix, Letter No. 5, pp. 151-153. 
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park and move on. A most discouraging and dismal prospect appeared, 
the ground seemed to be a mere crust which the f a l l i n g torrents had 
softened and dissolved, many of the wagons and a r t i l l e r y carriages had 
actually sunk down to the hubs i n the very tracks where they had stood. 
In the midst of large trees, where the ground was covered with grass 
giving every indication of i t s being firm and sol id , the wheels would 
sink down, and the mules, i n their struggles to draw, would themselves 
plunge into the quicksand beneath, and required assistance to get out. 
The wagons would be unloaded and, after moving a l i t t l e way and getting 
upon what seemed firm ground, would be reloaded, only to get bogged 
down again. Many times the soldiers bent their shoulders to ropes i n 
order to pul l the loaded wagons along over the worst places. Many of 
these worst places were corduroyed by the pioneers with the help of 
details from the various brigades. Andrews' division marched only 
three miles, and camped near the Fifteen-mile house. Spicely's Brigade 
went into camp i n a downpour of ra in at eight i n the morning. Moore's 
Brigade and most of the train were up by dark. The cavalry brigade, 
which started at noon, bivouacked near the Second Division just before 
the day's l ight fa i led. 
21st , was again on the road by daylight, our regiment was 
the second i n l i n e . Marched five or s ix miles through a drench-
ing rain and went into camp at 8 A.M. As there had been a heavy 
f a l l of rain a l l night, i t was utterly impossible for the wagons 
to get through. The country i s a l i t t l e more ro l l ing, but a 
treacherous quicksand l i e s under the sod 46 
The next day, Andrews' divis ion remained i n camp, however, part 
of Spicely's brigade was assigned to the task of improving the road 46 
Carlos W. Colby, op. c i t . , March 22 and Apr i l 9. See Appendix, 
pp. 151 and 157. 
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four miles to the front. Shortly before noon, Hawkins1 division 
reached Fifteen-mile hours, and camped i n front of the Second Division. 
The cavalry arrived late in the afternoon and part of the brigade took 
i t s place at the head of the column. 
The heading of this letter. Sixteen Miles from Sea, and 
Sixteen from Land, On the Pensacola and Montgomery R. R., March 
22nd, 1865, gives you as good a description of this country as I 
can give. Although I suppose i t must be called land, for i t 
belongs to the U. S . , unentered, for no one ever thought enough 
of i t to enter i t , and who blames anybody? I don't. A few 
squatters' houses have been bui lt along the road, but are now 
deserted. I have not seen a l iv ing pig, cow, or dog since leaving 
Pensacola, and they say that we are only half way through the 
Florida f lats . Today we are waiting for the Colored Division to 
pass. This i s a most delightful day, cool and pleasant.47 
The Confederates were trying every means i n order to ascertain 
the number and purpose of Steele's forces. From scouting reports, 
Colonel C. G. Armistead, Confederate Commander of the outpost at Canoe 
Station, about fifteen miles west of Pollard on the Mobile and Great 
Northern Railroad, estimated Steele's column as consisting of about 
48 forty thousand troops. A dispatch the following day confirmed the 
existence of Steele's force, but estimated i t to be ten thousand less 
49 
i n strength. 
The Union column, having been delayed by the heavy rains, resumed 
their march on Thursday, March 23. The cavalry took the advance 
followed by the division of colored troops. The Second Division, upon 
leaving camp about ten i n the morning, found the road so badly cut up 
by the trains in the advance, that i t was necessary for Spicely's 
47 
'Carlos W. Colby, op. c i t . , March 22, 1865. See Appendix I , 
pp. 151-153. 48 
O f f i c i a l Records, op. c i t . . Ser. I , XLIX, pt. 1 , p. 1138. 
4 9 I b i d . , pp. 1141-1142. 
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brigade, which was i n charge of the division tra in, to corduroy much of 
the ten miles to Pine Barren creek. Throughout the day, a small detach-
ment of Confederate cavalry endeavored to delay the column, but had 
l i t t l e success. 
About a mile from Pine Barren creek, there i s a gradual descent 
to that stream of about three hundred feet with a few small intervening 
h i l l s , however, the last descent to the creek i s quite steep. The road 
i s l ined on both sides with an open pine forest. Upon reaching the bank 
of the stream, i t was found that the Confederates had destroyed the 
bridge. The creek was unfordable for i t was about ten feet deep, i t s 
banks widely overflowing, and the current was flowing violently. Two 
companies of the T h i r t y - f i r s t Massachusetts Cavalry crossed the stream, 
dismounted, and sifter exchanging a few shots with the Confederate 
picket, drove i t away and remained themselves on picket duty. Captain 
E. H. Newton, assistant engineer on General Steele's staff , with the 
help of large details from the infantry, commenced the construction of 
a bridge across Pine Barren creek. 
The following two orders issued by General Canby concerning his 
whole command are enlightening, i n the f i r s t instant, as to how, where, 
and when a grand guard i s established, and in the second instant, the 
rules to be observed when foraging for resources i n enemy terr itory. 
SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ARMY AND DIVISION 
FIELD ORDERS, OF WEST MISSISSIPPI 
No. 16 Dannelly' Mi l ls , on Fish River, 
A l a . , March 23, 1865. 
10. The following rules for establishing the grand guards 
w i l l be s t r i c t l y adhered to; The general outline of the l ine of 
guards w i l l be indicated by an officer of the corps s t a f f , and to 
each division w i l l be assigned a portion of i t i n i t s front, or 
front and flanks. These l ines must be far enough i n advance of 
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the camps to give not only timely warning of any approach of the 
enemy, but also to insure ample time to the troops i n camp to f a i l 
i n and form before the enemy can be upon them. The guards must 
be of sufficient strength to cover the whole front of the camps, 
and the width of a divis ion deployed i n l i n e , or both wings beyond 
the front ( i f natural obstacles do not render such precautionary 
extension unnecessary), and to repel small parties of the enemy 
which may intend to feel along the picket- l ine to harass our troops. 
For these purposes the grand guards w i l l be formed i n three l i n e s , 
v iz . : F i r s t , the l ine of outposts (sentries); second, the l ine of 
guards (pickets); third, the l ine of reserves. The f i r s t l ine 
must cover the whole front i n one continuous chain, i f possible, 
so that every portion of the entire front would be under complete 
control. The position of the second l ine must be carefully selected 
with a view to defense. Parties sent out by the enemy to recon-
noiter or alarm the camps ought to be checked here. The third 
l ine (reserves) w i l l be placed between the second l ine and the 
camps at such points as w i l l enable them to easi ly communicate 
with and re-enforce the more advanced l ines . The commander of the 
grand guard should be habitually with the reserves and act as 
emergencies may demand. The l ine of guards (No. 2) must be thrown 
out at least a mile from the camps, i f natural objects do not 
render i t unnecessary or impossible, and the l ine of outposts 
(No. 1) half a mile beyond the guards. While the l ine of outposts 
must be continuous, the position of the inner l ines (Nos, 2 and 3) 
ought to be i n easy supporting distance with each other, and every 
officer and man should be acquainted with the relative position of 
the guards to their right and l e f t and i n front, A system of 
patrols toward and along the front of the f i r s t l ine and along the 
inner l ines must be established; also patrols i n the direction of 
the enemy should be sent out whenever the situation of things 
admits of them. At or shortly before sunrise i s the most suitable 
time for the last-mentioned patrols. The position of the f i r s t 
and second l ines should be regularly changed before n i g h t - f a l l . 
The most complete connection of the three l ines through a l l the 
divisions of the army i s imperative, and the several divis ion 
picket officers w i l l for that purpose confer with each other when 
establishing or correcting their l i n e s . When the troops camp i n 
more than one l ine those i n the f i r s t l ine w i l l cover the front, 
and those i n rear the flanks and rear, where such precautions are 
demanded. Anything of importance which may occur at the front must 
be communicated to these headquarters with as l i t t l e delay as 
possible. Refugees and deserters coming into the l ines who may be 
able to give any information of importance w i l l be sent i n person 
to these headquarters under proper guard. 
By order of Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby: 
C. T. CHRISTENSEN, 
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General50 
5 0 O f f i c i a l Records. op. c i t . . Ser. I , XLIX, pt. 2, pp. 68-69, 
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GENERAL 
FIELD ORDERS 
No. 8 
HEADQUARTERS ARMY AND DIVISION OF 
WEST MISSISSIPPI, 
March 23, 1865 
Whenever i t sha l l be deemed necessary for the troops of this 
command to subsist wholly or i n part upon the resources through 
which the army marches, the following rules w i l l be s t r i c t l y 
observed: The collection of such supplies w i l l be made by regu-
l a r l y detailed parties from each regiment or battery. The r e -
spective commanders w i l l select from 6 to 10 percent of their 
effective strength as foragers, and w i l l give them i n charge of 
one or more commissioned officers, at the rate of one officer to 
every thirty or th i r ty - f ive men. These officers must be held 
s t r i c t l y responsible for the behavior of their parties. Great 
care should therefore be taken i n the selection of officers and 
men. The officers should not only be energetic and zealous, but 
also discreet and s t r i c t discipl inarians, as i t i s l e f t to their 
judgment when, where, and what supplies should be seized. Only 
the real wants of the troops are to be considered, and a l l wanton 
and reckless acts must be suppressed with vigor. The collections 
ought to be made from the greatest possible number of plantations, 
i n order to divide and thus al leviate the heavy burden on the 
country. The premises of poor and destitute people must not be 
interfered with. No foraging parties w i l l be allowed, except on 
the special written authority of a divis ion or a superior commander, 
to enter dwelling houses, kitchens &c., nor to disturb the people 
i n the possession of their furniture or supplies necessary for 
their immediate wants. Horses, mules, and wagons w i l l only be 
taken by special authority from the proper off icers. A l l articules 
collected w i l l be brought to the roadside and loaded on the wagons 
selected for that purpose from the division trains. On a r r i v a l i n 
camp the proper officers of the supply departments w i l l distribute 
the stores. No receipt w i l l be given for any art ic le seized. The 
land to the right and l e f t of the marching column w i l l be the 
legitimate f i e l d of operations of these forage parties, and the 
officers i n charge must, whenever they are compelled to go beyond 
the regular flank detachments, secure their men again surprise and 
capture. The foragers of the leading divisions w i l l under no c i r -
cumstances go i n advance of the advance guard. Parties sent to 
collect grain and fodder for the animals w i l l be accompanied by a 
sufficient guard i n case i t i s impracticable for them to operate 
i n connection with the ordinary subsistence foraging parties. 
Small foraging parties must be avoided. The details should be 
made by divis ion, preferably, and at least by brigade. Every 
forage train w i l l be accompanied by an officer of the quarter-
master's department, who w i l l also superintend the equitable d i s -
tribution of the art ic les collected. 
By order of Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby: 
C. T. CHRISTENSEN 
Lieutenant Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General51 
51Ibid., Ser. I , XLIX, pt. 2, pp. 67-68. 
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Note the concern of the commander for the private property of those 
l i v i n g i n the area, not only by the strictness of what should be taken 
but also by the attention given to the personnel of the foraging party. 
The significance of these two important elements of war i s easi ly seen 
as Steele's column progresses. 
As to the work on the bridge over Pine Barren creek continued 
throughout the afternoon of the 23rd of March, a l l the troops arrived 
i n the area before supper time, camping on both sides of the road. In 
compliance with orders, the buglers sounded the evening c a l l s twice to 
give the Confederates an exaggerated impression of the number i n the 
column. 
23rd. We took up our l ine of march at 10 1/2A.M. Our regi -
ment was just i n the advance of the train. We marched ten miles 
and had to make several stops to corduroy the road. The country 
i s more h i l l y with occasional signs of c i v i l i z a t i o n . The change 
in the scenery from barren pines to the more enlivening foliages 
of the oak, ash, and the blossoms of the peach, plum, cherry, 
red bud, and dogwood i s an agreeable one. One great blessing we 
have i s good water and plenty of i t . We arrived i n camp by dark.52 
March 24 opened with pleasant weather again. The morning and 
early afternoon were spent working on the bridge, which was completed 
about three P.M., i t s length about three hundred feet. The cavalry 
was the f i r s t to traverse the creek on the new bridge. They were 
followed by their wagon train which moved tardi ly for there was a steep 
h i l l that ended at the creek bank. The road had been badly washed, 
making i t difficult to hold the wagons back. To add to the d i f f i -
culty, there was the danger of str ik ing against the trees which l ined 
the road on both sides. With this entanglement of d i f f i c u l t i e s , the 52 
Carlos W. Colby, op. c i t . , Apr i l 9. See Appendix, p. 158. 
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cavalry's train did not reach the far shore until almost dark. The 
Second Division, however, crossed and made camp a few hundred yards 
from the stream. Though the bridge spanned from bank to bank of the 
creek, the overflow flooded the south bank for one hundred feet or more. 
24th. Laid in camp until about 5 P.M. when we moved our camp across Pine Barren creek. Although the deepest of it has been pontooned yet we had to wade through water nearly waist deep. Occupied myself this morning in washing myself and clothes. Bill Perrin has just come in with a splendid bouquet of flowers, wish I had an opportunity of sending you one. All the kinds I know, are the dogwood blossom, red bud, and violets.53 
Steele's column moved out cautiously on the morning of the 25th, 
at daylight, with expectations of a fight. The scouting reports the 
previous evening revealed two brigades of Confederates with artillery 
were intrenched on a creek a few miles ahead. The report was made even 
more probable by the continual picket firing the night before. 
Lucas' cavalry troops encountered slight resistance when about 
three miles out. At nine o'clock, they reached Michell's creek and 
found the opposite bank entrenched by about four hundred Confederate 
cavalry troops. The bridge crossing the stream had been partially 
destroyed. The banks of the creek, however, were not steep and both 
sides were densely skirted with shrubbery giving protective cover to 
both the assaulting and the defensive forces. After a short, fierce 
contest, the Confederates were dislodged from their position and made 
an orderly retreat to the northern bank of Canoe creek. After repair-
ing the bridge, Lucas' cavalry crossed over the stream and moved for-
ward to encounter the enemy again where they had taken up a defensive 
position at Canoe creek. Again the Federal cavalrymen pressed the 
5 3 Carlos W. Colby, op., March 22 and April 9. See Appendix, pp. 152 and 158. 
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enemy with so much vigor and gallantry that the Confederates were 
unable to hold the attacking force at bay for long. From here, the 
Confederates fell back to Pringle's creek, a distance of about four 
miles, 
Pringle's creek was a shallow stream, and like Michell's creek 
was skirted with shrubbery. Covered with a characteristic growth of 
pines, the north bank rose gradually for about fifty feet to a crest, 
(On the brow of this crest was a high fence of split rails and a few 
hard-wood trees with heavy foliage. The road, after crossing the ford, 
bore around to the right and was much obscured by the trees as it 
gradually ascended the hill. 
Upon arriving at Pringle's creek, part of the Confederate force, 
most of the cavalry, turned toward Williams' station on the Mobile and 
Great Northern Railroad, Remaining at the creek was Brigadier General 
James H, Clanton's brigade consisting of two Alabama cavalry brigades, 
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Washington T, Lary and 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Faulkner, Their force did not exceed five 
hundred men. Assigned also to Clanton's brigade were two pieces of 
artillery and one hundred infantry reserves, the latter, however, stayed 
on the north side of the Escambia River. As General Clanton had not 
arrived, his brigade was under the command of Colonel Lary. The latter 
made a breastwork of the fence rails on the rise north of Pringle's 
creek, and behind it again formed his men to meet the advancing Federal 
troops. 
A sharp engagement ensued as soon as Lucas' advance came up. 
The Confederates were driven back two hundred yards in ten min-
utes, and were still falling back as Gen. Clanton galloped up and 
ordered a halt. At this Col. Leary [Lary] seemed surprised, and 
told Clanton they were being flanked. Clanton replied: "But we 
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must fall back in order." The latter then commanded his forces 
to dress up on the colors. His brave color-bearer, young Maynor, 
held the colors high, and repeated the command, "Dress up on the 
colors." Fifteen minutes afterward, Clanton fell severely, and 
it was then thought mortally, wounded. Immediately the buglers 
of the First Louisiana sounded the call for the charge, and that 
regiment mounted and led by its commander, Lieut-Col. A. S. 
Badger, dashed forward in line of battle, in a gallant, impetuous 
manner, and with a wild and thrilling cheer. They were met by a 
volley; and though some of their number fell the fury of the 
charge was not checked) and in a few moments they had swept over 
and captured the main part of the Confederate force. The prisoners 
consisted of Gen. Clanton, ten other officers, and one hundred and 
twenty enlisted men.54 The killed and wounded numbered about a 
dozen. The loss of the First Louisiana was two killed. . . .and 
eight wounded. In this action the Second New York attacked the 
Confederates on their flank. . . . . The two pieces of artillery 
and reserves from the north bank of that river [Escambia] produced 
an effect greater than their force justified; such is the moral 
power of artillery. They were replied to by four pieces of the 55 
Second Massachusetts, . . . .and in an hour compelled to retire." 
The Confederate troops not captured in the assault or the pursuit 
which followed, escaped across the Escambia river or in the swamps. 
Shortly before the cavalry's engagement of the enemy, Spicely's 
brigade of Andrews' division had gone into camp, about one o'clock in 
the afternoon, just north of Canoe creek. The brigade had been stopped 
only a short while, when orders were received from General Steele for 
the brigade, with some artillery, to advance to support Lucas' cavalry. 
Making a forced march, the brigade arrived at the Escambia River about 
four P.M., marching seventeen miles in about three hours. The 
Confederates, having destroyed the road bridge across the river and 
because it was greatly overflowing its banks, other means of crossing 
54General Lucas' official correspondence lists the captured as, 
". . . .General Canton, who was severely wounded, 18 other officers, 
and 101 enlisted men. . . . " (Official Records, Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 2, P. 119). 55 ^Andrews, op. cit., pp. 109-110. 
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had to be found. Details from Spicely's brigade immediately set to 
work constructing a foot bridge on the railroad trestle which crossed 
the river a few rods below the destroyed bridge. 
As the road had required a considerable amount of labor in order 
to bring the train along, the remainder of the column that day, got 
only a short distance past Michell's creek. 
25th. Was on the road by a little after daylight. Marched twenty miles and went into camp near Escambia river a little before dark. We went into camp by 1 P.M., but had hardly got our knapsacks off, when the order came to fall in as we were wanted to the front. By a flank movement our Colonel got the 97th in the advance and for six miles we had a forced march, making one halt of about five minutes. The cavalry was fighting ahead, but we could not get up to them in time to be of any assistance. They had done some good fighting, capturing 1 General, 1 Colonel, 1 Major and 150 men. The area showed signs of hard fighting and a hasty retreat on the part of the Rebs, it being strewn with knap-sacks, guns, and any and everything that would impede their 
f l i g h t . 5 6 
Complying with General Steele's order, Spicely's brigade of the 
Second Division, marched for Pollard, Alabama, at daylight, the 26th 
of March. Crossing over on the foot bridge, the brigade set out for 
their destination. The road showed tracks of the artillery used by 
the enemy the previous day. These signs, and not having certain know-
ledge of what force might be in Pollard, caused the commanders to take 
the necessary precautions and preparations to meet the possible resist-
ance. But no armed resistance was found, and the village was peaceably 
taken. Pollard was a small village containing, perhaps, twenty crude 
and scattered dwellings. Two or three empty wooden storehouses, used 
by the Confederate army for storage, were the only property burned by 
56— Carlos W. Colby, op. cit., April 9. See Appendix, pp. 158-159. 
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the Federal troops. The tearing up of about one thousand yards of 
railroad track, the bridges being left intact, was the only other 
property destroyed. Lucas' cavalry arrived at Pollard as the infantry 
was returning to their camp south of the Escambia river. 
26th. The infantry of the 2nd Brigade crossed the r iver as 
soon as they could see, and made a forced march to Pollard, a 
l i t t l e town at the junction of the Montgomery and Mobile with the 
Alabama and Florida R. R. [Mobile and Great Northern Railroad with 
the Alabama and Florida Railroad] where we had heard there was a 
small rebel force. By some means, our Colonel always succeeds i n 
getting the 97th i n the advance when there i s a prospect of a 
f ight. The town was surrounded and the whole force advanced on 
i t at once, but there was nary a Reb there, hearing of our advance, 
they had skedaddled. After destroying the R. R. track for some 
distance and burning several public buildings, we returned to our 
divis ion. 
In the Rebels' retreat, they had destroyed the main road 
bridge over the r iver [Escambia], so that we had to cross on the 
stringers of the railroad bridge and only footmen could pass. 
One peculiarity of this country i s that the ground i s more 
sol id i n the bottoms than on the tops of the h i l l s . After r is ing 
to an elevation of a hundred feet, water can be found within two 
or three feet of the surface, and i n many places flows over the 
top of the ground.57 
While General Steele's column was moving almost due north toward 
Pollard, Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Spurling, commanding a cavalry force 
of about eight hundred, was also traveling northward some twenty miles 
east of the main column. Spurling's force was landed on the morning of 
March 19, opposite Milton, Florida, on the East Bay near the east branch 
of the Blackwater r i v e r . From here, the mounted troops headed for the 
railroad at Evergreen, Alabama, v ia Andalusia, Alabama, passing near 
Lewis Station. The march to Andalusia was marked by frequent encounter-
ing of enemy scouts, of which, most were captured. The cavalry force 
camped the evening of the 23rd of March west of Andalusia, a few miles 
5 7 I b i d . , p. 158. 
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east of Evergreen. This proved to be an eventful night, for Colonel 
Spurling, himself, while scouting ahead, captured two scouts and one 
of General Clanton's staff off icers. The next two days also were 
eventful ones. After cutting the railroad several miles north of 
Evergreen, Spurling's force captured and destroyed two trains, one 
loaded with Confederate troops and the other with valuable stock. 
Heading southward, the Federal troops severed the enemy's communica-
tion l ines at Sparta and destroyed the Confederate army's supplies 
stored there. Spurling's troops rejoined the column on the 26th of 
March, their mission well executed, completed, and accomplished with-
out the loss of a single man. 
The same evening of Spurling's return, Steele called together his 
division commanders and notified them that the column would turn the 
next morning to join General Canby. As rations were running low, the 
country too destitute for requisitioning food, and the extra mouths 
of the prisoners to feed, a l l men of the column were put on half 
rations. 
Early on the morning of the 27th, the column turned and marched 
westerly, toward Canoe Station, on the Mobile and Great Northern 
Railroad. The cavalry moved out f i r s t , followed by Hawkins' division 
of colored troops. The going was slow as the f i r s t few miles had to 
be corduroyed, thereby delaying the Second Division's start u n t i l noon. 
The distance to Canoe Station along the route the column took 
was around thirteen miles. After passing the bad road near the 
Escambia River, the country became more h i l l y and transit of the wagons 
would have been less d i f f i c u l t , but rain commenced to f a l l soon after 
noon, seeming to dissolve the earth's surface. Notwithstanding the 
78 
Herculean task of corduroying the road and getting the wagons through, 
all of the column reached Canoe Station except Spicely's brigade, 
which had charge of the Second Division's train. They bivouacked 
about four miles from the main body of the column late in the evening. 
27th. We have now changed our direction and are marching 
towards Blakely. Our regiment is train guard. It rained all 
day and did not get into camp until near midnight, and then only 
made twelve miles. We are now reduced to half rations, consider-
able being thrown away from the wagons that broke down, the slow-
ness of our movements, and prisoners being fed make it necessary 
to economize.58 
The rain had stopped by the next morning. Andrews' division 
worked from dawn until eleven In the morning corduroying the road to 
Canoe Station in order to get their train and artillery up. The rest 
of Steele's force had moved on. 
The Second division train was all up to Canoe station by 
one o'clock. A rest was then taken of two hours. . . . At three 
P.M., the march was resumed in a northwesterly direction. The 
troops moved out in good spirits and handsome style, the music 
playing.59 
Andrews' division marched five miles before dusk and went into 
camp five miles behind the cavalry and Hawkins' division. 
28th. The 97th was in the advance of the division. Marched 
twelve miles and went Into camp early.60 
The march was resumed at daylight, the 29th of March, by the 
Second Division, but the roads were bad, and again had to be cordu-
royed much of the way throughout the day. Rain commenced again about 
three in the afternoon to add misery once more to the troops. The 
55 „ 
Ibid., pp. 159-160. 
59 
Andrews, op. cit., p. 116. 
60 Carlos W. Colby, op. cit., April 9. See Appendix I, p. 160. 
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infantry, Hawkins' and Andrews' bivouacked near the Perdido River.61 
The cavalry went ahead to Weatherford's plantation a few miles to the 
north. 
29th. Marched ten miles, was rear guard to the tra in, 
passed through one swamp that had to be corduroyed for three 
miles. During the day over five miles of corduroy had to be 
made. I t commenced raining at noon and at night i t f e l l i n 
torrents completely flooding the camp. Nelson Goodwin of Company 
G died from the effects of an accidental wound received yesterday 
from the fa l l ing of a tree.62 
The morning of the 30th was raw and windy, and the soldiers 
were seen i n thick c i rc les around the camp-fires. The colored 
division moved out f i r s t , and was followed by the Second at nine 
o'clock. The Perdido, where forded, was two feet deep, and some 
trees were fel led on which the soldiers crossed. To get the 
a r t i l l e r y along, the Second Division made two miles of corduroy, 
and made i t promptly. Considerable work had to be done also on 
the road near McGills.63 
Andrews' division marched two miles southwest of McGill's before 
stopping for the night, the rest of the column was a few miles farther 
down the road. Towards evening, a foraging party from Lucas' division 
returned from their expedition, near Montgomery H i l l west of Weatherford, 
with some beef and sheep which was distributed among the troops. Though 
the supply was limited, i t was badly needed, as the troops had been 
61General Andrews, i n both his O f f i c i a l Report and his book speaks 
of camping near "Perdido." The author has therefore assumed this to 
be the headwaters of the Perdido River. This would mean that the 
Infantry did not go to Weatherford, (according to and as indicated 
on Map 5 ) but instead turned west when about half way between Canoe 
Station and Weatherford, about due east of McGil l 's. The statement by 
Andrews that, "The Perdido, when forded, was two feet deep, . . . " 
seems to indicate that such a movement was made. General Hawkins' 
reports i n the O f f i c i a l Records do not cover the column's march to 
Blakely. Nowhere, to this author's knowledge, i s this movement of 
the infantry expl ic i t ly stated. 
62 Carlos W. Colby, op. c i t . , Apr i l 9. See Appendix I , p. 160. 
63 Andrews, op. c i t . , p. 1 17 . 
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laboring and facing hardships of the march on one-third rations. 
Supplying the troops with food had become a serious problem. "We had 
succeeded in communicating with the major-general commanding, and here 
received orders to proceed to Holyoke, but want of forage and rations 
March 30th. Marched about nine miles, nearly all the way 
through swamps, consequently most of the road had to be cordu-
royed. Have worked harder and feel more tired than any night of 
the march. Are now reduced to one-third rations and with what 
we can forage from the country, which is precious little for it 
is nearly all a barren wilderness. 
At dawn the following day, the Second Division resumed the march, 
found the roads good for a change, and made Stockton, nineteen miles, 
by two in the afternoon. The country near Stockton, Alabama, was more 
settled and fertile. The ration question was much brighter as for-
aging parties were sent out in the afternoon and the next morning. 
A considerable amount of corn and fresh meat were found at neighboring 
plantations. 
31st. Marched eighteen and a half miles over a rough broken 
country. It is a little more inhabited, so that our mess suc-
ceeded in getting some corn and a turkey for supper. At night 
we encamped on the grounds of a beautiful plantation near Stockton. 
The woman of the house was very bitter in her denunciation against 
the Yanks which caused a guard to be placed over the house to keep 
the boys from burning it. But it was of no use, for we had not 
got out of sight in the morning before it was in flames.66 
The march was resumed before noon on the first day of April. The 
cavalry lead the way followed by Hawkins. division of colored troops 
Andrews' division talcing the rear. The road south from Stockton was 
64 
Official Records. op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. I, p. 28l, General 
Steele's Official Report. 
65 Carlos W. Colby, op. cit., April 9. See Appendix, p. 160. 
compelled us to turn toward Stockton, . . . 
64 
66 Loc. cit 
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good and the troops had little difficulty keeping the wagon trains up 
with the rest of the column. The cavalry and Hawkins. division began 
setting up camp near Tensas Station. Colonel Spurling's brigade of 
cavalry had been sent on ahead to ascertain the best route to Holyoke 
and to communicate with Canby's headquarters in regard to the move-
ments of the Column from Pensacola. About four and a half miles from 
Blakely and one mile from where the road forks toward Holyoke, near 
Wilkins' plantation, Spurling found the road barracaded, and a strong 
picket or outpost composed of cavalry and infantry guarding it. The 
Second brigade of Lucas. cavalry division gallantly charged the out-
post, capturing seventy-four of the enemy and forcing the rest back 
toward their works at Blakely. 
Hearing of Spurling's fight, the remainder of Lucas. cavalry and 
the division of colored troops hurried to his support. By nightfall, 
these two divisions had pushed the Confederates to within two miles of 
their works at Blakely, Hawkins' infantry having marched almost twenty 
miles that day. Andrews' division, being in the rear, was unable to 
get beyond Tensas Station. 
April 1st. Made ten miles, some skirmishing along toward 
night by the cavalry and Negro troops. Do not feel very well as 
I have caught a severe cold and it has settled in my bones. 67 
Back on the last day of March, General Canby had ordered Veatch's 
division, escorted by the Fourth Tennessee cavalry regiment, from the 
assault of the Old Spanish Fort to Holyoke with supplies for Steele's 
67Ibid.. p. l6l 
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force. The troops of the Column from Pensacola received these supplies 
they needed for the next eight-day siege and assault of the Confederate 
68 works around Blakely, the second day of April, 
68For the preceding chapter, the following sources were consulted. 
Particularly helpful were the Official Reports and Chapters XIII and 
XVI in Andrews' book. Official Records, op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 1, 
Reports: No. 1, pp. 91-100} No. 4, pp. 119-123 and 135-138; No. 27, pp. 
200-206; Nos. 30-34, pp. 209-216; Nos. 79-90, pp. 279-299$ Nos. 92-95, 
pp. 302-313. Correspondence! Union; p. 879, pp. 879-880, p. 881, 
p. 886, pp. 887-888, p. 888, pp. 896-897, p. 915, pp. 915-916, pp. 924-
927; Confederate; pp. 1045-1048, p. 1050, p. 1052, p. 1053. p. 1054, 
p. 1056. Official Records, op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 2. Correspond-
ence: Union pp. 7-8, pp. 23-24, p. 25, p. 27, p. 33i p« 41, p. 42, 
pp. 67-68, pp. 68-69, p. 70, p. 89, pp. 90-91, pp. 96-97, p. 117, 
pp. 117-118, p. 118, p. 119, pp. 119-120, p. 133, p . 147, p. 151, 
pp. 151-152, p. 164, p. 167, p. 181, pp. 181-182; Confederate; p. 1137, 
p. 1138, p. 1149, p. 1152, p. 1154, p. 1154, p. 1156, p. 1158, p. 1159, 
p. 1160, p. 1161, p. 1167, p. 1168, p. 1169, p. 1172, p. 1173, p. 1174, 
p. 1176, p. 1178, p. 1179, p. 1181, p. 1 1 8 3 , p. 1188, p. 1190. Andrews, 
op. cit., pp. 95-120. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE INVESTMENT, SIEGE, AND ASSAULT OF BLAKELY, ALABAMA 
The town of Blakely, around which the Confederates had erected 
fortifications, was situated ten miles northeast of Mobile, on the east 
bank of the Apalachee river, and opposite its confluence with the 
Tensas river. The extent and depth of the town's adjacent waters 
made it a fine natural port. The town of Blakeley, as it was spelled 
then, was founded in 1817. By about 1825, it was a thriving city of 
between three to five thousand in population. Thus, at this time, 
Blakely was a larger and more important city than Mobile. It was the 
county seat of Baldwin County from 1820 to 187o. However, epidemics 
of yellow fever and high land prices caused the young town to lose its 
appeal within fifteen years after its birth. After unsuccessful 
attempts to make a comeback after each attack of yellow fever, Blakely 
finally gave in to an ever-growing Mobile by the middle of the 1830's. 
From this time on it gradually declined to a population of less than 
one hundred in 1865.69 
From the vicinity of the main landing near the river, two princi-
pal roads diverged, one bearing northeast to Stockton, the other south-
east to Pensacola. For about a mile they ran about parallel. Following 
the Stockton road, it was around a mile from the landing to the line of 
Confederate fortifications. The Pensacola road wound around on high 
ground. The ground rose slightly for about a mile from the river. 
69 
The Mobile Press Register. Mobile, Alabama, Sunday, October 30, 
1955, Section B. 
For the Investment, Siege, and Assault of Blakely, see Maps 9 and 
l0, pp. 90 and 105. 
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The Confederate fort if ications around Blakely were constructed 
in an elongated semicircle. These rested on a bluff close to the r iver 
at the extreme l e f t , and terminated with the high ground, a few rods 
from the r iver on the r ight. The l ine was almost three miles i n length 
and included nine well bui lt redoubts or lunettes. Arming these thor-
oughly bui lt fort if ications were about forty pieces of a r t i l l e r y . From 
s ix to eight hundred yards i n front of the works, the trees had been 
fel led. About f i f t y yards out from the fort if ications was a l ine of 
abatis, and opposite some of the redoubts was an interior l i n e . Then 
three hundred yards farther out, para l le l with the works, was another 
l ine of abatis, and behind the latter were detached r i f l e - p i t s . 
The garrison inside the fortif ications of Blakely consisted of 
Brigadier General Francis M. Cockrell's division of veteran troops, 
mostly from Mississippi and Missouri, and Brigadier General Charles W. 
Thomas' brigade of Alabama reserves. Cockrell's troops were assigned 
to the l e f t wing which extended from south of number four redoubt to 
the northern edge of number one redoubt, Thomas' Alabama reserves were 
on duty from north of the f i f t h redoubt to south of the ninth redoubt, 
thus encompassing the area of the right wing of the Confederate force. 
These two units of infantry plus several a r t i l l e r y companies, i n command 
of the batteries, made a force totaling about three thousand five hun-
dred, under the command of Brigadier General St. John R. L iddel l . 
Hawkins' division of colored troops had made camp, the evening of 
the f i r s t of Apr i l , two miles from the Confederate fortif ications at 
Blakely. Heavy f i r ing on the picket l ine brought these troops quickly 
into l ine of battle early Sunday, Apr i l 2. Colonel Charles W. Drew's 
Third brigade had camped i n advance of the division and i t was their 
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Map IX. 
Map of the Siege of the Confederate 
Fortifications at Blakely, Alabama, show-
ing the various positions and lines of in-
vestment of the Union Army under the Command 
of General Frederick Steele. 
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picket lines which were being fired upon by the enemy. Hawkins' other 
two brigades marched up in line with the Third, Brigadier General 
William A. Pile's First brigade covering the left flank of the divi-
sion and Colonel Hiram Scofield's Second brigade in the centre. With 
two companies from each brigade as skirmishers, the division advanced 
toward the enemy. The first earnest resistance encountered was about 
a mile and a quarter In front of the Confederate left, the enemy 
entrenched on the brow of a rise above a small stream. The skirmishing 
became so fierce that finally the advance skirmish line mounted to 
twenty seven companies. After three hours of hotly contested ground, 
the division entrenched about one thousand yards from the Confederate 
main works facing redoubts numbers one and two. During the contest, 
Colonel J. Blackburn Jones of the Sixty-eighth United States Colored 
Troops, in charge of the advance skirmish line was conspicuous along 
the line for bravery and had two horses shot out from under him. 
Hawkins' division and the other units engaged in the investment, 
were given a warm reception by vigorous artillery and musket fire. To 
add to the assaulting army's difficulties, the natural terrain was, in 
most places, anything but desirable. The pine forest began to swindle 
about two miles from the Apalachee river. From here, on west to the 
river, for the most part, the crests and brows of rises were compara-
tively void of any protective cover, the ravines had a small growth of 
hard wood trees in them but with almost insurmountable entanglements 
of undergrowth. Needless to say, these natural obstructions not only 
caused a hindrance, but also exposed the Federal troops to a greater 
danger. 
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The Second Division, who had camped just north of Tensas station 
the first night of April, had marched some distance before sunrise on 
the 2nd of April. They arrived before Blakely about ten A.M. After a 
short rest, a line of battle was formed. Spicely's brigade was assigned 
to the left flank of the division and Moore's brigade formed the right 
flank. With the two regiments from the letter's brigade, the One 
Hundred and Fourteenth Ohio and Twentieth Iowa, as advanced skirmishers, 
the division moved toward the enemy's works. Andrews' troops were 
warmly received by Confederate artillery fire and that of the enemy's 
advance skirmishers. After contesting about a mile of territory, the 
Second Division established its first line of entrenchments nearly a 
half mile long to the left of Hawkin's line about nine hundred yards 
from the Confederate fortifications. Two hundred yards of these en-
trenchments were on the right side of the Stockton road, the remaining 
fifteen hundred or more yards ran southward from the road. Late in 
the afternoon the Second Division was ordered to complete the invest-
ment by extending its line in a southerly direction, to south of the 
Pensacola road, making their line enlarged to about two miles in length. 
The troops were busy throughout the night dodging the blind fire 
of the Confederates and digging their entrenchments. The entrenching, 
however, was a slow process for spades were few in comparison to such 
a long line. 
[April] 2. Was on the road before day light, heard heavy 
cannonading in the advance soon after starting. Made a march of 
seven miles in a very short space of time, and came upon the enemy 
in force within three miles of Blakely. Made several counter-
marches and flank movements to get in our proper position. Soon 
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after dark we advanced towards the works driving in their outer 
p i c k e t s . 7 0 A heavy fire was kept up all night doing us no damage, 
however. 
The gallantry and vigor in which Hawkins. division pressed forward 
toward Blakely caused General Liddell to send the following dispatch 
to his commander. 
HDQRS. EASTERN DIVISION, DISTRICT OF THE GULF 
Blakely, April 2, 1865 
General MAURY 
Mobile: 
The enemy camped apparently in large force one mile above 
us last night on the Stockton road, and is now engaged skirmishing 
on the left flank preparing, I think, for an assault or demonstra-
tion in force. I need additional artillery temporarily if it can 
be spared. My cipher reader, Massey, has not yet returned from 
Mobile. 
ST. JOHN R. LIDDELL 
Brigadier-General, C o m m a n d i n g 7 2 
Again, as the Second Division was approaching the fortifications, 
Liddell sent another appeal for artillery. 
HDQRS. EASTERN DIVISION, DISTRICT OF THE GULF, 
Blakely, April 2, 1865 
General MAURY, 
Mobile: 
I believe the enemy are preparing to assault my line to-day. 
Please spare me some light artillery temporarily, and if possible 
send it over immediately. 
ST. JOHN R. LIDDELL 
Brigadier-General, Commanding73 
70 None of the six reports of Andrews' division, in the Official 
Records, gives the explicit time of the division's investment. However, 
the context of the reports seems to indicate middle to late afternoon. 
71 Carlos W. Colby, op. cit., April 9. See Appendix I, p. 161. 
72Official Records, op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 2, p. 1192. 
73 Loc. cit. 
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General Liddell listed his casualities for the day as five killed and 
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twenty wounded. 
As viewed from a distance, the ground lying between the combatants 
appeared level, but it was actually cut with rugged ravines, some run-
ning parallel and others perpendicular to the Confederate works. Along 
the bottoms of the principal ravines were small streams hidden by the 
dense undergrowth. Many of the banks of these streams were marshy. 
The general elevations of the ground was perhaps eighty feet above the 
water, and the greatest depth of the ravines was about sixty feet. 
Where the Second Division established its first line of entrench-
ments, the ground was a little higher than that occupied by the 
Confederates, however, from this position for about three hundred yards 
the ground in front of the division's line gradually eloped downward 
toward the enemy. The terrain occupied by Hawkins' division was nearly 
level with the Confederate works. 
The second day of the siege, April 3, found both divisions of 
Steele's force preoccupied with enlarging and securing their entrench-
ment lines. Particularly in Hawkins' division, the work was hindered 
by the fire of the Confederate artillery. His division was arranged 
with Pile's brigade on the left, next to the Second Division, and 
Drew's brigade, on the right with Scofield's held in reserve. In 
Andrews' division, Spicely's Second brigade was on the right, Moore's 
covered the left flank. 
74 
Loc, cit. 
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General Steele's headquarters was located about two miles to the 
rear of the Union lines at 0. Sibley's. The two division headquarters 
were situated about a half mile behind the lines. 
Brigadier General Kenner Garrard's Second Division of the 
Sixteenth Army Corps, and Brigadier General James C. Veatch's First 
Division of the Thirteenth Army Corps, both having been relieved of 
duty at Spanish Fort, were assigned to Steele's force. Before noon 
on the third of April, Garrard's division moved up to the front occu-
pying the investment line south of the Pensacola road, thus shortening 
the length of the investment line held by Andrews' division to a little 
over a mile. The line of Garrard's division was formed with Colonel 
John Rinaker's First brigade on the right, Brigadier General James I. 
Gilbert's Second brigade in the centre, and the Third brigade under 
the command of Colonel Charles L. Harris occupied the left flank of 
the division and thereby, the extreme left of the Union forces invest-
ing Blakely. Veatch's division was held in reserve at Steele's 
headquarters. 
5rd. Early in the morning we retired to an adjacent hollow 
to cover us from the enemy's fire, our position being too much 
exposed. A heavy cannonading was kept up all day by the Rebs, 
wounding one man in the 97th. 75 
The third day of the siege was occupied with Steele's troops con-
tinuing to make progress in their development of lines opposite the 
Confederate fortifications. The soldiers of both the Second Division 
and the division of colored troops were engaged in putting the finish-
ing touches to the first line of investment and were making sustained 
75Carlos W. Colby, op. cit., April 9. See Appendix I, p. 161. 
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headway on the second l ine of entrenchments. The following order by 
Spicely reveals how these entrenchments were made, and why they were 
made i n this manner. 
The r i f l e - p i t s i n front have been designated to each regi -
mental and battalion commander, w i l l by him be immediately 
divided into as many parts as he has companies, and each company 
commander w i l l be held responsible for the following, v iz : To 
have by sundown to-night his r i f l e - p i t s 4 feet wide at the top, 
3 1/2 feet wide at the bottom, and the earth that i s thrown outside 
to be a regular parapet not less than 4 feet at the top, and with 
a slope of 1 to 15; the parapet to be 3 feet high and the ditch 3 
feet deep. At a l l times there w i l l be at least one man to every 
four yards of r i f l e - p i t s , with sufficient number of commissioned 
and non-commissioned officers. Regimental and battalion com-
manders must remember that a man behind earth-works must occupy a 
space of not less than three feet when attacked. The intrench-
ments w i l l be advanced every day and night under the supervision 
of Lieut. Col. Victor Vifquain, Ninety-Seventh I l l i n o i s Vollun-
teers, with a detai l to be called for from each regiment and bat-
tal ion, the details to have at a l l times with them guns and 
accoutrements and sixty rounds of ammunition, their knapsacked 
l e f t behind i n camp. Commanding officers are referred for further 
instructions to the chapter on sieges in Revised Army Regulations. 
The brigade officer of the day w i l l not allow any f i res made inside 
of brigade headquarters. Regimental and battalion commanders w i l l 
be held s t r i c t l y responsible for the policing of their r i f l e - p i t s 
and for the good order that at a l l times must exist i n them. 
By order of Col. W. T. Spicely, commanding brigade: 
The art of psychological warfare was not unknown to the mil itary 
commanders of the C i v i l War as the following correspondence i l lustrates . 
GENERAL ORDERS 
No. 4 
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., SECOND DIV. 
THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, 
Before Blakely, A la . , Apri l 4, 1865 
F. T. LEWIS, 
Captain and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General 76 
76 O f f i c i a l Records, op. c i t . , Ser. I , XLIX, pt. 2, p. 231. 
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HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, 
Before Blakely, A la . , Apri l 1865 
COL. W. T. SPICELY, 
Commanding Second Brigade: 
COLONEL: Spanish Fort w i l l be bombarded at 5 o'clock this 
p.m. Let your men know i t , so that they can cheer for the benefit 
of the enemy i n Blakely. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant. 
GEORGE MONROE, 
Assistant Adjutant-General77 
[General Andrews' Staff] 
The execution of this no doubt had a moral effect on the garrison 
inside their works. However, i t produced more than just a moral effect. 
The shouts from many thousand voices made the Confederates 
think that they were going to be assaulted, and at sight of the 
skirmish-line of Moore's brigade they f e l l back rapidly to an 
interior l ine of p i ts , so that Moore's skirmishers, consisting of 
details from each regiment of the brigade, advanced nearly three 
hundred yards without resistance. This carried his l ine out of 
the woods, and upon a sort of plateau on a level with the g a r r i -
son' s main works, and only f ive hundred yards distance therefrom. 
Intrenchments were then commenced on the l ine thus gained and con-
tinued, but the work was d i f f i c u l t , for there were numerous stumps, 
and the surface was strewn with fal len pines. 78 
The ground i n front of Spicely's brigade was more earnestly con-
tested so that his skirmishers gained only a hundred and f i f t y yards. 
The l ines i n front of the colored division were advanced about two 
hundred yards, though at the expense of several k i l l e d and wounded. 
Previous to this date no a r t i l l e r y had been used by the besiegers, 
however, their f i r s t battery was put into action on this third day of 
the siege. Also making i t s f i r s t appearance on the siege l ine was part 
of Veatch's division. Around nine i n the evening, Brigadier General 
E l las S. Dennis' Second brigade moved to the front and occupied the 
77 Loc, c i t . 
Andrews, op. c i t . , p. 171 . 
94 
ground just north of the Pensacola road. This again enabled Andrews 
to close up his ranks so that his division was now entrusted with 
about three quarters of a mile in the siege line, 
4, Rather quiet during the day until 5 P.M. when our bat-
teries opened a terrific bombardment, on Fort Spanish, the extreme 
right of the Rebel works on the Mobile Bay. Heretofore they have 
had it all their own way and done all the fireing, so I think 
they were a little surprised to find us open all at once with 
fifty guns, and this is only a foretaste of what is to come. 79 
The soldiers' slumber was interrupted at daybreak, on the fourth 
day of the siege, April 5» with firing from the Second Connecticut 
battery located near the Stockton road. Throughout the day most of 
the Federal troops were occupied either on the forward lines of invest-
ment or behind the front line building artillery emplacements. In the 
afternoon, the position of Rinaker's brigade, Garrard's division, was 
changed from the right to the division's left. Late in the same after-
noon, his advanced skirmishers gained a position some four hundred 
yards from the Confederate's main works, but was fired upon with such 
intensity that his troops had to retreat. Some of the lost ground was 
regained, however, after dusk. 
In the evening, the skirmish line of Spicely's brigade gained one 
hundred and fifty yards, and intrenched within eighty yards of the 
Confederate's forward rifle-pits which were relatively unexposed as 
they were covered in front by an abatis. Moore's forward troops 
advanced forty yards through a network of pine logs. Both brigades by 
this time had two well built lines of entrenchments with safe approaches. 
79 Carlos W. Colby, op. cit., April 9. See Appendix I, p. 161. 
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The apprehension of a night sortie by the Confederates on the 
Union's r ight, caused General Steele to send Veatch's Third brigade, 
under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Kinsey, to the rear 
of Hawkins' division as a reinforcement. Nothing more, however, than 
the usual night skirmishing occurred i n front of the division. On 
Veatch's front, the investment l ine was advanced twenty-five yards on 
the right and nearly a hundred yards on the l e f t . 
5th. Nothing of interest i s transpiring along our l ines . 
Our large fatigue parties are gradually nearing their works by 
entrenching under the cover of darkness. The pits are dug deep 
and wide enough to hide a man, and then finished by day l i g h t . " 0 
At three o'clock on the morning of the 6th, the f i f t h day of the 
siege, the garrison made a sortie from opposite their fourth redoubt, 
down to their r ight, advancing their l ine with much noise and shouting. 
Their purpose, i t appeared, was to dislodge the besiegers' skirmishers. 
Along the l e f t half of the Union l i n e , the Federal troops held their 
ground firmly. The cunningness and quick thinking of the officers i n 
charge at the Union front were partly responsible by the Confederates' 
lack of success. 
Lieut, [A.R.] McDonald [of the Eleventh Wisconsin] had with him 
Sergeant Moore and about a dozen men. Being hard pressed, he 
undertook to awe his assailants by a strategem, and called out, 
"First and Second brigade supports, forward I" which had a good 
e f f e c t . 8 1 
Just before daylight, Apr i l 7, the sixth day of the siege, the 
garrison made another sortie against the advance l ine of the Thirteenth 
and Sixteenth Army Corps, assaulting the Union l ines from the Stockton 
80 
Loc, c i t , 
81Andrews, op. c i t . , p. 178. 
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road south. The Confederates, In a comparatively large force, deliver-
ing repeated volleys, charged with cheers up to the pits of the 
Federals. They were supported admirably by their artillery. The 
tumult of the roar of cannonading and musketry was near startling even 
to the veteran soldier. Only the steadfast soldiership of the few 
troops at the front enabled Steele's force to repulse the enemy. 
During the afternoon and continuing throughout the evening, rain 
fell making the air chilly and duty in the muddy trenches considerably 
uncomfortable. This unpleasantness, however, did not retard to any 
extent the process of developing lines opposite the Confederate works. 
New batteries were completed and work was continued on the investment 
lines. 
In Andrews' Second Division, Moore's brigade widened their third 
parallel from six to eight feet and extended it some to the left. The 
third entrenchment, in Spicely's brigade, opened one hundred and fifty 
yards from the left, along a crest and connected with an approach which 
had been finished the preceding day. This put their third parallel 
only five hundred yards from the Confederate fortifications. 
Inside the fortifications, three siege guns had been put in posi-
tion and were to take part in a heavy bombardment to take place the 
next morning at eight. The Confederates also had some seven inch guns, 
but these could not be put Into position for the want of platforms. 
Andrews relates an incident which was not an uncommon occurrence 
during the Civil War. 
Between the skirmishers of Garrard's division, of the 
Sixteenth corps, and of Thomas' Alabama reserves, a system of 
intercourse had grown up, which the garrison commander justly 
condemned. The men on the skirmish line made truces of some 
hours' length, during which they would meet and converse in a 
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friendly manner, often discussing public questions relating to 
the war. They would also exchange newspapers, and trade coffee 
and sugar for tobacco. They agreed also that there should be no 
f i r ing while the skirmish-line was being relieved. Then when they 
resumed their places, i t would sometimes happen that one or the 
other would c a l l out to warn his adversary that he was about to 
f i re . The garrison commander learned that the Sixteenth corps 
men were "very bold," and that they exposed themselves "without 
being fired upon with sufficient effect to make them timid." 
To abate the mischief, he directed Gen. Thomas, commanding the 
reserves, to send a company to report to Gen. Cockrell, to ex-
change for a company of his command, and that the old soldiers 
of Cockrell's divis ion should be scatted i n the skirmish pits 
with Thomas' men."2 
7th. I t rained nearly a l l day. There was about an hours 
heavy f i r i n g i n the morning. Then a l l was comparatively quiet. 
Two men from the regiment were wounded by their shel ls . Adjutant 
Prierson was wounded by an accidental discharge of a p istol i n 
the hands of one of the officers 8 3 
At one A.M. the morning of the eighth of Apr i l , the seventh day 
of the siege, the garrison, with their usual enterprise advanced a 
strong skirmish l i n e , covered by the f i r e of a r t i l l e r y , against the 
forward positions of Steele's besieging army. The heaviest fighting 
occurred on Veatch's front and on the right of Andrews' division. The 
Confederate movement was successfully repulsed, but an alarm was caused 
a l l along the Federal l i n e . Heavy f i r e continued along the l i n e , for 
about an hour both sides discharging missiles from a r t i l l e r y and 
muskets. 
At eight i n the morning, the Confederates opened with a l l their 
a r t i l l e r y , and f ired with uncommon vehemence for an hour. Their shells 
frequently struck the parapets of the besiegers' r i f l e - p i t s and exploded 
over them. Though there were many narrow escapes, the besieging army 
82Andrews, op. c i t . , p. 184 
83Carlos W. Colby, op. c i t . , Apr i l 9. See Appendix I , p. 162. 
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Incurred few casualties. Shortly after the bombardment commenced, i t 
was answered by the voluminous f i r i n g of the Union batteries. 
As the skirmish subsided toward the middle of the morning, work 
i n advancing the trenches was steadily progressing on a l l parts of the 
besieger's front throughout the day and following night. Work was also 
continued on some new batteries. 
During the day, orders were received by General Andrews to have 
his divis ion i n readiness to march with five days. rations i n the 
haversack and fifteen i n their wagons. The prospect of losing the 
results of their week's t o i l i n the development of l ines opposite the 
Confederate works was most unwelcome news for the men i n the divis ion. 
This order, did not, however, dampen their ardor as progress continued 
to be made on the divis ion's trenches. The movement of the divis ion 
from the l ines at Blakely did not transpire as i t was later learned 
that the order had been occasioned by a false alarm of Confederate 
troops gathering i n considerable force above Stockton, Alabama. 
Towards n ightfa l l , the troops on both sides remarked with awe, 
the t e r r i f i c cannonading at Spanish Fort. About ten i n the evening 
the besiegers heard of the assault there and that a lodgment had been 
effected. 
8th. Weather cloudy with a l i t t l e f a l l of ra in. We are 
rapidly approaching their works by entrenching. For the last 
hour there has been one of the heaviest bombardments on our 
extreme l e f t , near or at Fort Spanish that I ever heard. That 
i s their main works, with a continuous l ine of works to the 
r iver above Blakely. 
There i s more or less cannonading every day, our losses 
however, have been comparatively l i g h t , but three men i n the 
regiment have been wounded by the enemy's f i r e , seriously but 
not mortally. Yesterday Adjutant John R. Frierson was severely 
wounded by an accidental discharge of a p istol i n the hands of 
one of the off icers, the b a l l entering his mouth and passing 
through so as to be cut out at the back of the neck. I t i s 
thought, however, that he w i l l recover. 
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Map X. 
Map of the Final Line of Invest-
ment by the Federal Army at Blakely, 
Alabama. 
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Our division I s again under marching orders with five days. 
rations i n haversack and fifteen i n wagons. The report i s that 
i t i s to take supplies to General George H. Thomas and we suppose 
him to be near Montgomery, Alabama.84 
The morning of Sunday, Apr i l 9. the eighth and last day of the 
siege, was calm, for the skirmish l ine was unusually quiet. Around 
nine o'clock there was a shower of ra in, but the sun came out for a 
l i t t l e while, and the rest of the day was partly cloudy. 
The f a l l of the Old Spanish Fort enabled Canby to send more 
a r t i l l e r y to Blakely. In the course of the day, these were emplaced 
and opened f i r e , but were fa int ly answered by the defenders. 
The besiegers now had three l ines of entrenchments with safe 
approaches to them. This third l ine was, on the average, six hundred 
yards from the Confederate main works. Some of the skirmishers of 
Garrard's division were three hundred yards from them. On the two 
flanks of Moore's brigade of the Second Division, approaches had been 
opened a hundred yards out from the advance para l le l and a fourth 
para l le l was started. This located the brigade's front l ines about 
four hundred yards from the enemy's fort i f icat ions. In Spicely's 
brigade, the third para l le l , on the l e f t , was within about f ive hun-
dred yards of the garrison's main works, but this front l ine slanted 
toward the rear so that where i t crossed the Stockton road i t was close 
to eight hundred yards from the enemy. During the previous night, part 
of Hawkins. troops advanced their l ine about one hundred and forty 
yards. 
84 
Carlos W. Colby to his s i ster , Headquarters, Company G, 97th 
I l l i n o i s Volunteers, i n the f i e l d near Blakely, Apr i l 8, 1865; Carlos 
W. Colby, op. c i t . , Apr i l 9. See Appendix I , Letter No. 6, pp. 154 
and 162. 
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Up to this time, the colored division had taken the heaviest 
toll in casualties with sixteen killed and one hundred and seventy-
six wounded. The other divisions losses were about four or five 
killed and twenty to thirty wounded. 
Before noon reconnaissance reported some boats leaving Blakely 
loaded with Confederate troops. It was not long before the rumor ran 
through the Union lines that the enemy was evacuating. This report 
seemed to be confirmed by the unusual silence of both the Confederate 
artillery and sharpshooter fire. Soon there developed a general desire 
all along the besieger's line to take the first opportunity to move to 
"feel the enemy." 
General Garrard received instructions for his division to make an 
assault on the enemy's fortifications during the afternoon. The other 
divisions were at first supposed to support Garrard's division in its 
assault at five thirty in the late afternoon, however, by five o'clock 
all the division commanders had obtained permission to engage in a 
general assault and to move on the garrison works as far as they could 
go, and to enter the works if possible. 
All this time, the Union troops were deceived in supposing that 
any part of the garrison had evacuated. The troops they saw leaving 
Confederate fortifications were the small portion of the Spanish Fort 
garrison who had escaped through the swamps to Blakely. None of the 
Blakely garrison had left at all. General Liddell, upon receiving 
word of Canby's troops moving to the Blakely vicinity, ordered Thomas 
and Cockrell to hold their commands "in readiness for an assault at 
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Figure 1, 
A View in Front of Hawkins' Division 
from Sketches Drawn of the Battle Fields 
in 1866. 
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85 any moment." The garrison suffered a severe artillery fire during 
the forenoon, which dismounted "two guns, field pieces, Including the 
86 
only Blakely gun." The Confederate artillery did not, however, reply 
to this bombardment as they were saving their ammunition to repel an 
assault. 
Shortly after noon, the skirmishers in Pile's front of Hawkins' 
division reported that the Confederate sharpshooters in their front 
had suddenly become quiet and asked permission to "feel the enemy." 
General Pile ordered a few artillery shots fired to see what reply 
would be elicited. When no reply was made, he ordered thirty men and 
one commissioned officer from each regiment to be ready to advance. 
Shortly after three, this party sprang out of the rifle-pits and 
charged forward to capture, if possible, the Confederate advanced 
rifle-pits. They had no sooner left their cover when they were met 
with firing from both the enemy's sharpshooters and artillery. The 
assaulting party moved more cautiously, seeking what little cover 
there was behind stumps and felled trees. This protection, however, 
was only temporary, for in order to advance, they had to jump over the 
fallen trees and logs and were consequently much exposed. The ground 
was exceedingly rough and the assaulting party had three hundred yards 
of ground to contest. The garrison sharpshooters were located behind 
the protection of a strong line of abatis and took advantage of the 
exposure of the Union soldiers, many of whom were shot down as they 
advanced. But still the officers and men of the colored units kept 
85 
Official Records, op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 2, p. 1223. 
86Ibid., p. 1222. 
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moving forward with self possession and courage, and though fighting at 
a disadvantage, returned the fire with spirit. 
Perceiving by the steady advance of the assaulting party, that 
they meditated a serious attack, the garrison sent out reinforcements 
to their skirmish line, and the contest grew more obstinate. Still the 
Union skirmishers continued to move forward. Pile reinforced his first 
party with five companies with instructions to entrench immediately in 
the rear of the enemy's abatis. Within about an hour, Pile's assault-
ing force had gained three hundred yards necessary to take possession 
of the garrison's advanced rifle-pits, and inflicted some loss on their 
occupants as they fell back to the main breastworks. 
The skirmish line along the rest of Hawkins' division advanced 
about four o'clock. The Confederate advanced pits were captured in 
the front of Scofield's and Drew's brigades, yet without loss. In 
Drew's brigade, of the eleven officers in the assaulting party, seven 
were killed or wounded. 
The skirmish line of General Pile's brigade had been entrenched 
in their new position, under heavy fire, less than an hour, when the 
cheering of the white troops on their left was heard. Ascertaining 
that the Second Division was charging the main breastworks of the 
Confederates in their front, Pile ordered his brigade forward. The 
assault became general in the front of General Hawkins. division of 
colored troops. 
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Greater gallantry than was shown by officers and men could 
hardly be desired. The latter were burning with an impulse to 
do honor to their race, and rushed forward with intense enthusi-
asm, in the face of a terrible fire. As they got close to the 
works some of the confederates, dreading to fall into their hands, 
ran off to surrender to the white troops."87 
As the troops of Drew's brigade advanced, several of the 
Confederates, with muskets, remained outside of the works refusing to 
surrender, and maintained a cool and desperate struggle until they 
fell. As Scofield's line charged, the explosion of a single torpedo 
killed and wounded thirteen. As his troops were advancing, . .they 
heard a confederate officer behind the works exclaim, 'Lay low and mow 
the ground—the d d niggers are coming !' which became a byword in 
88 camp." The colored troops captured nine pieces of artillery, 304 89 
pieces of small arms, and 200 men plus 21 officers. The colored 
division's loss in the assault was thirty-two killed and one hundred 
and forty-seven wounded. Of these, quite a proportion were officers. 
The division's total loss In killed and wounded before Blakely was 
three hundred and seventy-one, of those killed, five commissioned 
officers and forty-three men, of those wounded, twenty-three com-
90 missioned officers and three hundred and one men. 
87 Andrews, op. cit., p. 200. 
88 Ibid., pp. 200-201. 
The feelings of the Confederate soldiers towards the Federal 
colored troops is interesting. The facts seem to indicate that a 
good many of the Confederates both feared and hated the Union's colored 
soldiers. This is indicated in the last two quotations, the latter 
by the fact that the resistance on Hawkins. front was stiffer, for 
the division's losses were the heaviest of all the divisions taking 
part in the siege and assault of Blakely. 
89Official Records, op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 1, pp. 887-288. 
90 Andrews, op>. cit., p. 201. 
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The prisoners [taken by Hawkins' division] were treated 
with kindness. A colored soldier of the Fiftieth regiment 
found his former master among the prisoners. They appeared 
happy to meet, and drank from the same canteen. Some of the 
Louisiana men, however, made an attack on the prisoners and were 
with difficulty restrained from injuring them. The latter almost 
invited attack by manifesting an unreasonable dread of the colored 
soldiers; huddling in heaps as if their captors were wild beats. 
Capt. Norwood and Lieut. Gleason of the Sixty-eighth were wounded, 
the latter mortally, in their efforts to save the prisoners.91 
In the Second Division headquarters, it was arranged that a regi-
ment, deployed as skirmishers, should advance in front of each brigade. 
After these regiments had gained one hundred and fifty yards, the re-
mainder of the brigades would follow, deployed in a line of battle. 
The assault was to commence with the Second brigade, and the cheer of 
the skirmish line, as it started, was to be the signal for the skirmish 
line to start in front of the Third brigade. The commander of the 
latter brigade, Colonel Moore, assigned the position of advance skir-
mish line to the Eighty-Third Ohio. At the request of its commander, 
the Ninety-Seventh Illinois was designated for the skirmish line of 
Spicely's brigade. Both brigades were on the front trenches at about 
half past five. 
91This attitude of the colored troops is also quite interesting. 
Though not mentioned in his letters, Carlos W. Colby, in his War 
Memoirs written some forty-five years after the Civil War wrote the 
following concerning the charge of (probably) Piles' brigade. . . . 
I had a grand and thrilling sight of seeing a charge of a colored 
brigade off to the right; now dropping down out of sight as a charge 
of canister went over them, then up and forward with thinned ranks, 
always keeping an eye on the gun for smoke, again to fall as the charge 
went over them. As the storming column climbed over the works, I could 
hear their yell, 'Fort Pillow, Fort Pillow,' in retaliation for the 
massacre of colored prisoners captured there." (The War Memoirs of 
Carlos W. Colby, manuscript, possession of author".) 
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Lieut.-Col. Vifquain had the Ninety-seventh deployed, and had 
passed along the trenches once or twice to see that everything was 
in readiness, when an explosion of a torpedo occurred on the rear 
edge of the trench, tearing off the leg of Capt. Wisner, of the 
Ninety-Seventh Illinois, who was endeavoring to pass to his com-
pany, and injuring to all appearances, fatally, one or two men. 
It was no happy augury, and as the wounded were borne along the 
trench and approach to the rear, the spirits of the beholders 
seemed depressed. Such is the terror of concealed danger.92 
This occurrence caused a short delay, and it was almost six when 
the movement commenced. " . . . .Lieutenant-Colonel Vifquain, command-
ing the Ninety-Seventh Illinois Infantry, gave the command, 'Forward, 
Ninety-Seventh!' at which time his regiment sprang with him over the 
parapet, and with a loud cheer charged in line as skirmishers upon 
93 
the enemy. Instantly the Ninety-Seventh was met with a volley of 
bullets, and before they had gone twenty yards, a few men fell. Less 
than a moment later, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Baldwin's regiment, 
the Eighty-Third Ohio dashed out of their trenches toward the 
Confederates raising a chorus of cheers. By this time, three or four 
pieces of artillery from the garrison were brought to bear on these 
regiments, firing rapidly. The enemy's sharpshooters being disposed 
to hold their position, met the assault with a bitter musketry fire. 
The soldiers of the Illinois regiment began returning the fire when 
less than a hundred yards out of their trenches. The contest grew 
more and more bitter, the Union soldiers gaining ground every minute 
while the Confederates reluctantly retreated. It was soon evident 
that the garrison was in full strength instead of having only part of 
their force still inside the works as it had been believed before the 92 
Andrews, op. cit., pp. 202-203. 
Official Records. op. cit.. Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 1, p. 201. 
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Figure 2. 
A View from the Centre of Andrews' 
Second Division Showing the Confederate 
Redoubt No. from Sketches Drawn of the 
Battle Fields in 1866. 
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assault began. Literally swarms of defenders retreated from their 
rifle-pits to their main fortifications, near the fourth redoubt. 
The Ninety-Seventh had gone but a short distance when the remain-
ing regiments of Spicely's brigade sprang forward. Lieutenant Colonel 
Oran Perry's regiment, the Sixty-Ninth Indiana, was on the left flank 
of the brigade; the Seventy-Sixth Illinois, under the command of 
Colonel Samuel Busey, occupied the centre of the line, and the Twenty-
Fourth Indiana regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Francis A. Sears, command-
ing, moved from the right flank position north of the Stockton road 
against the third redoubt. These regiments charged with great enthu-
siasm and gallantry. Lieutenant Colonel Perry was severely wounded 
before he had gotten two hundred yards. Colonel Busey's regiment had 
one man killed at the first line of abatis and at the second line, the 
battle became fierce and bloody. The garrison maintained a bold front 
from behind their breastworks, and when the Seventy-Sixth Illinois was 
within fifty yards of the fourth redoubt, they suffered severely from 
the Confederate musketry and artillery. While part of the regiment 
sustained a spirited fire, the rest crossed the abatis and commenced 
the charge on the main works. 
The Twenty-Fourth Indiana entered the Confederate works on the 
right of the Seventy-Sixth Illinois, shortly after the latter had 
position. Colonel Sears' regiment had a difficult terrain to cover, 
which included passing over two deep entangled swampy ravines. 
. . . .when part was to the confederate works, the regiment 
was halted, and ordered to lie down. But such was the ardor of 
the men that their commander found it difficult to restrain them, 
and bade them go on. Such was their ardor they did not stop to 
capture the confederate skirmishers, nor even disarm all they met. 
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One of the latter raised his hands, to indicate his submission, 
and after the Twenty-Fourth men had passed him turned and fired 
on them grazing the ear of a man named Messer. The latter turned 
turned upon him, and shot him dead. 94 
The loss of the Twenty-Fourth Indiana was about twelve killed and 
wounded. 
The soldiers of the Ninety-Seventh Illinois had gotten rather 
scattered having started deployed as skirmishers, but mostly being 
veterans, they knew well how to take care of themselves and performed 
their duty with unflinching valor. The colors of the regiment were 
planted on the enemy's fortifications almost simultaneously with the 
Eighty-Third Ohio. Colonel Spicely in his report tells the following 
about the assault. 
His [Colonel Vifquain's] command was closely followed by 
the rest of my command, and the contest for a long time seemed 
to be who should arrive in the enemy's works first. The dash 
was so sudden and Impetuous that it was almost impossible to 
determine who arrived first. But the honor of first entering 
the works is justly due to the Ninety-Seventh Illinois. . . ."95 
. . .going into battle with about 300 men and losing 6l killed 
and wounded," was what Vifquain recorded in his official report of the 
96 
assault. The loss in the Sixty-Ninth Indiana regiment, was ten 
wounded. Spicely's brigade took the heaviest toll in killed and 
wounded than any other brigade on the battlefield, totaling two hun-
dred and two. 
In Moore's brigade, part of the advanced skirmish line had three 
ravines to pass over. The colors of the Eighty-Third Ohio moved on 
94Andrews, op. cit., p. 206. 
95Official Records. op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 1, p. 209. 
96Ibid., pp. 213-214. 
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the l i n e , advancing as fast as the nature of the ground and the 
obstacles of brush and logs would permit. When the regiment descended 
into the ravine nearest the Confederate works, i t was deep and long 
enough that almost the entire regiment was lost from sight for two or 
three minutes. The entanglement i n the bottom of this ravine was 
jungle- l ike and almost defied the passage of persons even at a time of 
leisure and unencumbered with weapons. This type of obstruction was 
common a l l along the territory being assaulted by the Union army. 
As the Eighty-Third Ohio regiment reached the last and most im-
pregnable abatis nearest the enemy's breastworks, the rest of Moore's 
brigade commenced the charge. On the right was the Thirty-Fourth 
Iowa, under the command of Colonel George W. Clark; right of centre 
was Colonel John H. Kel ly's regiment, the One Hundred and Fourteenth 
Ohio| l e f t of centre, the Thirty-Seventh I l l i n o i s regiment under the 
command of Colonel Charles Black and covering the brigade's l e f t 
flank was the Twentieth Iowa, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph 
B. Leake. A l l of these were veteran regiments with gallant and able 
commanders. As soon as the Eighty-Third Ohio had made a passage through 
the last abatis, the regiment, with dauntless s p i r i t , charged forward 
and were soon upon the redoubt directly i n front of them. 
Lieut. -Col. Baldwin was soon on the parapet; and seeing 
that the most of his regiment was ready to mount the works, he 
jumped down inside, and cried out, "Surrender!" The commanding 
officer inquired, "To whom do we surrender?" Baldwin answered, 
"To the Eighty-Third Ohio." Then the officer said, " I believe 
we did that once before,"—referring to a somewhat similar 
occasion a t Vicksburg.9? 
9 7 "Andrews, op. c i t . , p. 209. 
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Following the path opened by Baldwin's regiment, the other reg i -
ments i n the brigade were soon through the abatis and upon the 
Confederate works. Of the brigade losses, the Eighty-Third Ohio took 
the heaviest t o l l ; their total almost equaled the rest of the brigade, 
with seven k i l l e d and twenty-one wounded, the Thirty-Fourth Iowa had 
three k i l l e d and twelve wounded, the loss i n the Thirty-Seventh 
I l l i n o i s was one k i l l e d and three wounded, the One Hundred and 
Fourteenth Ohio had only two wounded, and the Twentieth Iowa escaped 
the assault with only i t s flag being shot through. 
The number of prisoners taken by the Second Division totaled one 
thousand three hundred. The fort if icat ions of the enemy carried was 
three-quarters of a mile. The total number of casualties incurred by 
Andrews' division was two hundred and thirty three, forty one k i l l e d 
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and one hundred and ninety two wounded. 
Next on the l e f t i n the Union's l ine of assault was Brigadier 
General E l las S. Dennis1 brigade of Veatch's divis ion. This brigade's 
assault took part of the f i f t h redoubt and the enemy's works south to 
the Pensacola road. Their charge was lead by the Eighth I l l i n o i s 
regiment. The brigade's losses i n the assault were thirteen k i l l e d 
and sixty-four wounded, of these, the Eighth I l l i n o i s regiment alone 
lost ten k i l l e d and f i f t y four wounded. In Veatch's front, about 
three hundred prisoners were captured. 
General Garrard's divis ion, assigned to the large task of carry-
ing the extreme l e f t flank of the Union forces, assaulted the works i n 
the divis ion's f u l l strength of three brigades comprised of fourteen 
— 
9 8 I b i d . , p. 210. 
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Figure 3. 
A View from the Right of Garrard's 
Division from Sketches Drawn of the Battle 
Fields in 1866. 
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regiments. The right side of the divis ion's trenches being closest 
to the Confederate fort i f icat ions, the commander ordered the assault 
99 
to commence from t h e r e . " This included Colonel John I. Rinsker's 
brigade which was primarily on the south side of the Pensacola road 
and the right half of Colonel Charles L. Harris' brigade which was 
located i n the centre of the division. Rinaker ordered the Eighty-
Ninth Indiana to take the honored position as advanced skirmishers 
for their brigade, and the Eleventh Wisconsin occupied the same posi-
tion i n front of Harris' brigade. Garrard ordered his skirmish l ine 
to form i n two l ines supported by the main l ine of battle. When the 
f i r s t skirmish l ine had started and appeared to be moving with success, 
the second l ine was to begin the charge, and then when the f i r s t l ine 
reached the enemy's main works, the main l ine of battle was to start . 
This plan of battle was adopted by the division commander because of 
the terr ible obstructions i n his front. 
When the order to charge was given the skirmish l ine sprang over 
their parapets with the ringing cheers of veterans, rushed onward, 
with emulous ardor and high resolve, to victory or death. Though en-
countering a destructive f i r e of musketry, grape, and canister, the 
gallant troops stormed forward. Though many were struck down, and the 
ranks of the leading regiments were v i s i b l y thinned, the survivors 
moved unfalteringly to the main works where they engaged i n hand to 
hand combat with the garrison defenders who fought with an unyielding 
s p i r i t . 
99See Map No. 10, p. 105. 
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No sooner had the right half of the division commenced their 
assault than the left half started. Brigadier General James I. 
Gilbert's brigade, on the extreme left of the division, and the re-
mainder of Harris. brigade moved forward simultaneously with part of 
the Twenty-Seventh Iowa in advance as the forward skirmishers. This 
portion of Garrard's division made a charge of the longest distance, 
from nine hundred to one thousand one hundred yards had to be covered 
before reaching the Confederate's breastworks. In their front, the 
artillery uttered its last fierce thunders, pouring forth shell, grape 
and canister} the musketry volleys rolled along the line in quick suc-
cession, and clouds of smoke rose up from the besieged works. The Union 
soldiers continued to advance unfalteringly against this ferocious fire. 
The heaviest resistance was encountered by the Tenth Kansas directly in 
front of the Sixth redoubt. 
The furious fire that had beset them, made them cluster in a 
group, and they entered the works more as a column in mass than 
in line. Then, with fixed bayonets, they swept along the works 
to their right, mixing blue and gray together) and the latter, 
seeing their helpless condition, huddled into the angles of the 
fort, and making little resistance, surrendered by scores. Yet 
there was some firing after the Tenth were inside the works, for 
a number of the confederates refused to surrender.100 
Garrard's division in carrying the Confederate works captured 
". . .21 guns, 4 mortars, and 1,524 enlisted men, and 100 officers, 
Including 2 brigadier-generals, one of them Brigadier General Liddell, 
commanding East District of the Gulf, at the division's loss of forty-
one killed and one hundred and twenty-three wounded.101 
100 
Andrews, op. c i t . , p. 217. 
1 0 1 0 f f i c i a l Records, op. cit., Ser. I , XLIX, pt. 1 , p. 247. 
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The total casualties of the Union army engaged in the assault 
were six hundred and fifty-four, one hundred and twenty seven killed 
and five hundred and twenty-seven wounded. Though there is no account 
of the number of Confederate casualties, probably they totaled about 
102 
one third that incurred by the assaulting army. "About 3,200 
prisoners, 40 pieces of artillery, a large amount of ordnance and sub-
sistence stores, &c., fell in our hands," recorded General Steele in 
his Official Report.103 
Carlos W. Colby, late of the Ninety-Seventh Illinois regiment, 
gave the following account of the assault on his brigade's front in a 
letter to his sister, Sallie. 
I suppose if I do not give a full account of the fight, that 
you will give me a scolding, and as I should not like to be 
scolded, I think I had better report to the best of my ability. 
Well, at about 5 P.M. on the 9th Inst, the order came to 
fall in. And then everyone knew that there was a charge to be 
made. From all appearances of things I had made up my mind that 
such was to be the case soon after dinner. We made our way to our 
advance rifle pits, which is a good five hundred yards distant 
from the rebel works. While we were forming in the pits, Capt. 
Wisner of Co. D stepped upon the bank in the rear of the pits 
and was walking along close by where I stood when he stepped on a 
torpedo which exploded, completely severing his right leg from 
his body at the knee. The lines stood four deep in the pits, 
the 24th Ind. in the advance on the right of our Brigade, sup-
ported by the 76th Ill. and we in the advance on the left sup-
ported by the 69th Ind. The 83rd Ohio was in the advance on 
the right of the 3rd brigade, resting on our left. 
The order was given to charge, the advance immediately 
started with a whoop and yell. Our route lay for the first hun-
dred yards, over the brow of a hill exposed to a raking fire from 
two forts{ with an abatis work of brush and fallen timber, which, 
for a man without any opposition, was hard to get through. On 
this hill we suffered the most, but no man but what was wounded. 
102 Andrews, op. cit., p. 220. 
The number of Confederate casualties is not given in the Official 
Records. 
1030fficial Records, op. cit., Ser. I, XLIX, pt. 1, pp. 283-284. 
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faltered. Then we had to cross a valley of fallen and tangled 
timber, every man doing his best, firing while on the run and then 
dropping behind a stump or log to reload. At a distance of fifty 
yards from their works, there was another abatis, more difficult 
than the first. As I was climbing through it I 3aw the flash of 
a cannon on my right which I knew was belching forth grape and 
canister, but I was in a tangled mess of limbs and could not fall. 
It proved to be loaded with grape, one struck my gun and shattered 
it in my hand, another passed through my blouse, and the third 
struck the sole of my boot nearly cutting it through, but not a 
single one touched me. I then advanced fifteen or twenty steps 
when I saw a man fall a little to my left. I had started for his 
gun when a musket ball took me in the leg. At first I thought it 
was a spent ball and was going on but had proceeded but a few 
steps when I fell and could go no farther. Then on examination I 
found the ball had passed clear through the fleshy part of the 
leg and was bleeding profusely. 
After creeping back to a little less exposed position, I 
laid and watched the lines as they advanced on top of the parapets. 
I claim that our colors was second to none in being planted on 
the parapets, as far as I could see, and that was through two 
brigades. I have sent you a New Orleans paper of the 10th with 
an article on the taking of the place, the writer gives us no 
credit whatever, but speaks in the highest praise of other regi-
ments in the division. One thing is certain, we lost heavier than 
any other according to our numbers, we losing sixty-two, I think, 
out of less than four hundred in the charge. The loss from our 
whole division was only about two hundred. Where we charged was 
the most exposed position, and had more torpedoes than any other 
place. Immediately in front of where Capt. Wisner was blown up, 
fifteen or twenty large torpedoes have been dug up, and that is 
exactly where I came out of the works. I was lucky enough to 
escape, but poor John Wyant stepped on one and exploded it, tear-
ing off one leg and badly shattering the other. Lowe, our color 
bearer, was shot after planting the colors on their works. A 
braver lad never lived, after he was shot, he sent his compli-
ments to the Colonel and said he had put the colors on their works. 
I was helped off the field by two boys from the 15th Mase. 
Batty., I would not let the stretcher bearers take me for there 
were many worse wounded. I got to the division hospital and had 
my wound dressed by about nine o'clock. 104 
Though the Union soldiers gallantly stormed from their parapets, 
charging the enemy's works, there was every reason for them to dread 
104Carlos W, Colby to his sister, Sallie, Sedgwick U. S. General 
Hospital, Ward 10, New Orleans, Louisiana, April 17, 1865, manuscript, 
in possession of author. See Appendix I, Letter No. 8, pp. 164-168. 
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the assault. The nature of the ground over which the assault was made, 
i t s being cut up by almost impassable ravines, rough terrain, covered 
with man-placed obstructions, and mined i n many places with torpedoes; 
there was l i t t l e wonder that the Union losses were not even heavier 
than they were in the th i rty - f ive regiments, some sixteen thousand 
troops which participated i n the assault. 
The assault l ine was about three miles i n length, and the advance 
of the entire l ine was remarkably simultaneous. 
The scene was picturesque and grand. From different points 
view the assaulting l ines could be seen for a mile or two, as far 
even as the form of men could be distinguished moving over the 
broken ground. The regimental colors, though not in perfect l i n e , 
were steadily advancing, and the troops were dashing on over and 
through the obstructions l i k e a stormy wave. I t was at a moment 
when the shock of battle was the f iercest. In the clamor could 
be heard the voices of the assaulting troops. Nothing could ex-
ceed their enthusiasm. I f then they could have known the great 
event that had occurred a few hours before——that Lee had surren-
dered -—and that their contest would probably be the last impor-
tant struggle of the war, they could hardly have experienced more 
exulting emotions, or pressed forward with more dauntless step. 
I t seemed as i f , " a l l the joy, a l l the sensation of l i f e , was i n 
that moment, that they cast themselves with the fierce gladness 
of mountain torrents, headlong on that brief revelry of glory."105 
105 
Andrews, op. c i t . , p. 221. 
For the preceding chapter, the following sources were consulted. 
O f f i c i a l Records, op. c i t . , Ser. I , XLIX, pt. 1 . Union Reports: No's. 
1 - 8 , pp. 91-150; Nos. 10-34, pp. 153-216; Nos. 55-71, pp. 247-267; and 
Nos. 79-95, PP. 279-313. O f f i c i a l Records. op. c i t . , Ser. I , XLIX, 
pt. 2. Correspondences Union; p. 192, p. 193, pp. 195-196, p. 195, 
PP. 195-196, p. 208, p. 210, p. 211 , p. 212, p. 227, p. 229, p. 230, 
p. 231, p. 232, pp. 232-233, p. 233, p. 234, p. 242, p. 244, p. 245, 
p. 246, p. 247, p. 248, p. 251, P. 252, p. 256, pp. 264-265, p. 266, 
pp. 266-267, p. 267, p. 268, p. 269, pp. 281-282, p. 282, p. 283, 
p. 284, p. 286, pp. 286-287, p. 287, p. 288, p. 289, p. 295, p. 298, 
P. 299, p. 302, p. 303, p. 304, p. 305, pp. 305-306, p. 306, and 
p. 307; Confederate; p. 1190, p. 1194, p. 1204, p. 1209, p. 1210, 
p. 1214, p. 1217, p. 1219, p. 1222 and pp. 1222-1223. 
Andrews, op. c i t . , pp. 121-129 and 168-222. 
Carlos W. Colby, op. c i t . , Letters of Apr i l 8, Apr i l 9, and 
Apr i l 17 , 1865. 
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CHAPTER V i l l 
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The f a l l of Blakely and the capture of I t s garrison l e f t the 
Confederates with less than five thousand troops for the immediate 
defense of the c i ty of Mobile. The Confederate naval strength, having 
been primarily eliminated i n the Battle of Mobile Bay, though i n Apr i l 
of 1865, outnumbered the Union's navy i n small draught vessels and was 
insuff ic ient to repulse an attack which might be made upon Mobile from 
the seaward side. General Maury, finding his force too small to hold 
the c i t y , evacuated his position on the 11th and 12th of Apr i l . Learn-
ing of t h i s , part of General Canby's force landed near the c i t y , entered 
i t unopposed, and put Mobile under Federal occupation. Though not an 
important part of the Union's strategic picture, the move was deemed 
an expedient one. The occupation of Mobile, however, added to the 
Campaign's already achieved success and attainment of i t s strategic 
objective. As previously stated, the main strategic objective of the 
Mobile Campaign was to establish a l ine of communication for subsequent 
mil itary operations into the State of Alabama and neighboring Georgia. 
The conduct of the Confederate garrison of Blakely was, on the 
whole, commendable. The defending troops manifested much energy and 
s p i r i t during the siege and bravely made s a l l i e s on several nights, 
greatly disturbing the besiegers. Apprehending that an assault was 
about to take place, the soldiers of the garrison fe l t confident they 
could repulse i t . Needless to say, the s p i r i t s of the defenders were 
s l ight ly dampened by the moral and mil itary advantage of the besieging 
troops i n having reinforcements from the Old Spanish Fort in their 
124 
rear. Had Steele's forces assaulted Blakely prior to the fall of the 
Confederate works to Canby, the garrison would have had more hope in 
resisting the assault. 
Aside from lacking adequate ammunition, guns and troops for proper 
defense of their works, the Confederates made two mistakes with respect 
to their defense during the assault. A large number of sharpshooters 
or skirmishers were in pits three hundred yards in front of their main 
works when the assault began. They had an opportunity to fire only once 
or twice, before they fell back. But there was no covered route of 
retreat, and not being able, on account of the obstacles, to move 
rapidly, they were for a short time a sort of cover to the assaulting 
troops, embarrassing, if not preventing the fire of those behind the 
main works. Had these skirmishers been able to retreat by means of a 
covered route, even part of the distance, it would have enabled the 
troops inside the main fortifications to have rendered a more effective 
fire upon the assaulting force. Even more practicable, if, instead of 
being three hundred yards to the front, had the main body of the sharp-
shooters been in rifle-pits fifty yards in front, with approaches into 
the main works, a double line of musketry fire could have been poured 
on the assaulting Federal troops just as they were reaching the most 
difficult abatis. The garrison's second mistake was their failure to 
carry out the rules for defending fortifications. These rules required 
the garrison to mount the parapet when they found the assaulting troops 
were attacking closely. This did not appear anywhere on the line. 
The commanders in the garrison were not entirely responsible, for 
these mistakes should not have happened. There is little doubt that 
the garrison at Blakely should have been evacuated within an hour after 
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the fall of Spanish Fort. Every possible means should have been used 
to remove the defending troops before an assault could be made. This, 
however, was not ordered by the commanding general in Mobile. General 
Maury alleged that it would have been difficult to evacuate the garri-
son at Blakely after daylight, and before this time, not all of the 
Spanish Fort garrison which escaped to Blakely had been transferred to 
Mobile, and thus, he thought an evacuation of the Blakely garrison was 
not possible. Had the Blakely garrison been evacuated, Maury could 
have assembled a force of about nine thousand strong for the defense of 
the city of Mobile. This is just short of the total number of effec-
tive troops estimated to be necessary for sustaining an assault of the 
city by a force numbering about forty thousand and resisting the attack 
for ninety days. Thus, in retrospect, saving the Blakely garrison from 
being captured could have enabled General Maury to have sustained re-
sistance for about three months at Mobile. 
The question as to the favorability of the time for the assault 
on the Confederate works has posed some interesting speculation, how-
ever, the facts indicate that the question should be answered in the 
affirmative. The troops engaged in the assault had the moral support 
of the presence of the rest of the army which had come from Spanish 
Fort, even though the latter troops were not used in the assault. No 
doubt, when the garrison saw the assaulting lines advancing, they felt 
that the woods behind them were also full of troops, for they could 
not have failed to hear the victorious troops as they marched to the 
Blakely vicinity. Could the garrison troops have repulsed an attack a 
day or so earlier? It is difficult to give even a speculative answer 
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to this question, though one fact is certain, their hope of effecting 
a repulse would have been greater. As it was, nowhere along the line 
was the general assault repulsed. 
It is probable that General Steele would have waited a few days 
before ordering a general assault had it not been for the fall of the 
Spanish Fort, the distance over which a charge had to be made, such as 
it was, five or six hundred yards. It is also probable that the assault 
coming when it did, saved many of the besiegers' lives. Following the 
assault, it was found that where the fourth parallel probably would 
have been dug by the Union soldiers, there were many torpedoes buried. 
There is little doubt that many lives would have been lost by farther 
extension of the approaches and trenches. 
The amount of work performed by the besiegers in the development 
of the lines opposite the Confederate works was commendable. Each 
division constructed its entrenchments according to its own plans, and 
had little, if any professional assistance from engineers of the com-
manding general's staff. In total, about ten miles of trenches and 
approaches were constructed. The entire investment was completed with-
out the capture of a single Union soldier. 
When the Mobile Campaign commenced no one knew just how long the 
war would continue. Since most of the Confederate forces east of the 
Mississippi river surrendered within a month after the fall of Blakely, 
just what the effect of the Campaign on the general military situation 
of the war, is difficult to ascertain. The success of Canby's opera-
tions around Mobile, occurring at the same time as Lee's surrender at 
Appomattox, followed by the capture of Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, 
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was influential in pointing out that the continuation of hostilities, 
after the Confederacy had once again been split, was useless. 
The battles at the Old Spanish Fort and at Blakely were the last 
ones of any size fought. The Campaign was one of the concluding steps 
in the final defeat of the Confederacy. Had the Campaign and the 
other Union elements operating in northern and western Alabama failed, 
the vast area from the middle of Mississippi to the middle of Georgia 
would still have been left intact, from which the hostilities of 
Confederacy might have been continued. With this area from which to 
operate, it might have offered an outlet for the Confederate armies in 
the east, namely those of Lee and Johnston, to escape. 
In the Mobile Campaign, both the Confederate and Union armies 
were entitled to praise for their constant industry and energy. The 
gallantry displayed by the officers and soldiers of both the Blue and 
the Gray in this Campaign has rarely been surpassed. 
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Union Letters of Carlos W. Colby, February 19, 1865 
to Apr i l 17 , 1865 
Letter No, 1 
Hd. Qrs. Co G. 97 I l l s . 
Barrancas Florida 
February 19th 1863 
My Dear Neace Carr ie 1 
How often do I think of you, and Sympathis with you, since the 
2 
loss of your dearly beloved Mama, As long as i t i s daylight I have 
plenty to do to ocupy my mind, but when night comes then i t again 
returns to my mind how desolate and lonely i t must be at home without 3 
your Dear Mama And yet Dear Carrie i t i s a l l for the best, for her 
Soul w i l l rest i n peace, with your Dear Grandma i n Heaven. So why 
should we wish to c a l l her back to Earth, where a l l i s t o i l and 
trouble. Since I l e f t home I have often resolved to write you but 
have so often broken my resolve and this i s the f i r s t time that I have 
carried i t into effect with Pen, and Paper, Most of my time dureing 
the week i s ocupied i n doing the duties that are required of me i n 
camp, so much so that I can not have time to write a letter without 
being disturbed. For the past week have had to d r i l l s ix hours a day 
beside the many other l i t t l e thing that had to be done, so you see I 
do not have much time to myself. And as for writing after night that 
1Niece Carrie i s the daughter of Carlos W. Colby's s i s t e r , 
Caroline Colby Thomas, also sometimes called Carrie. 
2 
Caroline Thomas died i n December, 1864, shortly after giving 
birth to Charles (Charlie) Thomas. 
3 
Many places Carlos W. Colby f a i l s to add punctuation, often i t 
i s d i f f i c u l t to distinguish between his commas, periods, and where 
new sentences begin. 
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is out of the question, for our house is so small that we can have 
neither Chairs nor table in it, And a l l the protection we have from 
the Earth is a Rubber Blanket spread on the Ground, that has to serve 
for Chairs to sit on, a table to eat from, and a bed to sleep on, In 
my tent there are two beside myself Wm [William D] Perrin, and Orville 
Paddock [Jr.],4 each of us have a piece of tent cloth buttoned together 
at the ends and stretched over a pole, so as to look like the roof of 
a house with the third piece we will up one of the tent, and then for 
the other end we use a rubber blanket, in this way we have a house 
big enough to crawl into but not b i g enough to stand up in, then when 
we go on a march each man takes his piece of tent, his Rubber, and 
Woolen Blanket and r o l l s them up in his Knapsack with all his cloths, 
so that when we stop at night we can have our house built and ready to 
go to bed in a half hour after stoping, beside this a Soldier has to 
carry a Canteen full of Water, a Haversack with Rations to eat for two 
or three days, a Gun and Cartridge Box. Makeing as some of the boys 
say [,]a full Mule load. 
We are having dlightful warm and pleasant weather. The grass is 
looking as green, and the birds sing as gaily as they do in April with 
you. 
I have no news to tell you, nor anything to write about that will inter-
est you that I can think of So you will have to excuse me for not 
writing a more interesting letter 
4-
Members of Company G., Ninty-seventh Illinois Volunteer Regiment, 
Perrin is from Hardin, Illinois and Paddock is from Alton, Illinois. 
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Now Carrie you must write me and tell me how you are getting along 
with your Studies and whether Marshall learns as fast as ever or not. 
I am expecting to be greatly astonished when I come home after seven 
months more service to find how much progress you have made in your 
Studies so you will not let me be disapointed? Will You? I wrote 
to your Papa one day last week. Give my love and Kises to All, Without 
forgetting to throw in several extra Kisses to Marshal[l]5 and 
Charlie6 
I remain ever Your loving 
Uncle 
Carlie 
5 Carlos W. Colby's nephew, Carrie's seven year old brother. 6 
Carlos W. Colby's nephew, Carrie's two months old brother. 
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Letter No. 2 
Barrancas Fla. Feb. 22nd [1865] 
7 Dear Sallie' 
The National Salute in honor of Washingtons birthday has just 
ceased fireing. 
Time has flown so rapidly with me as since being in the service of 
my Country. I can hardly realize that two years have passed away 
since I was on picket at Youngs Point and heard the salute fired from 8 
all Gun Boats at the mouth of Yazoo river And yet such is the case 
and an eventful two years it has been to my self And one of deep 
Affliction to our family. 
I believe that our Regiment is the only one here that is cele-
brating the day by not drilling. And that is a wonder too for Col. 
9 
Vifquain is the hardest drill master here, by all odds. As a general 
thing, there has to be a good excuse or he will have us drilling. 
Vifquain is a man that I respect, still I fear him Since he 10 
has come in command [,] the Regt. has been under the strictest 
Military discipline Some of his rules are rather grinding to a 
volunteer, and I sometimes think useless, Although I had rather it 
7 Carlos W. Colby's sister, Sarah. 
8In February, 1863 the Ninty-seventh Illinois was taking part in 
the Vicksburg Campaign. Young's Point is about ten miles due west of 
Vicksburg, Mississippi. The mouth of the Yazoo River is just north 
of Young's Point on the east side of the Mississippi River. 
9 
Lieutenant Colonel Victor Vifquain was the Commander of Ninty-
seventh Illinois Volunteer Regiment. He was awarded the Congressional 
Medal of Honor for gallantry displayed in the assault of the Confederate 
works at Blakely, Alabama. 
10Carlos W. Colby abbreviates regiment both "Regt." and "Rgt." 
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would be so, than to be ruled by as lenient hand as formerly, for 
then a good Soldier had all the duty to preform and a shirk was 
always playing off. By being so strict he has made a good many 
enemies, some of whom have been writing him Anonamous letters, making 
some dreadful threats, Shaving his Horses Main tail & &. He suspects 
it to be the doings of some of the members of Co. G. Should not be 
at all surprised if his supposition was correct, for since I have been 
back to the Regt. Our Company have had eight or ten men tried by Court 
Martial for various misdemeanors At the present time we have six under 
Arrest [three] Absent, and three present. As many more [roughs] might 
be subtracted from the Company and then would [we would still] have a full 
compliment of roughs. One thing is certain the Colonel keeps a sharp 
eye on us so that we are well looked after He has the keenest eye of 
any man I ever saw, he can see every movement that is made on Dress 
parade, and the penalty of moving hand or foot or of the least un-
necessary noise is six days extra duty to a private or the reduction 
to a non commissioned Officer. As for myself believe am rather a 
favorate for I have crossed him two or three times, and as yet have 
never been reproved. 
Troops are concentrating at this place, All preparations are 
being made for a Military movement in some direction prehaps through 
the interior of the State to Montgomery [Alabama], that I should much 
prefer to staying here all summer (Although this is a healthy place) 
for I have always had the best health when on the march, And [I] 
can stand the marching as well as the best of them. 
Our Regt. was never in as good health as at the present time since 
leaving Dauphin Island which was about the middle of Dec. it has sent 
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but one man to the General Hosp. with sickness And there are not over 
ten, or fifteen excused daily As for myself I occasionaly have a draw-
back for a day or two, but not enough to interfere at a l l with my duty 
My weight i s now 161 lbs. that i s a gain of about twelve lbs. since I 
l e f t you. 11 Have writen this with a pencil because I hate to s i t on 
the ground with ray portfolio on my knee, and write with a pen This i s 
about the dulest place for news that I was ever i n . Have reed, but 
one letter from you since have been here. Yesterday the flags of the 
fort were at half mast [,] the report i s that a vessel with the 2 1 
Iowa12 on board, have sunk i n coming from N. O. [New Orleans] here, 
Although i t may be only a report [,] May God grant that i s i s for 
i t i s a splendid Regt. 
With love and kises to A l l I remain as ever Your loving Brother 
Carl 
11Carlos W. Colby was s ick with dysentery and wa3 given a fur -
lough to go home i n the middle of September, 1864, and returned to 
duty December 24, 1864, not f u l l y recovered. 
12 The Twenty-first Iowa Infantry Regiment. 
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Letter No. 3 
Barrancas Florida 
March 4th 1865 
My Own Dear Carrie 
I had just thought of writing to your Auntie to day, but as 
lost evenings mail brought me a letter from you enclosed In which 
was the Handkerchief which you dear Mama had procured for me, I sha l l 
take this oppourtunity of Answering yours and let Aunties go u n t i l 
some future time. Dear Carrie you do not know how much surprised, 
and delighted I was at receiving your letter . To see such a nicely 
written letter , without a mistake i n i t , i s enough to delight the 
heart of any loving Uncle, And then to see what improvement you 
have made i n writing since I left home i s quite astonishing. 
The Handkerchief you sent me I sha l l prise highly, as being a 
present from My Own dear Sister Carrie, beside your letter , I also 
13 
received one from your Auntie dated the 12th of last month i n which 
she gives a good account of you, and Marshal, as progressing f inely 
with your studies, of course was not surprised at that, for you 
always was a good g i r l , And would not intentlonly do anything wrong, 
And to learn you lessons was always a delight, 
I was pained to hear that you had suffered so with the Ear Ache 
and also the sickness of your dear l i t t l e Brothers. I hardly know 
what to write about, to interest you, but for the want of anything 
better to write w i l l give a l i t t l e description of how some of the 
Officers have fixxed up Around their tents. A Lt . Colonels Shoulder 
13Probably Sarah, Carlos W. Colby's s i s t e r . 
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Straps consists of two Silver leavs on the strap. Some of the men made 
an imitation of the same, in the sand, in front of Lt. Colonel Vifquains 
tent one night just before dark, The outlines of the leaf was made by 
placing little Snails (that are picked up along the coast) all around 
and filling in the centre with white sand, when it was finished it 
looked quite perfect, but the next morning low, and behold it was all 
spoiled And as every body at first supposed that someone had done it 
on purpose but on a close examination it proved that the Snails were 
alive, and that they had done all the mischief , by moving from their 
proper positions. Dr. Smith has in front of his tent a miniature Fort 
built in the Shape of a Star, it mounts eight Guns which are nothing 
more than Ale bottles, The Parapet is covered with Green moss 
it is built so styleish as to attract the attention of every passer 
by for everything about it is perfect eaven to a small Flag flying 
over it Some of the boys in the Regt. got some red berries and placed 
them on the sand in the Shape of letters, and wrote out the words 
Fort Smith. 
In the 76 Illinois they have a representation of the Eagle made in the 
sand, and the name of the Colonel with the number of the Regt written 
with the red berries, 
In the 24 Indiana nearly every Officer has some ornamental work in 
front of his quarters, such as hearts, diamonds, cannon, morters. 
It is rearly worth ones while to spend an hour in roaming around 
through the different Corps, to see the ornamental works which is 
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equal to any Garden, But enough. Am nearly at the bottom of the page 
so Goodbye Give lots of kises to Marshal and Charlie and lots of 
love to All 
I Am Your loving Uncle 
Carl 
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Letter No. 4 
[No heading or date, pro-
bably Barrancas, Florida, _ 
between March 4 and 10, 1865] 
Dear S a l l i e 
As there i s no d r i l l to day, w i l l have a l i t t l e talk with you, 
When I commenced writing did not think should more than time enough 
to answer Dear Carries letter . 
I t I s now evening and but a l i t t l e while to r o l l c a l l , After 
14 
writing the heading of this was called away to make out a Clothing 
estamate for the Co. [Company G] for this month, After which came 
dinner, then hearing that a boat had arrived at port concluded to 
rove [in] to town, to see what the news was from America or any other 
c i v i l i z e d Country, As this i s one of the out posts and not counted i n 
any enlightened Kingdoms In this way the Afternoon passed away and 
this epistle not finished, but considered myself recompenced for my 
Afternoon loaf, for I procured a N.O. [New Orleans] paper of the 1st 
Inst, i n which was the gratifying news of our troops ocupying 
Charleston and through Rebes ['] source [,] Wilmington also, 
Truly this i s encourageing news, And may God speed the r ight, and 
teach a l l rebels i n Arms, ere i t i s to late, that their Cause i s an 
unholy one, While i n town to day, saw and talked with one of eight 
deserters who l e f t the Rebel ranks two weeks ago at Montgomery, Ala. 
Theirs i s the old Story of dissatisfaction and terrible suffering i n 
the ranks of their army they are hearti ly disgusted with the would be 
14— 
As there i s no heading to this letter , Colby must be referring 
to the salutation and f i r s t two sentences. 
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Counfederacy as they c a l l i t . Well we are making preperatlons for a 
tramp through that portion of the Country so s h a l l probibly have a 
chance to see whether there i s any sympathy for us or not. The old 
1 3 A . C . [Thirteenth Army Corps] been again reorganized with Gen 
[Gordon] Granger15 i n command [,] ours i s the 2nd Div. Comd. by 
Brig. Gen. [Christopher C] Andrews, this with a brigade of Colored 
troops All under the Command of [Major] General [Frederick] Steel [e] 
is to constitute the right wind of the Army, as near as I can 
find out.16 Another detachment of the 13 Corps is to leave Ceder 
point under the charge of the Corps commander, The l e f t wing i s to 
start from Pascagoula under old Grey Hairs as he generally i s called 
[Major General] A. J . Smith, Of course a Soldier i s not expected to 
know much about Mil itary a f f a i r s , but then we can conjecture what i s 
17 
going to transpire And sometimes correctly. So i f there i s any 
r e l i a b i l i t y to be placed i n such reports we sha l l start about the 20th 
of this month. 
We have been having any amount of inspections, Grand Reviews & [etc.,] 
by General's Steel [,] Ashboth [Brigadier General Alexander Asboth]18 15 
The new Thirteenth Army Corps was reorganized February 18, 
1865, Major General Gordon Granger Commanding. 
16Colby's information here i s incorrect. Steele's Command con-
sisted of the Second Division (13th Army Corps), one division of 
Colored troops (Brig. Gen. John P. Hawkins Division) plus one Cavalry 
Brigade (Brigadier General Thomas J . Lucas' Brigade, and after March 
29, 1865, Lucas' command was a Cavalry divis ion). 
17 
Here, however, Colby's conjecture i s incorrect, see Chapter 
IV, text. General Steele i n command of U. S. Forces, The Column 
from Pensacola as of February 28, 1865. 
18 
Commander of the Distr ict of West Florida with Headquarters 
at Barrancas, F la . 
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and Andrews but that Is not worth speaking about for It Is a perfect 
bore( and that you knew before Have had quite a little desertion in 
Co. 6 in the last week Jeremiah Heath who was wounded as a Scout on 
the Atchafalaya [River]19 and was immediately promoted to Corporal 
for bravery has been reduced to the ranks for feigning a parilised 
arm from the effects of his wound. He returned to the Regt. at the 
same time I did and had so completely fooled the Dr.20 as to clear 
himself from duty until the present time, by Carrying his arm still 
and claiming to be unable to bend it. In some way the Dr got wind 
of his playing off, and so called him up to examine him, on the pre-
tence of making out his discharge. After a little Soft Soaping he 
got him to make a full confession of his ability of vising his arm. 
The consequence is that Mr. Heath had to go on duty, and has been 
pretty hard run by the boys of the Company. It is now almost time 
to call the roll, and what an awful scroll I have written do not 
believe I could read it, but circumstances under which it is writen 
must be a partial excuse I am siting on the ground with my Portfolio 
on my knees and most of the time there has been four in the tent 
beside myself [,] All talking and laughing and every half minute 
asking me some questions 
I answered Cousins Lucys letter before I left five mile creek. How 
19 
The Atchafalaya River is located in southeastern Louisiana 
west of Baton Rouge and the Mississippi River. The Regiment was 
active in this area from the middle of September to the middle of 
October, 1864. 
20 
Probably refers to Charles Davis, the Regimental Surgeon 
at this time. 
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i s Henry's s ick horse getting along? And the other Horses how do 
they look? What i s the prospect for Wheat the comeing season? And 
the f ru i t crop Also? Try and get Henry to write Give my Kindest 
regards to Aunt Neipha [?] Henry [,] Dr. Birckrudge wife and 
family 
The drums have commenced to beat so Good night 
Lots of love 
Carl 
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Letter No. 5 
Sixteen Miles from Sea, and Sixteen 
from land 
On the Pensacola and Montgomery R.R. 
March 22, 1865 
Dear S ister , 
The heading of this letter gives you as good a discription 
of this Country as I can give Although I suppose i t must be called 
land, for i t belongs to the U.S. unentered, for no one ever though 
enough of i t to enter i t , and who blames Anybody? I dont, A few 
squatters houses have been buklt along the road, but are now deserted 
Have not seen a l i v i n g pig, cow or dog since leaving Pensacola and 
they say that we are only half way through the Florida f l a t s . We 
l e f t the Coast early Monday morning the 97th [ I l l i n o i s ] and the 24 
Ind. were train guards and assistants i n Case the teams stal led, and 
by the way they done nothing else for there i s no bottom to this 
country as soon as the sod i s cut through [,] so that i t made mules 
of us a l l day but nevertheless we made eleven miles by a l i t t l e after 
dark. Yesterday our Regt, was the second i n l ine marched five miles 
through a drenching rain And went into camp by 8 1/2 A.M. Could go 
no further for the trains could not get through. On the f i r s t days 
march our Division train of 150 waggons broke 13 waggon tongues, and 
two wheels And as for yesterdays march I guess i t was not much 
better for at dusk there had not more than half the train got up. 
Today we are waiting for the Colored Division to pass 
This i s a most delightful day cool and pleasant. 
General Steel [e] i s i n command of the two Divisions i n this 
Expedition. He came up last night, And brought with him A large 
mail. I got one from Lucy's Jamie written at School. He has improved 
a good deal i n writing since he last wrote have written a good long 
letter i n answer to i t this morning, And have written my write out, 
and do not feel i n the humor to write any more. 
This march i s just going to be the cureing of my Dyesentary, 
As I am feeling better every day, In my last I to acknowledge the 
receipt of several Harpers weekly's three I think. 
Am doubtful whether I shal l be able to mail this soon or not. 
No more at presant love and kisses to a l l Ever you loving 
Brother 
Carl 
March 24 This i s a most delightful day cloudy and cool We marched 
10 miles yesterday Are now encamped near Pine Barren creek, which 
i s being pontooned, Have had no opportunity of mailing this as yet, 
Have been Occupying myself this morning i n washing myself and Cloths 
[clothes], B i l l Perrin has just come i n with a splendid Boquet of 
flowers, wish I had an opportunity of sending you one. A l l the 
kinds that I know are the dogwood blossom Red Bud, and violets, The 
green border i s fern, and the leaves from the Spice wood. 
We have none of our comisioned Officers with the Company [,] Lt . 
Laramer [Second Lieutenant George W. Larimer] of C. E in command 
[,] Capt. [Frederick P.] Lewis i s A.A.A.G. [Assistant Acting 
Adjutant General] on Col. Spiceleys [William T. Spicely's] (Comdg. 
the [Second] Brigade [Thirteenth Army Corps]) Staff. Lt. [Charles] 
Davis i n charge of the Ambulance Corps of the Div, And the day 
before we l e f t Pensacola [Second Lieutenent William P.] Hazard21 
21Lieutenant i n Company G, 97th I l l i n o i s Regiment, later cleared 
himself. 
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recd. an order from the War Dept. revoking his Commision. When we 
were at Barrancas the Inspector General made inquiries In regard to 
the number of men i n the Co. at the time of his muster which was only 
82 and 85 i s the minimum for which a Second Lt. could be musyered 
Do not know whether w i l l succeed i n clearing himself or not At 
least he w i l l get an honorable discharge and only the mustering 
officer w i l l be blamed. 
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Letter No. 6 
Hd. Qrs. Co. G 97th I l l s Vol. 
In The Field Near Blakely 
Apr. 8th, 1865 
Dear Dear Sister 
I wrote a few l ines a few evenings since informing you of our 
a r r i v a l at this place, And the commencing of a Siege. The most I 
can now say i s , that we are rapidly approaching their works by en-
trenching. For the last hour there has been one of the heaviest 
bombardment's on our extreme l e f t , Near, or at. Ft . Spanish that I 
ever heard [,] that i s their Main works with a Continuous l ine of 
works to the river above Blakely There i s more or less cannonadeing 
every day, our loss however has been comparatively l i g h t , but three 
men i n the Regt, being wounded by the enemys f i r e Seriously but not 
Morraly Yesterday Adjutant [John R.] Frierson was severely wounded 
by an accidental discharge of a p istol i n the hands of one of the 
Officers [.] the b a l l entering his mouth and passing through so 
as to be cut out at the back of the neck I t i s thought however that 
he w i l l recover. 
Our Div. i s again under marching orders with five days rations 
i n Haversack and fifteen i n waggons. The report i s that i t i s to 
take supplies to Gen [George H] Thomas and we suppose him to be 
near Montgomery 
Had intended to have written a long letter giving a detailed 
account of our march from Pensacola, but my time has been so occupied 
that have rearly had no time, and now have hardly five minutes to 
c a l l my own. 
I t i s getting so dark that i t i s with d i f icu l ty that I can 
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see the l i n e s , so w i l l have to c l o s e f o r the p r e s e n t , for have no 
candle Since have been here have received letters from you and one 
22 
Harpers weekly. In the letter Henry enclosed in yours he asks what 
I think we had better take for the property where the House Stands. 
I think that i f we could get $2,500 dollars [sic] i n cash, or i t s 
equivalent, that i t would be best to s e l l , and pay up Debts, and then 
improve the other property. Wi l l think the matter over more and 
report more fu l ly the next opportunity but I should say s e l l at that 
price Shal l have to write to Marshal some time so now Good Night 
I t i s so dark that I can not see the marks that I make so do not know 
whether you can read i t or not 
Love and Kises to a l l 
Your loving Brother 
Carl 
22 Surname not known. 
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Sunday Noon [Apri l 9, 1865] 
And we have not been relieved Although we are s t i l l expecting i t 
to transpire at Any Minute. 
The heavy fireing that I spoke of i n the other sheet was an 
assalt on Ft . Spanish by our forces. And i t i s now o f f i c i a l l y re -
ported to be in our posesion. Some Say that i t was taken at midnight, 
that the f i r s t assalt was unsuccessful, As to the fact of the case 
am not prepared to say. Our loss most have been heavy for our men 
were three l ines deep. We have always supposed that when Ft . S.— 
[Spanish] f e l l that they could not hold Blakely And the report now 
i s that they are evacuating And with their Gun Boats i n the r iver to 
cover their retreat, we can not do much to oppose or harrass them. 
Our Gun Boats have not as yet got up to be of any assistance for the 
Channel of the river i s l i t e r a l y f u l l of Torpedoes, which could not 
23 
be removed as long as they were under the cover of their Batteries. 
But now they are being speedily removed by Prisoners Captured last 
night. The Number reported Captured faires from two, to three 
thousand. As for getting any thing rel iable i t i s utterly impossible 
as there are so many rumors affloat. 
I f I am not disturbed before finishing w i l l coppy my notes 
entered i n a Diary. Before going further w i l l t e l l you how i t i s 
customary for an Army to march. The Cavalry always [(usually)] 
take[s] the lead, and i f any enemy [is] i n the rear, also the rear i s 
protected by them. With two or more Div. of Inft . [infantry] the 
23 
These protective batteries were probably those at Fort Huger 
and Fort Tracy at the fork of the Apalachee and Blakely Rivers. 
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Advance Div. to day takes the rear to morrow And the same with Brig's 
[Brigades] and Regt.'s, the advance Brig. takes the rear of i t s Div. 
And the Regt. of i t s Brig. The last Brig. [is] usually guarding the 
Div. tra in, one Regt just i n the advance, one behind and the others 
as flankers, or i f not practable to t r a v i l [travel] beside the waggons 
each Regt. i s assigned so many waggons and marches between them. My 
notes commences on leaving Pensacola [, Florida] March 20th. 
[March 2oth] Left Pensacola early this morning for a wild Goose 
chase through the Country, and for my part have but l i t t l e confidence 
of success. Our force consists of two Brigades of the 13 A.C. [,] 
And one Div. of three Brig, of Colored I n f t . [,] and three Regts 
of Cav., then there are four more Cav. Rgt [s.] [that have] gone up 
the Bay to embark at Milton making i n A l l a force of about fifteen 
thousand men With five days Rations i n Haversack and six on the waggons. 
Our Regt. was on train guard, which consists of one hundred f i f t y 
waggons. The country i s [so] low [,] flat [,] and Sandy [,] 
the waggons would mire down, so that we had to put our Shoulders 
to the wheel frequently to help them out, After making eleven miles 
we were tired enough to go into Camp 
[March 21st] Was again on the road by day l ight Marched s ix miles 
through a drenching rain and went i n to camp by 8 A.M. As there had 
been a heavy f a l l of ra in a l l night i t was utterly impossible for the 
waggons to get through. The Country a l i t t l e more ro l l ing, but a 
treacherous quick sand l i e s under the sod. 
[March 22nd] Our Div. l a i d in Camp to let the Colored troops pass. 
Weather clear and cool. 
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[March] 23rd. took up our l ine of March at 10 1/2 A.M. Our Regt [was] 
just i n the advance of the train [,] march ten miles, had to make 
several Stops to Corduroy the worst places i n the roads, Arrived i n 
Camp by dark The Country more h i l l y , with occasional signs of c i v i -
l i zat ion. The Change i n the Scenery from barren Pines to the more en-
livening foliage of the Oak, Ash, and the blossoms of Peach, Plumb, 
Cherry [,] Red bud and dog wood i s an agreeable one, One great 
blessing we have i s good water and plenty of i t . 
[March] 24th. Laid i n Camp u n t i l about 5 P.M. when we moved our Camp 
across Pine barren Creek, Although the deepest of it had been pon-
tooned yet we had to wade through the water nearly waist deep 
[March] 25th. Was on the road by a l i t t l e after day l i g h t . Marched 
twenty miles and went into Camp near Escambia r iver a l i t t l e before 
dark. We went into Camp by 1 P.M. but had hardly got our Knapsacks 
off, when the order came to f a l l i n as we were wanted to the front. 
By a flank movement our Col. got the 97 [th I l l i n o i s ] in the advance 
and for s ix miles we made a forced march making but one halt of about 
five minutes. The Cav. [was] fight [ing] ahead but we could not get 
up [in time] to [assist] them, they done some good fighting [,] 
Capturing 1 General (mortaly wounded)24 1 Col. 1 Maj. and 150 men2-5 
T h e [ y ] Showe[d] signs of hard fighting and a hasty retreat on the 
24 
Brigadier General James H. Clanton, C.S.A. , was thought at 
f i r s t to be mortally wounded, but recovered. 
25 
Brigadier General T. S. Lucas, commanding the Separate 
Cavalry Brigade, l i s t s the captured as "General C l a n t o n - - , 18 
other off icers, and 101 enlisted men." O f f i c i a l Records, Ser. L, 
XLIX, pt. 2, p. 119. 
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part of the Rebs, it [the area] being strewn with Knapsacks, Guns and 
any and every thing that would impede their flight 
[March] 26th. The Inft of the 2nd Brig crossed the river as soon as 
they could see, and made a forced march to Pollard, a small town at 
the junction of the Montgomery and Mobile with the Blakely and Pollard 
R.R. [Mobile and Great Northern and the Alabama and Florida Railroads] 
where we had heard there was a small rebel force, By some means our 
Col. always succeeds in getting the 97th in the Advance when there is 
a prospect of a fight. The town was surrounded and the whole force 
advanced on it at once, but there was nary Reb there, hearing of our 
advance they had skedadeled, After destroying the R.R. track for some 
distance and burning several public buildings we returned to our 
Division. In the Rebels retreat they had destroyed the main road 
bridge over the river so that we had to cross on the stringers of the 
R.R. Bridge and only footmen could pass. One peculiarity of this 
country is that the ground is sollider [more solid] in the bottoms than 
on the tops of the hills. Adter rising an elevation of an hundred 
feet, water can be found within two or three feet of the surface, and 
in many places flows over the top of the ground. 
[March] 27th. We have now changed our direction and are marching 
towards Blakely Our Regt is train guard It rained all day [,] 
did not get into Camp until near mid night, and then made only about 
twelve miles. We are now reduced to half rations considerable being 
thrown away from waggons that broke down The slowness of our move-
ments, and Prisoners being fed made it necessary to economise 
[March] 28th. The 97 in the Advance of the Div. marched twelve miles 
and went into Camp early 
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[March] 29th. Marched ten Miles [,] was rear guard to the train 
[,] passed through one swamp that had to be Corduroyed for three 
miles [,] during the day over five miles of corduroy had to be 
made [it] commenced raining at noon and rained all the After noon 
and at night it fell in torrents completely flooding the camp. Nelson 
Godwin [Goodwin] of Co. G. died from the effects of an accidental 
wound received yesterday from the falling of a tree 
[March] 50th. Marched about nine miles nearly all the way through 
swamps consequently most of the road had to be corduroyed [,] have 
worked harder and feel more tired than any night of the march. Are 
now reduced to one third rations and with what we can forage from the 
Country which is precious little for it is nearly all a barren 
wilderness 
[March] 51st. Marched eighteen and a half miles over a rough broken 
country, it is a little more inhabited, so that our mess, [Orville] 
Paddock [Jr.] and [Wiilliam D.] Perrin succeeded in getting some corn 
and a Turkey. At night we encamped on the grounds of a beautiful 
plantation near Stockton. The woman of the House was very bitter in 
her denunciation against the Yanks which caused a guard to be placed 
over the house to keep the boys from burning it, but it was of no use, 
for we had not got out of sight in the morning before it was in flames. 
April 1st. Made ten miles some skirmishing along toward night by 
the Cav. and Negroes Do not feel very well as have caught a severe 
cold and it has settled in my bones 
[April] 2. Was on the road before day light heard heavy cannonading 
in the advance soon after starting Made a March of seven miles in a 
very short space of time, and came upon the enemy in force within 
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three miles of Blakely. Hade several countermarches and flank move-
ments to get In our proper position. Soon after dark we advanced 
toward the works driving i n their outer Pickets. A heavy f i r e was 
kept up a l l night doing us no damage however. 
[April] 3rd. Early i n the Morning we retired to an adjacent hollow 
to cover us from the enemys f i re [,] our position being too much 
exposed. A heavy cannonading was kept up a l l day by the Rebs. 
wounding one man i n the 97. 
[April] 4. Rather quiet during the day u n t i l 5 P.M. when our Batteries 
opened a t e r r i f i c bombardment. On Ft . Spanish the extreme right of 
the Rebel works on the Mobile Bay. Heretofore they [the Confederates 
(probably) at Spanish Fort] have had i t a l l their own way and done a l l 
the f i re ing, so I think they were a l i t t l e surprised to find us open 
a l l at once with f i f t y Guns, and this i s only a foretast[e] of what i s 
to come 
[April] 5th. Nothing of interest transpiring along our l ines Our 
large Fatigue parties are gradualy nearing their works by entrenching 
under the cover of darkness the pits are dug deep and wide enough to 
hide a man and then finished by day l ight 
[April] 6th. The Regt, was arroused at about 3 A.M. this morning as 
there was a heavy f i r i n g on our l e f t . I t proved to be a l i t t l e Sortie 
of the enemy to drive i n the Skirmishers of the 3 [rd] Brigade, but they 
found us too much for them and had to ret ire considerably discomforted. 
At about 8 A.M. one of our batteries opened on a flag that they had on 
their works This caused a spir ited cannonading for an hour 
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[April] 7th. I t rained nearly a l l day. There was about an hours 
heavy f i r i n g i n the morning Then a l l was comparatively quiet two men 
from the Rgt were wounded by their shel ls . Adjutant Frierson was 
wounded by an accidental discharge of a pistol i n the hands of one of 
the Officers 
[April] 8th. Weather cloudy with a l i t t l e f a l l of ra in just before 
dark there was one of the heaviest bombardments at Ft . Spanish that I 
ever heard 
And So ends the Diary up to date, you see I was rather dispondent when 
we f i r s t started out [,] one reason of i t was because I did not l i k e 
Gen. Andrews. I have since formed a l i t t l e better opinion of him, 
believe he i s brave, and cautious, but altogether to sty l i sh , and not 
any to much capasity. He i s a great favorate of Gen Steeles however. 
That [This] sheet of letter paper was the cleanest I have, and to use 
wet paper i t takes so much. 
I f you do not hear from me for a few weeks do not feel worried for a 
march i s just the thing for me. Have never f e l t better since being 
i n the Service that at the present time Kiss a l l the youngsters for 
their loving Uncle 
Carl 
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Letter No. 7 
In Hosp. Near Blakly 
Apr i l 10/65 
Dear Sister 
I wrote you a long letter yesterday My expectations and plans 
that I l a i d down i n that were flustrated A few minutes after the 
letter had been mailed, by an order to f a l l i n , then I saw that there 
was a Charge to be made. We Charged their works and took them although 
I did not get in side their works, for I was struck by a musket b a l l i n 
the Calf of the leg when within about twenty steps of their works, 
the b a l l passing through the fleshy part of the leg, making as clean 
a wound as could possibly be. i t was considerable painful last night 
but to day i t i s quite easy Our Regt ['s] loss was quite heavy [,] 
nearly one third of the Div loss We having f i f t y odd k i l l e d and 
wounded Our Co David Stanton Ki l led and seven wounded John Wyant 
probably mortaly wounded [died Apr i l 1 1 , 1865] John or Joseph Clark 
[,] Henry and Thomas Doyle [,] Chas John and Frank Depuy [,] 
A l l wounded but not daingerous [dangerously] Capt [Samuel R. Howard] 
and S. L. Howard both wounded but not serious that i s a l l I believe 
from the neighborhood. The 97 had four Capts and one Lt. wounded. 
Do not feel worried for my wound i s not at a l l serious one I under-
stand that we are to be sent to N.O. w i l l write again i n a day or 
two Love to A l l 
Carl 
With the exception of Stanton none of my most Intimate friends were 
Struck 
The 97 has covered herself with Glory 
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Letter No. 8 
Sedgwick U.S. Gen Hosp. Ward 10 N.O. 
[New Orleans, Louisiana] 
Dear S a l l i e 
This i s a very warm day so much so that a sheet i s almost a 
burden on me. Have just finished my dinner, had Bean Soup, Boiled 
Beef, a potatoe, and a s l i c e of Bread. For breakfast I had potatoe 
Stew, Bread and Coffee, for supper i t w i l l be Bread, Rice and Tea, 
with Molasses or Apple Sauce. The quality i s very good, and well 
cooked but the quantity i s a l i t t l e small for a S l ight ly wounded man, 
who has an egredious [egregious] apetite. My wound i s getting along 
f inely , i t i s discharging profusely, and pains me but very l i t t l e . 
As yet can not bear any weight on my foot, but can move myself i n 
bed without pain My greatest suffering a l l the time has not been the 
pain from my wound, but to see the agonies of those who have been 
terr ibly mangled and cut to pieces, their groans and moans i s most 
heart rending. 
I suppose i f I do not give a f u l l account of the f ight, that you 
w i l l give me a scolding, and as I should not l i k e to be scolded think 
I had better report to the best of my a b i l i t y . 
Well at about 5 P.M. on the 9 Inst the order came to f a l l i n . 
And then everyone knew that there was a charge to be made, from the 
appearances of things I had made up my mind that such was to be the 
case soon after dinner We made our way to our advance r i f l e p i t s , 
which i s a good five hundred yards distant from the rebel works, while 
we were forming i n the pits Capt. [James W.] Wisner of Co D stept upon 
the bank i n the rear of the pits and was walking along close by where 
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I stood when he steped on a torpedo which exploded completely severing 
his right leg from his body at the knee. The l ines stood four deep i n 
the p i ts , the 24 Ind. i n the advance on the right of our Brig supported 
by the 76th Ill. and we i n the advance on the l e f t supported by the 69 
Ind. The 83 Ohio was i n the advance on the right of the 3 Brig resting 
on our l e f t . The Order was given to charge the advance immediately 
started with a whoop and y e l l Our rout[e] lay for the f i r s t hundred 
yards over the brow of a h i l l exposed to a raking f i r e from two forts, 
with an abatis work of bush and fal len timber which for a man without 
any oposition was hard to get through, on this h i l l we suffered the 
most but no man but what was wounded faltered, then we had to cross a 
valley of fal len and tangled timber every man doing his best, f i r ing 
while on the run and then droping behind a stump or log to reload At 
a distance of f i f t y yeards there was another abatis more d i f f i c u l t 
than the f i r s t , as I was climbing through i t I saw the flash of a 
canon on my right which I knew was belching forth grape, and canister, 
but I was in a tangled mass of limbs and could not f a l l , i t proved 
to be loaded with grape one struck my gun and shattered i t i n my 
hand Another passed through my blouse and the third struck the sole 
of my boot nearly cutting i t through but not a single one touched me. 
I then advanced fifteen or twenty steps when I saw a man f a l l a l i t t l e 
to my l e f t and I had started for his gun when a musket b a l l took me 
i n the leg. At f i r s t I thought i t was a spent b a l l and was going on 
but had proceeded but a few steps when I f e l l and could go no farther 
[,] then on examination I found the b a l l had passed clear through 
the fleshy part of the leg and was bleeding profusely. After creeping 
back to a l i t t l e less exposed position I l a i d and watched the l ines as 
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they advanced on top of the parapets. I claim that our Colors was 
second to none i n being planted on the parapets. As far as I could 
see and that was through two Brigades. I have sent you a N.O. paper 
of the 10 with an art ic le on the taking of the place, the writer gives 
[us] no credit whatever, but speaks i n the highest praise of other 
Rgts i n the Div. One thing i s certain we lost heavier than any other 
26 according to our numbers, We loosing sixty two I think, out of less 
than four hundred i n the charge. The loss from our whole Div. was only 
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about two hundred. Where we charged was the most exposed position 
and had more torpedoes than any other place. [I] immediately i n front 
of where Capt W — was blown up fifteen or twenty large torpedoes have 
been dug up, and that i s exactly where I came out of our works. I was 
lucky enough to escape but poor John Wyant steped on one and exploded 
i t tearing of[f] one leg and badly shatering the other. David Stanton 
was shot dead on the f i e l d with the b a l l str ik ing him In the eye. 
Wyant l ived but two days. Charlie Johnson and my se l f are the only 
ones that are at this Hosp, he i s wounded i n the neck but i s doing 
well. Patrick Finn and John [G.] Clark [,] Thos. and Henry Doyle 28 
and Frank Depuy were a l l s l ight ly wounded but l e f t In the f i e l d Hosp 
Edward [Edwin D.] Lowe Our color bearer was shot through the bowels, 
after planting the colors on their works A braver lad never l ived 
he belonged to Co K was from Jerseyvi l le After he was shot he sent 
26 
The Ninty-seventh I l l i n o i s Volunteer Regiment's losses i n the 
assault as given i n Colonel Vifquain' O f f i c i a l Report, was sixty one. 
27 
Andrews' div is ion's losses was 235 men k i l l e d or wounded i n 
the assault. 
28 
A l l of these were members of Company Q from Colby's home town 
of Alton, I l l i n o i s . 
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his compliments to the Colonel, And said he had put the colors on their 
works. I was helped off the f i e l d by two boys from the 15 Mass 
[Massachusetts] Batty, I would not let the stretcher bearers take me 
for there were so many worse wounded, got to the Div. Hosp. and had my 
29 
wound dressed by about nine Oclock Jimmie Rowe was there on duty 
he was very kind to me, l a i d at the Div. Hosp u n t i l l two or three 
oclock of the 11th when we took the Ambulances for the Steamer landing 
twelve miles distant. Arrived at the landing about 10 P.M. where we 
were loaded on a l ight draft boat to convey us to deep water, there to 
be changed to a Gulf Steamer to come to the C ity . I t was after dark 
on the night of the 13[th of April] when we arrived here, and it took 
a l l night to unload the boat. The Buffering of the poor fellows was 
terr ible for the Gulf was rough, and the accomodations poor, most of 
them having to lay below where i t would suffocate a man, or else on 
deck i n the hot Sun. Have given as minute detai ls as my memory would 
permit. 
Although I am now s l i g h t l y wounded yet I consider myself a better man, 
than a l i t t l e over three months ago when I joined the Regt, for I am 
once more i n t i r e l y free from that Disease that troubled me so long 30 
I can get a furlough of s ixty days but do not think I s h a l l take I t 
Wish I could consult you a l i t t l e about the matter 
29 
One of the Regimental Hospital Stewards, later to become Carlos 
W. Colby's brother-in-law. 
30 By not taking the furlough he would be discharged that much 
sooner. 
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A few days previous to the fight B i l l y Spears and B i l l y Brooks that used 
to l i v e at M Spauldings came to see me from the 122 Ills, the next day 
I went over to their Regt, and saw them and Charlie Brown and two of 
the Deleplain boys. B i l l y Howell was wounded at Nashville B i l l y 
Spears i s the same l i t t l e bow leged boy as of old but they say that he 
has good pluck. They wished to be remembered to you. [Not signed] 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNION FORCES, COMMANDED BY MAJOR 
GENERAL EDWARD R.S. CANBY, OPERATING AGAINST MOBILE, 
ALABAMA, MARCH 17 TO APRIL 12 , 18651 
[HEADQUARTERS] 
Engineer Brigade 
96th U.S. Colored Troops, Col. John C. Cobb 
97th U.S. Colored Troops: 
Lieut. Col. George A. Harmount 
Col. George D. Robinson 
1st Company of Pontoniers, Capt. John J . Smith 
Siege Train 
Brig. Gen. James Totten 
1st Indiana Heavy A r t i l l e r y , Companies B,C,H,I,K ,L , and M, 
Col. Benjamin F. Hays 
New York Light A r t i l l e r y , 18th Battery, Capt. Albert G. Mack 
THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS 
Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger 
Mortar Batteries 
6th Michigan Heavy A r t i l l e r y , Company A, Capt. Seldon F. Craig 
6th Michigan Heavy A r t i l l e r y , Company K, Lieut. Charles W. Wood 
FIRST DIVISION 
[transferred to General Steele' command, Apr i l 1 , 1865] 
Brig. Gen. James C. Veatch 
F i r s t Brigade 
Brig. Gen. James R. Slack 
99th I l l i n o i s (five companies), Lieut. Col. Asa C. Matthews 
47th Indiana, Lieut. Col. John A. McLaughlin 
21st Iowa, Lieut. Col. Salue G. Van Anda 
29th Wisconsin, Lieut. Col. Bradford Hancock 
1 O f f i c i a l Record. op. c i t . , Ser. I , Vol. XLIX, pt. 1 , pp. 105-109. 
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Second Brigade 
Brig. Gen. E l las S. Dennis 
8th I l l i n o i s , Col. Joshiah A. Sheetz 
11th I l l i n o i s , Col. James Coates 
46th I l l i n o i s , Col. Benjamin Dornblaser 
Third Brigade 
Lieut. Col. William B. Kinsey 
29th I l l i n o i s , Lieut. Col. John A. Cal l icott 
30th Missouri (four companies), Lieut. Col. William T. Wilkinson 
161st New York, Maj. W i l l i s Craig 
23rd Wisconsin, Maj. Joseph E. Greene 
A r t i l l e r y 
Capt. George E. Fox 
Massachusetts Light, 4th Battery (D), Lieut. George W. Taylor 
Massachusetts Light, 7th Battery (G), Capt. Newman W. Storer 
Cavalry 
4th Tennessee, Lieut. Col. Jacob M. Thornburgh [Used as escort for 
F i r s t Division when transferred to Steele's command, Apr i l 2 , 1865] 
BERTRAM'S BRIGADE 
[F i rst Brigade, Second Division, Thirteenth Army Corps] 
Col. Henry Bertram 
94 I l l i n o i s , Col. John McNults 
19th Iowa, Lieut. Col. John Bruce 
23rd Iowa, Col. Samuel L. Glasgow 
20th Wisconsin, Lieut. Col. Henry A. Starr 
1st Missouri Light A r t i l l e r y , Battery F . , Capt. Joseph Foust 
THIRD DIVISION 
Brig. Gen. William P. Benton 
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F i r s t Brigade 
Col. David P. Grier 
28th I l l i n o i s , Lieut. Col. Richard Ritter, Maj. Hinman Rhodes 
77th I l l i n o i s , Lieut Col. John B. Reid 
96th Ohio (five companies) Lieut. Col. Albert H. Brown 
35th Wisconsin, Col. Henry Orff 
Second Brigade 
Col. Henry H. Day 
91st I l l i n o i s , Lieut. Col. George A. Day 
50th Indiana (five companies) Lieut. Col. Samuel T. Wells 
29th Iowa, Col. Thomas H. Benton, Jr. 
7th Vermont, Col. William C. Holbrook 
Third Brigade 
Col. Conrad Krez 
33rd Iowa, Col. Cyrus H. Mackey 
77th Ohio, Lieut. Col. William E. Stevens 
27th Wisconsin, Capt. Charles M. Cunningham 
28th Wisconsin, Lieut. Col. Edmund B. Gray 
A r t i l l e r y 
New York Light, 21st Battery, Capt. James Barnes 
New York Light, 26th Battery, Lieut. Adam Seattle 
SIXTEENTH ARMY CORPS 
Maj. Gen. Andrew J . Smith 
Pontoniers 
114th I l l i n o i s , Maj. John M. Johnson 
FIRST DIVISION 
Brig. Gen. John McArthur 
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First Brigade 
Col. William L. McMillen 
33rd Illinois, Col. Charles E. Lippincott 
26th Indiana, Col. John G. Clark 
93rd Indiana, Col. DeWitt C. Thomas 
10th Minnesota, Lieut. Col. Samuel P. Jennison 
72nd Ohio, Lieut. Col. Charles G. Eaton 
95th Ohio, Lieut. Col. Jefferson Brumback 
Second Brigade 
Col. Lucius F. Hubbard 
47th Illinois, Maj. Edward Bonham, Col. David W. Magee 
5th Minnesota, Lieut. Col. William B. Gere 
9th Minnesota, Col. Josiah F. March 
11th Missouri, Maj. Modesta J. Green 
8th Wisconsin, Lieut. Col. William B. Britton 
Third Brigade 
Col. William R. Marshall 
12th Iowa, Maj. Samuel G. Knee 
35th Iowa, Lieut. Col. William B. Keeler 
7th Minnesota, Lieut. Col. George Bradley 
33rd Missouri, Lieut. Col. William E. Heath 
Artillery 
Indiana Light, 3rd Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Ginn 
Iowa Light, 2nd Battery, Capt. Joseph K. Reed 
SECOND DIVISION 
[Transferred to General Steele's command, April 2, 1865] 
Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard 
First Brigade 
Col. John I. Rinaker 
119th Illinois, Col. Thomas Kinney 
122nd Illinois, Lieut. Col. James F. Drish, Maj. James F. Chapman 
89th Indiana, Lieut. Col. Hervey Craven 
21st Missouri, Capt. Charles W. Tracy 
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Second Brigade 
Brig. Gen. James I . Gilbert 
117th I l l i n o i s , Col. Risdon M. Moore 
27th Iowa, Maj. George W. Howard 
J2nd Iowa, Lieut. Col. Gustavus A. Eberhart 
10th Kansas (four companies), Lieut. Col. Charles S. H i l l s 
6th Minnesota, Lieut. Col. Hiram P. Grant 
Third Brigade 
Col. Charles L. Harris 
58th I l l i n o i s (four companies), Capt. John Murphy 
52nd Indiana, Lieut. Col. Zalmon S. Main 
34th New Jersey, Col. William Hudson Lawrence 
178th New York, Lieut. Col. John B. Gandolfo 
11th Wisconsin, Maj. Jesse S. Mil ler 
THIRD DIVISION 
Brig. Gen. Eugene A. Carr 
F i r s t Brigade 
Col. Jonathan B. Moore 
72nd I l l i n o i s , Lieut. Col. Joseph Stockton 
95th I l l i n o i s , Col. Leander Blanden 
44th Missouri, Capt. Frank G. Hopkins 
33rd Wisconsin, Lieut. Col. Horation H. Virgin 
Second Brigade 
Col. Lyman M. Ward 
40th Missouri, Col. Samuel A. Holmes 
49th Missouri, Col. David P. Dyer 
14th Wisconsin, Maj. Eddy F. Ferr is 
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Third Brigade 
Col. James L. Geddes 
8lst I l l i n o i s , Lieut. Col. Andre. W. Rogers 
lO8th I l l i n o i s , Col. Charles Turner 
124th I l l i n o i s , Bvt. Col. John H. Howe 
8th Iowa, Lieut. Col. William B. Be l l 
A r t i l l e r y Brigade 
Capt. John W. Lowell 
I l l i n o i s Light, Cogswell's Battery, Lieut. William B. Elting 
2nd I l l i n o i s Light, Battery G, Lieut. Perry Wilch 
Indiana Light, 1st Battery, Capt. Lawrence Jacoby 
Indiana Light, 14th Battery, Capt. Francis W. Morse 
Ohio Light, 17th Battery, Capt. Charles S. Rice 
CAVALRY 
F i r s t Division 
Brig. Gen. Joseph Knipe 
F i r s t Brigade 
Col. Joseph Karge 
12th Indiana, Maj. William H. Calkins 
2nd New Jersey, Lieut. Col. P. Jones Yorke 
4th Wisconsin, Col. Webster P. Moore 
Second Brigade 
Col. Gilbert M.L. Johnson 
10th Indiana, Maj. George R. Swallow 
13th Indiana, Lieut. Col. William T. Pepper 
4th Tennessee, Lieut. Col. Jacob M. Thornburgh 
A r t i l l e r y 
Ohio Light, 14th Battery, Capt. William C. Myers 
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COLUMN FROM PENSACOLA BAY, FLORIDA 
Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele 
FIRST DIVISION 
Brig. Gen. John P. Hawkins 
F i r s t Brigade 
Brig. Gen. William A. Pi le 
73rd U.S. Colored Troops, Col. Henry C. Merriam 
82nd U.S. Colored Troops, Col. Ladislas L. Zulavsky 
86th U.S, Colored Troops, Lieut. Col. George E. Yarrington 
Second Brigade 
Col. Hiram Scofield 
47th U.S. Colored Troops, Lieut. Col. Ferdinand S. Peebles 
50th U.S. Colored Troops, Col. Charles A. Gi lchr ist 
51st U.S. Colored Troops, Col. A. Watson Webber 
Third Brigade 
Col. Charles W. Drew 
48th U.S. Colored Troops, Col. Frederick M. Crandel 
68th U.S. Colored Troops, Col. J . Blackburn Jones, Lieut. Col. 
Daniel Densmore 76th U.S. Colored Troops, Maj. William E. Nye 
SECOND DIVISION 
[Detached from the Thirteenth Army Corps] 
Brig. Gen. Christopher C. Andrews 
Second Brigade 
Col. William T. Spicely 
76th I l l i n o i s , Lieut. Col. Charles C. Jones, Col. Samuel T. Busey 
97th I l l i n o i s , Lieut. Col. Francis A. Sears 
24th Indiana 69th Indiana (four companies), Lieut. Col. Oran Perry, 
Capt. Lewis K. Harris 
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Third Brigade 
Col. Frederick W. Moore 
37th Illinois, Col. Charles Black 
20th Iowa, Lieut. Col. Joseph B. Leake 
24th Iowa, Lieut. Col. George W. Clark 
83rd Ohio, Lieut. Col. William H. Baldwin 
114th Ohio, Col. John H. Kelly 
Artillery 
Connecticut Light, 2nd Battery, Capt. Walter S. Hotchkiss 
Massachusetts Light, 15th Battery, Lieut. Albert Rowse 
CAVALRY 
LUCAS' DIVISION 
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Lucas 
First Brigade 
Col. Morgan H. Chrysler 
1st Louisiana, Lieut. Col. Algernon S. Badger 
31st Massachusetts (mounted infantry), Lieut. Col. Edward P. Nettleton 
2nd New York Veteran, Col. Morgan H. Chrysler, Lieut. Col. Asa L. Gurney 
Second Brigade 
Lieut. Col. Andrew B. Spurling 
1st Florida, Capt. Francis Lyons 
2nd Illinois, Maj. Franklin Moore 
2nd Maine, Maj. Charles A. Miller 
Artillery 
Massachusetts Light, 2nd Battery (B), Capt. William Marland 
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The Mobile Campaign was one of the last campaigns of any size 
undertaken by the Union army during the Civil War. The glory of the 
success of the Union forces along the eastern coast of the Confederacy 
during the months of March and early part of April, 1865, has, for 
nearly one hundred years, overshadowed this important campaign embarked 
upon by over forty thousand Union soldiers in the Mobile area. It is 
the purpose, therefore of this thesis to focus attention upon this 
nearly forgotten campaign, to give a general account of the events 
which preceded the Union Army's operations in the area around Mobile 
Bay, and to provide a narrative of the Federal Army's activities in the 
Mobile Campaign with a detailed emphasis on the operations of General 
Frederick Steele's force. 
This account of the Mobile Campaign, for the most part, follows a 
chronological order. Because there is so little known and written 
about this Campaign, considerable space has been devoted to the general 
background leading up to this extensive military movement. The limiting 
factor of space has permitted the author to describe only briefly the 
activities of the Union Cavalry and the force under the direct command 
of General S. R. S. Canby. Where possible, in the narration of General 
Steele's operations, the description as found in the letters written by 
Carlos W. Colby, late of the Ninety-Seventh Illinois Volunteer Infantry 
Regiment was used to give the common soldier's outlook during the 
operations. 
In digest form this thesis includes the following: After the intro-
duction there is a discussion of the general Union strategy in the "west" 
from 1863 to 1865 and the Naval Battle of Mobile Bay in 1864. Following 
the naval activities which preceded those of the army, a description is 
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given of the concentration of Union forces and the camp life at 
Barrancas, Florida. With the Union Army concentrated, the Northern 
Campaign strategy is discussed with a description of the opposing 
Confederate forces. The first action of the Union troops is briefly 
related next. This was the operation of General Canby's force and the 
assault by this portion of the Union army in the Mobile Campaign upon 
the Confederate fortifications around the Old Spanish Fort on the 
eastern shore of Mobile Bay. The remaining two thirds of this thesis 
is concerned with the activities of General Steele's force. First is a 
narration of his troops' march from Pensacola, Florida, northward 
through the Florida flats into southern Alabama and then westward to 
north of the city of Mobile where his column turned south to the 
Confederate defenses around the town of Blakely, Alabama, located almost 
due east of Mobile. The second portion of General Steele's Expedition 
is concerned with the investment, siege and assault of these Confederate 
works at Blakely. For the interest and benefit of the readers, follow-
ing the observations and conclusions concerning the Mobile Campaign in 
general and Steele's force in particular, are two appendices. Appendix 
I contains the letters of Carlos W. Colby exactly as they were written, 
from which edited excerpts were used in the narration of General Steele's 
expedition. Appendix II includes the Organisation of Union Forces in 
Operation Against Mobile, Alabama, March 17 to April 12, 1865. 
Based upon the Official Records and using the vivid descriptions 
given in the Colby letters and in C. C. Andrews' book, History of the 
Campaign of Mobile, written in 1867, this study for the first time pre-
sents the whole story of the Union forces in the Mobile Campaign. From 
relating the reasons why this campaign against the area around Mobile 
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Bay was delayed from 1863 to 1865, through, the Naval Battle of Mobile 
Bay, to the Federal Army's activities on the eastern side of Mobile 
Bay which included the last large assault of the Civil War made against 
Confederate fortifications by the Union troops, this study emphasizes 
the almost forgotten operations of the Union Army in the Mobile 
Campaign, especially the important part played by General Frederick 
Steele's expedition. 
